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ABSTRACT

The document contains the texts of 13 presentations made at the 25th annual meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society in December, 1976. Topics include Rationality and Public Education; Education for Womanhood; Alternative Learning and Alternative Assessment; Man, Nature, and Social Management; The Public School and Its Moral Authority; and The Integration of Cognitive and Affective Dimensions of Learning: An Analysis from the Perspective of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. Additional papers explore cultural pluralism in relation to the American dream, dangers of overemphasis on equality in education, and a suggested framework within which to examine controversial educational issues. Three appendices list current officers of the Society, the history of previous annual meetings and officers, and a program of the 25th annual meeting. (AV)

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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 1976-1977

EDITOR:

JAMES JOHN JELINEK
Professor of Education
Arizona State University
Tempe, Arizona 85281



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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY IN SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA,
DECEMBER 3-5, 1976.

JAMES JOHN JELINEK,
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
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J. J. J.

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CHAPTER 1.

RATIONALITY AND PUBLIC EDUCATION.

JERROLD R. COOMBS.

For many years now it has been fashionable to proclaim that the public school movement in America is dead, that there is no longer a significant body of politicians and educators promoting and defending public schools. Now it appears that attacks on public schooling have achieved such proportions that it makes sense to speak of an anti-public school movement. Those disaffected with public schools charge them with a number of grave shortcomings. Among the most significant of these charges are the following: (a) Public school systems are too bureaucratic and unresponsive to the needs of local communities. (b) Whether by design or not, the public schools serve as a means for keeping the dominant socio-economic classes in power. (c) Public schools are racist and discriminatory. (d) Public schools fail to promote equal opportunity.

The cures suggested for these ills are diverse. Some, like Illich, advocate the abolition of schools altogether. Others, including some "revisionist" historians, argue for limiting the mission of public schools to teaching the three R's. A third suggestion is that public funds be allocated directly to parents who could then choose the school which their child would attend. Finally, there are those such as Jenks who advocate reduced concern for public schooling because of its marginal significance in promoting equality. His view is that we be chiefly concerned with making schools happy places to be.

In several recent articles Freeman Butts has attempted to stem the tide of anti-public school sentiment. He argues that the opponents of public schools have mistaken ideas of the primary purpose of public schooling, and it is this which leads to their attacks. Rather than abandoning public schooling, we should revitalize it in such a way as to achieve its primary goal. Butts expresses this goal as follows: "What the schools should do above all is to try to build positive commitments in thought and action to the democratic values of the liberal political community and to the liberal political processes of the democratic constitutional order."

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I have a great deal of sympathy with Butts' position, for I count myself a defender of public schooling and of democracy. Still, I do not think that his line of argument is adequate. The basic difficulty is that Butts, as well as those he is opposing, takes what I shall call the instrumental view of public schooling. In this view, schooling is an instrument for giving students certain predetermined beliefs, commitments, abilities and dispositions. And these beliefs, commitments and the like are themselves seen as instrumental to bringing about a desirable social end such as equality of opportunity or to bringing about social benefits for the students.

Jenks obviously takes an instrumental view of public schooling. Why else would his finding that public schools do not promote equal opportunity lead him to dismiss public schools as being not very important? It is because he sees schooling as an instrument for securing social goods and political ends that others have argued for schemes to make public funds available to private schools or directly to parents. This allows parents to choose schools which promote the individual and social ends they desire. Illich and others argue for the abolition of schools precisely because they view public schooling as an instrument by which the dominant classes maintain their power. Butts takes the position that public schools should be instruments for building commitment to democratic values.

Arguments concerning the individual and social ends that public schools should promote have a long history. Sometimes they appear in the guise of disputes concerning who should control the schools, that is, who shall determine the aims of public schools. The current round of attacks on public schooling is one more indication of our inability to resolve this question. So long as we are unable to resolve this question, and so long as we take an instrumental view of public schooling, we will be unable to justify satisfactorily a system of public schools.

I want to argue that the grounds on which we should attempt to justify a system of public schooling is that such a system provides the best opportunity for educating persons. Richard Peters, in concluding his analysis of the concept of education, characterizes education as initiation into worthwhile knowledge and understanding. "The more recent and more specific concept [of education] links such processes with the development of states of a person that involve knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth, and also suggest that they are desirable." It should be clear that "knowledge," as Peters is using the term, does not mean mere information. To have knowledge is, at the least, to have a true belief and an understanding of the evidence which warrants it.

Having knowledge, then, involves having rational belief, that is, beliefs supported by reasons, the relevance of which are understood. Thus educating someone implies initiating him into knowledge and understanding based on reasons together with the canons of reasoning by which these beliefs may be challenged or supported. Education involves not only intellectual development, but also the development of dispositions, emotions and skills that are appropriate to a life of reason. Its aim is to develop rational, autonomous persons.

Clearly, the view that public schooling should educate persons is very different from what I have called the instrumental view of public schooling. The instrumental view sees public schooling as aiming to promote predetermined beliefs, attitudes and commitments. The educational view, on the other hand, sees public schooling as teaching students to form beliefs and commitments on the basis of relevant reasons and evidence. Not only are these aims different, they are antithetical. If my goal is to educate, I cannot be trying to inculcate any given belief, for I want the student to accept only those beliefs which the weight of relevant evidence leads him to accept. If the relevant evidence is insufficient to produce a given belief, then, as an educator, I do not want the student to have that belief. Actually this way of stating the case is a little too strong and I shall want to qualify it later. Here I am concerned with emphasizing the differences between the educational and the instrumental views of schooling.

Schooling which attempts to bring about predetermined beliefs and commitments is more akin to indoctrination than to education. In contrast to education, indoctrination, according to the analyses of Flew and Green, involves the initiation of persons into beliefs in such a way that the beliefs are fixed and not held on the basis of evidence. Consequently, new evidence has no effect on the beliefs. The reason indoctrination is regarded as morally reprehensible is that it does not respect persons as rational, autonomous beings having the right to construct their own beliefs on the basis of their own tests against experience. To indoctrinate a person is to treat him as less than a person. It is to treat him as an object to be manipulated. The instrumental view of schooling encourages schools to be indoctrination agencies. Nor will a school be saved from the charge of indoctrination by the fact that the beliefs it is inculcating are sanctioned by the constitution or by the parents of the students. If the beliefs embodied in the constitution are rationally defensible, and I think they are, educated persons presumably will accept them. Nonetheless, we have no moral right nor educational warrant for making anyone accept these beliefs. [Butts, though basically an instrumentalist, recognizes the

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dangers of indoctrination. Thus he makes the paradoxical claim that we must protect the right of all persons to hold a diversity of beliefs, but we must also develop a commitment to actions that uphold the common bonds of a free government.]

Many of those who argue for schemes which would provide for parental choice of schools see clearly that public schools which attempt to foster predetermined beliefs and commitments are morally indefensible. They fail to see that schools which foster beliefs predetermined by parents are just as morally objectionable. Children are, after all, persons not property owned by parents to be manipulated in any way they desire.

Earlier in this paper I argued that we ought to abandon the attempt to justify public schooling by showing it to be an instrument for promulgating desirable beliefs and commitments. My reason for suggesting this was that we are unlikely to reach consensus on what beliefs and commitments are desirable. Now it should be clear that there is an even more telling reason to be offered. It is simply this. No instrumental view of schooling can be morally defensible, because all such views fail to treat students as persons whose rational autonomy must be respected.

I want to return now to the justification of public schooling viewed as an agency for educating persons. This justification has two parts: (a) justification of the desirability of promoting rationality, and (b) justification of public schooling as the best hope for promoting rationality. Paul Hirst argues that no justification for being rational is possible or needed, since a request for justification presupposes a prior commitment to reason. Even if this is true, we must still answer the question, "Why is it desirable to promote rationality in persons in general?" I cannot give any full answer to this question here, but several points are worth noting. First, being rational is a necessary part of being an autonomous person. It is for this reason that Peters has argued that all genuine education is liberal education, freeing persons from blind impulse as well as from manipulation by others. Second, because autonomy is a necessary ingredient of acting morally, being rational is a prerequisite of being moral. Finally, given that anyone in our society has much he must learn, the only morally responsible way of helping him to manage that learning is by the appealing to and the enhancing of his rationality. In sum, educating persons, developing their rationality, is necessary to their developing as persons in the full sense of that word.

Consider now the second question, "Why is public schooling the best hope for developing rationality?" Though I think this question can be

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satisfactorily answered, I am not persuaded that the answer I offer here is satisfactory. Basically the answer is that no alternative agency is likely to do the job. Private schools are usually conceived as instruments for securing certain kinds of beliefs and commitments. That indeed is the reason they are established. Were these schools to promote reason, they would likely lose their support. Nor does it seem likely that reason can be developed through informal learning. If it could, rationality would be far more extensive in our society than it is at present. Public schools are the only ones that can afford to devote themselves to genuinely educating persons, for they have, or at least should have, no private interests to promote. Moreover, the very fact that society cannot agree on a set of beliefs and commitments to be promoted by public schools makes them the best hope for developing reason. However, attempts to turn them into instruments for developing particular commitments will always be met with opposition from some group. Finally it should be noted that reason is, in a sense, public. There is not one sort of rationality for one religious or social group and a different rationality for others. Any system of schooling which promotes the view that what counts as being rational is different for different groups is inimical to rationality. More than that, it is inimical to a just and responsible society. For in a society composed of groups with diverse commitments, legitimate public policy can only be based on the outcome of rational deliberation, which is deliberation in which all, regardless of prior commitments, can participate.

Some will object that the kind of schooling I am advocating will of necessity have a very narrow academic focus. It will be limited to subjects like math and science because it is only in these areas that it makes sense to speak of genuine knowledge, i.e., rational belief. Since moral and political beliefs are not the sorts of beliefs that can be held rationally, schools will not be able to deal with such issues. Thus, this objection concludes, you cannot have citizenship education, moral education or aesthetic education. But this is an intolerable conclusion, for neither the schools nor society can afford to be unconcerned about the development of such beliefs and commitments.

The basic flaw in this objection is the supposition that it does not make sense to talk of value commitments being rational or irrational. I want to argue that such talk does make sense; that there are standards of rationality which govern the reasoning one employs in coming to a value commitment; that these standards are presupposed by anyone who seriously uses value language; and that like all other standards of rationality they are grounded in general canons of logic and consistency. I will not argue these points here, for that would require a paper at least twice as

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long and twice as tedious as this one. But I have argued these points at length elsewhere, as have a large number of other people.

If my argument to this point is correct, the most serious challenge to the public school system is presented not by instrumentalists, but by those who claim that public schools are incapable of educating. This claim is argued persuasively in a recent book by James McClellan. This argument is worth careful consideration, for if it is correct, public schooling very likely cannot be justified. McClellan begins his argument by noting that Peters' analysis of our concept of education, which he takes to be a correct analysis, reveals that this concept incorporates confusions and contradictions. Specifically, he says that education calls for transmitting what is worthwhile to kids in such a way that kids will become committed to it, and it calls for the use of procedures which involves a willingness to volunteer on the part of students. But if we attempt to do the former we must inevitably fail to do the latter. [McClellan is relying on an earlier version of Peters' analysis of education rather than the one I quoted above. The more recent work gives less reason for thinking that the concept of education incorporates confusions but does not entirely rule out that possibility.]

McClellan believes that the most important task of the concept of education is to capture our highest and most consistent conceptions of teaching and learning. Hence, we can straighten out our ideas about education by clarifying our conceptions of teaching and learning. Actually clarity is not McClellan's major concern. Beginning with our ordinary conception of teaching, he attempts to construct a concept that is precise enough to allow us to differentiate teaching from its counterfeits, particularly indoctrination and conditioning. With this precisely honed concept of teaching he purports to have overcome at least some of the muddles built into the concept of education. Although McClellan doesn't put the matter this way, it is clear that he regards teaching in this purified sense as a necessary condition of educating. If you are not teaching, you are not educating.

McClellan's construction of what he calls the specific sense of teaching has two stages. First, he argues that the paradigm A teaches B that, how to, etc., X employs the concept teach in the specific sense, if and only if, the following conditions hold: (a) B learns that X; (b) B's learning was caused by what A did; and (c) B learns that X implies B knows that X. The second stage of McClellan's explication involves specifying the features an act must have to count as an act of teaching. The important thing here is to delimit the acts which satisfy the epistemological and moral constraints implicit in the idea of causing

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persons to come to know. It should be noted that McClellan regards these epistemological and moral constraints to be present, at least recently, in our ordinary conceptions of teaching and learning. Indeed the greater part of his book consists of arguments showing this to be the case. I will not recount these arguments for they are not what I wish to take issue with here.

In order to explicate the conditions an act must meet to count as a teaching act, McClellan makes use of the paradigm "A teaches something to B." The sorts of verbs that fit this paradigm include demonstrate, explain, prove, report and the like. The acts denoted by these verbs are called lecting acts. Thus to be engaged in a specific act of teaching is to be engaged in lecting. This brings us to the moral and epistemological criteria, for the claim that A lects something to B is true only if the following two conditions are met: [These are not sufficient conditions because they don't guarantee the truth of the thing.]

1. B knows that A is acting with the intent that B will come to know the something in question.
2. B believes that A in his action is supplying the grounds for knowing the something in question and that supplying these grounds is A's reason for his action.

Taken together these conditions constitute the criterion of lucidity.

In addition to the condition of lucidity, a true lecting claim is thought by McClellan to satisfy a further set of conditions he calls pellucidity. Although there are eight conditions of pellucidity, I will mention here only those that are germane to our central question, "Can public schools educate?" For our purposes the central conditions of pellucidity are the following:

1. B wants to know the something in question;
2. B believes that A recognizes his want and that A knows what B must do to satisfy that want;
3. B believes that A is acting with the intent of helping B satisfy his want;
4. B pays attention to A because he believes A intends to help him satisfy his want;

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5. B believes that A knows (3) and (4);

6. A believes that B wants to know the something in question; and

7. A believes his action will help B come to know the something in question.

In sum, lecting is pellucid only if it satisfies a genuine desire to know and only if both parties are motivated to participate in the exchange because they are aware of this desire to know and want to satisfy it.

We may summarize the argument to this point as follows: Lucidity and pellucidity are necessary conditions of lecting, lecting is a necessary condition of teaching (specific sense), and teaching is a necessary condition of educating. Necessary here does not always mean logically or conceptually necessary. McClellan doesn't put the matter quite as boldly as this, but it seems clear that the reason this entailment holds is because the only way we can be sure indoctrination is not taking place is by restricting teaching to lecting which is both lucid and pellucid.

It should be clear now why McClellan believes that the public school system as presently constituted is virtually incapable of educating. Since, as I argued earlier, it is conceived as an instrument for securing predetermined beliefs and commitments, its structure incorporates a large element of compulsion, control and lack of concern for reason. This structure virtually assures that little in the way of lecting that is both lucid and pellucid will take place. Rather it is weighted in the direction of encouraging indoctrination.

McClellan doesn't assert that it is impossible to change the public school system in such a way as to make it a genuine educational agency, but clearly he is more pessimistic on this score than I am, and my pessimism is quite strong. The reason for the difference between us has not to do with our having different beliefs about the difficulty of making drastic changes in the public school system. We both know that would be damnably difficult. No, the difference is that the conditions he sees as necessary to genuine education are more demanding than those that I regard as necessary. Consequently, meeting his conditions would require a more drastic change in public schools.

My disagreement with McClellan centers mainly on the pellucidity condition. This condition would disqualify as educational agencies, not only the public school system as presently constituted, but, I think, any conceivable system of public schools. Fortunately the claim that

pellucidity is a necessary condition of lecting is simply false. Nor is it the case that lecting which fails to be pellucid is necessarily indoctrinative or morally objectionable on some other grounds. Consider the example of lecting that McClellan gives to make his case for pellucidity, namely explaining. Given that I have met the conditions of lucidity, the claim that I am explaining X to Mary is not shown to be false or inappropriate by showing that Mary does not want to understand X. Now McClellan claims that it would be wrong to describe my action as explaining in this case. It only seems appropriate because we are accustomed to distorting notions like explain when we use them in school contexts. But this will not save his case. Suppose, for example, that Mary is my wife and she is so angry with me for being late that she does not want to hear my explanation of why I was late. Suppose further that I hold her hands to keep her from stopping her ears and proceed to tell her why I was late. Would it be wrong to describe what I was doing as explaining to Mary why I was late? Clearly not. And notice that there is no context of schooling presupposed in this case.

Now consider the indoctrination issue. If I explain X to Mary when she doesn't want to know X, am I indoctrinating Mary? Not, it seems to me, as long as I have met the lucidity condition. For if I have satisfied that condition, Mary has come to know X. Consequently my explaining fits the first paradigm which McClellan himself sets forth as distinguishing teaching from indoctrinating.

"Explain" is not atypical of lecting verbs. As far as I can determine, none of the lecting verbs requires that the conditions of pellucidity be fulfilled as a condition of their being used correctly.

Clearly, an element of compulsion often enters the situation when one explains or proves X to someone who doesn't want to know X. In schools this often involves the use of scolding, detentions, and other punitive acts. I suspect that McClellan's pellucidity condition was meant to rule out such acts, because he regards them as morally objectionable. Still it is wrong to suppose that non-pellucid lecting must be morally objectionable. First we should note that compulsion is not a necessary concomitant of such lecting. The phrase, "he does not want to know X" is ambiguous. It can mean either, "X is not something he wants to know" or it can mean, "he wants not to know X." If a case of lecting is non-pellucid because the student is indifferent, compulsion need not be present. And this seems to me to be the most common sort of case in which lecting in schools fails to be pellucid.

Even those cases of lecting involving some element of compulsion are not

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necessarily morally objectionable. To suppose that they are is to adopt the dubious moral principle that compelling another to listen or watch something in order to further his own interests is never justified. It seems to me we can justify compelling or restraining a person for his own good, at least in those cases where we have good evidence that the person is, in the future, likely to agree that we had good reason for restraining or compelling him. However, giving an adequate argument for this claim would take more time than I have left. Let me merely note that this is the sort of justification we quite commonly give for restraining potential suicides, and, in some cases, compelling them to undergo psychiatric treatment.

If education does not require that teaching be pellucid as well as lucid, then the idea that public schools can educate does not appear quite so ludicrous. If we can show that we may, in some circumstances, violate the conditions of lucidity without indoctrinating, the enterprise may indeed be fairly plausible. I want to agree with McClellan that lecting meeting conditions of lucidity must be the norm if we are to be genuinely educating. But I don't think we should rule out in advance, as McClellan does, the possibility that we can bring about genuine knowing at least in part by teaching that lacks lucidity. Nor should we rule out in advance the possibility that under some conditions teaching that lacks lucidity may be morally justified and thus not indoctrinatory.

We are indebted to McClellan for making it very clear that anyone who engages in teaching that does not meet both the conditions of pellucidity and lucidity bears the burden of proof that such teaching is not morally objectionable. Thus both as philosophers and as educators we have much work to do before we can make public education a plausible enterprise.

CHAPTER 2.

SOME CULTURAL DILEMMAS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM.

DONALD S. SECKINGER.

Edward Tylor still provides us with a classic statement of definition of culture: "Culture or civilization . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." (1) More refined modern conceptions of culture, as Kenneth Lottich points out, do not in general see culture as identical to civilization. (2) We can, therefore, speak variously of the culture or subculture of a particular nation, a profession, an institution, a social class, or an ethnic group.

More often than not, most of us find ourselves as participating members simultaneously in a variety of cultures. In American society characterized as culturally pluralistic, our joint participation creates inevitable conflicts of choice. To fulfill one main element of the great American dream of material success and acquisition, for example, we may well have to modify the stabilizing and reassuring anchors of traditions inculcated deep in us through the subcultures of family, friends, and socio-cultural origin. Americans, indeed, may be said to be people on the move, engaging as individuals and in groups on voyages that bring both gains and losses, rewards of material well-being counterbalanced by psychic, spiritual, and moral disorientation. For better or worse, this is the American character, the archetype of modern, Western (or Westernized) industrial man and woman.

George Kneller has well pointed to a fundamental source of cultural dislocation that seems to reach its peak in the industrial societies in Western civilization, as well as in the Westernizing nations of the third world as these begin to acquire the material gadgetry that is so characteristically Western or American. "The more integrated the culture, the more its technology and values are likely to interpenetrate; it is mainly in less integrated cultures, like the United States, that technology can unmoor itself from the order of established values." (3)

I intend in this paper to illustrate the unmooring of values in our pluralistic, technological American society on three interrelated levels or planes of cultural life. These categories are not chosen at random but rather deliberately reflect the prime concerns of leaders in American education and culture who historically placed their faith in our public schools, our media of communication, and our evolving political processes to fulfill the American dream.

The levels are easily recognizable and would appear to revisionist historians hopelessly naive of attainment, poisoned at their wellsprings by materialist-individualist motivations for gain, glory, and self-congratulatory moralizing. Nevertheless, they are worth articulating if we are to even begin to puzzle out what has happened to the threefold American dream. Our three levels of the American conception of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, especially as related to schooling and media and healthy political life may be exemplified by the socio-economic maxims of Benjamin Franklin, the qualified political idealism of Thomas Jefferson (qualified with strong doses of Lockean realism), and the paradoxically conservative moral idealism of the New England Puritans translated into a national educational moral faith by Horace Mann. Let us now examine each of these at its source and, more importantly, try to describe what has been and is happening on each of these levels of our national life as we have moved into the modern disintegrated world.

As recently as the 1960's the advice of Benjamin Franklin, in the mouth of Poor Richard, would have seemed hopelessly naive, archaic, and out of tune with the great expectations of the American dream -- material expectations, wants converted into needs, that, when blindly pursued, lead individuals and nations eventually up against the realities of a finiteness of resources. Hear what Franklin has to say:

" . . . You may think perhaps, That a little Tea, or a little Punch now and then, Diet a little more costly, Clothes a little finer, and a little Entertainment now and then, can be no great Matter; but . . . Fools make Feasts, and wise Men eat them."

" . . . These are not the Necessaries of Life; they can scarcely be called the Conveniences, and yet only because they look pretty, how many want to have them. The artificial Wants of Mankind thus become more numerous than the natural; . . ." (4)

As we have moved through the economic plane of existence in this, the richest nation of earth, we have, on the one hand, vastly enhanced material well-being for many millions and, on the other, managed to convert the

idea of production for consumption and saving into consumption as intrinsic good.

Examining American popular magazines from the turn of the century to the present, with special emphasis on advertising, is a useful way to see how we continue to move into more and more hectic conversions of wants to needs. Life becomes more complex, more artificial, and change moves us on more rapidly.

Smoking the newfangled cigarettes in the early 1900's are impossibly handsome young men lounging in the unreachable leisure world of high society, as conceived by meticulous illustrators, with equally idealized young women looking on, but not participating. By the thirties, men and women both, in color photographs, are testifying to the relaxing quality of smoking in the midst of high powered professional occupations. By the time we reach the present, male and female models are enjoying a sexual encounter with one another and with the reader through the medium of the super-scientific smoke as an object of personality affirmation.

Similarly with other products and services, one notices a sea change as the years go by. Automobiles evolve from dependable sporting luxuries to glamorous bundles of gadgetry to assertions of the lost self. Foods are packaged and marketed in fairly straightforward ways in the early decades of the century with emphasis on wholesome growing conditions of canned fruits, dietary gentleness of breakfast cereals, purity in manufacture. By the thirties, the push toward prepared-in-advance frozen items is in full swing. Pushing past mid-century, plastic foods having taken their natural place in our consciousness, paradoxical trends emerge for a return to lost nutrition and taste through expensive new products.

The inevitable sense of a loss of meaning, a confusion in values, a heightened level of contradiction, escalates as we move through the years. The present resembles a peculiar kind of "newspeak" -- reflecting decades of a debasement of values and institutions. Nothing escapes exploitation. What began with a minimal sense of the dignity of the self ends in the public display of crudity, word-play, and suggestiveness. Human beings, in our ultimate imagery of ourselves, are dehumanized objects truly; if one is consuming a product in the early twentieth century, one is being consumed by it in our own times.

If we can so merchandise goods and services so that their intrinsic worth is beside the point and if we can so exploit human hopes and fears on the material plane, why not then in the political life of the nation as well? As Jefferson warned:

"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be. The functionaries of every government have propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe." (5)

Now as I see our attachment to gadgetry and prepackaging increasing through the years, I cannot help but compare this to the communications revolutions of recent generations. Ideas and images are carefully prepared, packaged, and sold. Media happenings are arranged. The free press so valued by Jefferson is very often hoodwinked and manipulated -- or allows itself to fall into the oversimplifications of the electronic age. Dramatic effects, network ratings, the role of reporters as show business personalities clothing the "news" in an aura of authority -- here is a magnified dimension indeed that leaps beyond the print media. Here is where most persons get their news and information capsules for the day. At best, an inadequate and, at worst, a highly distorted source. In fairness, the print media -- newspapers, magazines, journals, and books by the thousands upon thousands -- do give us a healthy diversity of views. Ironically, those few who deliberately search out diversity are not the mainstream of the electorate. Score one for Alexander Hamilton.

Finally, we have the moral plane of national experience, influenced in our own times both for better and worse by the affluence and convenience of the material plane and the power of the electronic and print media on the political level. Horace Mann's postulates in the early years of the American common school movement would certainly have to be modified:

"That our public schools are not theological seminaries is admitted. . . . But our system earnestly inculcates all Christian morals, it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system -- to speak for itself." (6)

The modification I would suggest would be the comparative study of cultural and moral systems in the schools and the analytical examination of ethics and credibility in advertising, in business and government, and in the electronic and print media. This would inevitably lead to self-critical evaluation of schooling itself, of textbooks and other materials of instruction. It would come close to cultural reconstructionism -- perhaps too close for comfort.

A number of arguments may be raised in contradiction to the reflections

expressed here. On the economic or material plane, it could be contended that technology has simply provided the takeoff point to corrupt a people awaiting their fall. Thus, one way out of the dilemma for emerging and/or totalitarian nations would be to learn from our example; control merchandising through a centrally planned economy and provide, thereby, for what the people need, as the moral judges of the society see it. This would, of course, mean, on the political plane, taking the media out of private hands and removing the profit motive; turning over all news to a prescribed diet, again in the hands of the moral judges. Finally, on the moral plane itself, compel, through these same experts -- educators, social scientists, and other Platonic censors -- the comparative teaching of a number of cultural, moral, ethical systems.

And here we come full circle. The price of an integrated culture may well be a planned, centralized, control of experts or guardians. We are left with a new dilemma: who is to watch the watchers in the new order of things? Is there an answer? I can only leave you with the dilemmas, economic, political, and moral disintegration on the one hand, and compulsory reintegration on the other. Perhaps, at this point, it is time to reframe our bicentennial self-evaluation in both-and rather than either/or terms -- but this would require a new synthesis, a new society, and a new culture, tasks which go far beyond the scope of the present paper.

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CHAPTER 3.

DAMNED BY DEFINITION.

HUGH C. BLACK.

How ironic it is that the school of thought "Idealism" founded by Plato, whose monumental contribution to Western civilization was the ideal of conceptual knowledge by "definition" and "classification" should today be damned by such "Strain-ed" definitions as something called "thought patterns." I refer to John F. Strain of Redlands University and his Summer 1975 article in Educational Theory entitled: "Idealism: A Clarification of an Educational Philosophy." Despite earlier criticisms of Strain's aberrant "clarifications" of Idealism, (1) the literature of educational philosophy continues to perpetuate these violations of long-standing principles of logic. My purpose here is to protest and shout: "Let's stop these untruths!"

Strain (strangely, to me) dismisses with the evangelical fervor of the Absolutist whom he must abhor such established "Idealists" in educational philosophy as Herman Harrel Horne and J. Donald Butler (as he seemingly would such philosophers as Theodore M. Greene and Alexander Meiklejohn) as "synthesizers." Such American educational philosophers are only "so-called Idealists" "whom history has designated as Idealist philosophers of education because many of them imitated their philosopher counterparts" and "attempted to incorporate the concept of American Individualism, the theory of Darwinian evolution, and the data of modern psychology into Objective Idealism or a synthesis theory of Idealistic Philosophy." (2)

Strain defines "Idealists" and "Idealism" in an uncommon way but then interchanges his peculiar "uncommon" definition with the common meaning so that he argues in a circle, begs the question, makes non sequiturs of the rhetorically flourishing, widely irrelevant type, and throws at his reader unrepresentative and faulty generalizations. His question begging through circular definitions is of the type which can go on for volumes and not be easily detected by the unwary reader whom he leads away from truth with that elusive skill of the beast so aptly described in the

phrase: "if trapped by an exception, he can be rescued by a distinction." My task here is to put you onto the scent so we can be aware of this one in our field who skillfully diverts us from the truth about Idealism in education. Our task is difficult since my foe defines his terms in such a way that his argument seemingly cannot be disproved.

Strain's way is much like the example cited by Edith W. Schipper and Edward W. Schuh in their 1959 A First Course in Modern Logic (N. Y.: Henry Holt & Co., p. 57):

"Someone might contend that people living in Miami are blessed with beautiful Florida weather. Then, when it is remarked to this person that some days in Florida are rainy or cold or humid or rocked by a hurricane, he replies triumphantly: 'Ah! But that is not what I meant by Florida weather!' And of course he has in this way irrefutably proved his case. But he is not talking about Florida weather."

In a similar way, John Strain writes of Idealists and Idealism; and when I cite the exception, he gives me the distinction: "but that is not what I mean by Idealism." I say that he may have "proved his case," "but he is not talking about Idealism!"

I give to Strain the logical right to define a term such as "Idealism" in any way he may choose. That is, he may make a stipulative definition. But his readers -- or most of them -- may not be alert to Strain's odd usage and thus be led into error and untruths, especially when Strain himself shifts back and forth from his odd use of "Idealism" to the customary meaning. Thus Strain fails to make himself clearly understood, fails to communicate truths about Idealism, and fails to be a responsible educational philosopher. Truthful "communication" should be, I plead, the "ruling purpose of language" and of educational philosophers. I am, you see, an Idealist!

Strain fails to communicate to me truths about Idealism because he is ignorant of or does not recognize the "realism" of such true "Idealists" as Socrates and Plato -- a realism basic to the conventional understanding of what "Idealism" is. Plato, through Socrates in the dialogue Phaedrus, reminds us that about any statement what we should most want to know is whether or not it is true. When Plato shows Socrates engaged in the philosophical questing for truth about the nature of piety, character, temperance, or whatever moral concept of the many he devoted his long life to, Socrates' questioning of his fellow traveler in the investigation always causes him to judge the inadequacy of his first, assured definition (usually described best by the expression: "an

encrustacean of conventional opinion") by virtue of its failing to stand up under the standard of experience. That is the standard of critical examination -- what one "knows" by virtue of his experiences, what most rational human beings find acceptable as considered truth, what one gets down to in essence when we scrape away "the encrustaceans of conventional opinions" which give us our usual diversity of individual opinions. And in the development of logic this insight of the old "Idealists" who began it all gets expressed even today in books on logic which warn us against "shimmering vagueness linked together with false generalizations and the golden chains of word magic." One antidote is expressed this way: "The positive criterion for testing a generalization is the literal truth of the proposition as stated. If the generalization claims "all," or "none," then one counter instance makes it false." (3) Let us apply this criterion and refute Strain by pointing out several counter-instances, even though only one is necessary to our task, strictly speaking.

Keep in mind, now, that Strain says in his article (p. 263) that "When one refers to Idealism as a philosophy of education, one has to have in mind Hegelian Idealism . . . the dominant Idealism of the 19th century. . . ." He declares Karl Rosenkranz's Paedagogik als System, "written in the spirit of Hegel" and "the classic text in education," as the 'masterpiece' of Idealistic philosophy of education which William T. Harris introduced to American Intellectuals as an influential "thought pattern" in the last half of the 19th century (pp. 264-265). According to Strain, holders of the Idealistic "thought pattern" are to be recognized by virtue of their call for a return to traditional education and "the good old days" of American Society" (p. 265). Idealists are identified by Strain -- believe it or not -- with the "Essentialists" of 1938, the Arthur Bestors following World War II, the Council for Basic Education, and the "more recent political movement of law and order." Even though Strain says at the beginning of his article (p. 263): "one must search the journals of some years back before finding an article on Idealism as a philosophy of education" and "Even books about it are quite old," Strain maintains at the end of his piece that "The thought pattern of Idealism has been and continues to be an influential educational position in the world today." "Since it is so very prevalent and often powerful as a system of thought," he says on p. 271, "it must be studied and examined closely by those working in education."

If that does not do us in with its contradiction, shift in meaning, and untruth, Strain informs us further about the meaning of Idealism in educational philosophy. His descriptive and programmatic definitions have Idealism meaning law and order advocates who espouse traditional education and who hope to turn "American events back to the ways and

manners of late 19th century American life style" (pp. 265-266). Strain describes and "clarifies" Idealism for us under such topics as progress, institutionalism, self-control, self-estrangement, discipline, educational methodology, state schools, National progress, and National leadership (pp. 266-271). Under each descriptive topic distinguishing the "thought pattern" of Idealism, Strain fires a shotgun blast which includes "everything under the sun." Critical examination in terms of my personal experiencing of "Idealism" reveals "here and there" a statement really true of what some Idealists believe, many statements directly antithetical to what Idealists believe, and the over-all "clarification" false. My "real" experiences of Idealism assure me that Idealists are not always Absolutists, believers in unqualified "progress," mere "habit-formers," rigid disciplinarians, faculty psychologists who are mind exercisers ["Faculty psychology and the philosophy of education of Idealism are at root inseparable," says Strain on p. 268.], "keeping all pupils up to practically the same level of achievement" (p. 269), textbook learning by repetitious drill and exercises, and being ivory-towered intellectuals bored with immediate and practical enterprises who forego any kind of political leadership! Strain is a slippery customer to refute only if you are not knowledgeable from having experienced the dynamics of Idealism in educational philosophy.

So my first "counter-instance" refutes Strain's opening statements to his argument; namely, that "One must search the journals of some years back before finding an article on Idealism as a philosophy of education. Even books about it are quite old." Frankly, I glory in the irony that the editors of Educational Theory, who, I think, served its readers and the profession of educational philosophy ill by publishing Strain's untruths about Idealism, yet arranged the Summer 1975 issue handily for my refutation. You need not look to the latter part of the 19th century but simply at the immediately preceding article to Strain's [Summer 1975, mind you!] to find an article devoting some eight of its twenty pages of material to saying that the firmly established Idealist Susanne K. Langer in her classic work of the modern period, Philosophy in a New Key, is significant for curriculum workers in education today! In his article "Curricular Metaphors: From Scientism to Symbolism," (4) Steven Selden of the University of Pennsylvania cites this Idealist as "One of the strongest supporters of the humanistic view of Cassirer that man transforms experience and then lives in the world of those symbols rather than with mental mirror-images of a hypostatized reality." "Langer," he further declared, "analyzes the period after Descartes as having an empirical orientation and proposes that today's underlying generative idea, her "new key," is that of symbolism and the implications for Langer appear significant as they may well seem for curriculum workers" (p. 255).

Selden had written just before this that: "While accepting the view that man was indeed in the physical order Cassirer offered a caveat; for he was, 'No longer in a merely physical universe, man [now] lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe.'" I submit that Cassirer and Langer and Hugh C. Black, Donald S. Seckinger, and Kenneth V. Lottich, who produced the book dated 1972 "The Great Educators: Readings for Leaders in Education," which includes in Chapter 8, pp. 48-60, under "A Hypothesis and World View of Meaning," a part of Langer's classic chapter on "Symbolic Transformation," are an experiential refutation of Strain's unique definition of Idealism. For the immediately preceding article to Strain's own and this book of "today" by these true Idealists stand in refutation against Strain and his "thought patterns" about "Idealism."

As in my earlier "Florida Weather" example, Strain may reply that Cassirer, Langer, Black, Seckinger, Lottich, H. H. Horne, J. Donald Butler, Theodore M. Greene, Alexander Meiklejohn are only "so-called Idealists" and not what he means by "Idealists."

If so, I reply that Strain is still untruthful about Idealism. He must admit that Karl Rosenkranz and his Paedagogik Als System are what he means by "Idealist" and "Idealism." And Strain must admit that his descriptive or programmatic definition of the "thought pattern" of Idealism includes and means "dependence on books." He says specifically on p. 269 of his article: "Maturity on the part of the teacher and the repetitious nature of knowledge to teaching technique reflect the Idealists' concern for past knowledge and the permanence of truth. New discoveries merely add to what is already known. Knowledge is found in books. What teachers repeat year after year is the subject matter existing in textbooks." My refutation is this "counter-instance" from Rosenkranz -- an Idealist by Strain's stipulation:

"Chapter XI. Intellectual Education (c) Instruction (cont'd) (3) The Modality of the Process of Teaching. . . . Sec. 123. (1) For the most, the best, and the mightiest things that we know we are indebted to life itself. The sum of perceptions which a human being makes for himself up to the fourth or fifth year of his life is incalculable; and after this time we continue involuntarily to gain by immediate contact with the world countless ideas. But we understand, by the phrase "the school of life," especially the ethical knowledge which we gain by what happens in our own lives. . . . Without the power exercised by the immediate world our intelligence would remain abstract and lifeless. [Instruction by experience begins with infancy and continues through life. . . . The education that one gets by adopting a trade or form of industry and

earning his living, or by acting as a citizen, obeying the laws and assisting at the ballot-box to make them, or in the army risking one's life to defend them -- each of these is a peculiar form of the education that life offers, and its results cannot be obtained through any other form -- certainly not by the school -- however much the school may re-enforce them.]

Sec. 124. (2) What we learn through books forms a contrast to that which we learn through living. Life forces upon us its wisdom; the book, on the contrary, is entirely passive. . . . We call book-instruction "dead" when it lacks, for the exposition which it gives, a foundation in illustration addressed to sense-perception, or when we do not add to the printed description the perceptions which it implies; and these two are quite different. (5)

"Sec. 116. In the act of learning there appears (a) a mechanical element, (b) a dynamic element, and (c) one in which the dynamic again mechanically strengthens itself. . .

Sec. 118. (b) The dynamical element (i. e., the self-activity of the pupil) consists of the previously developed power of attention, without which all the exposition made by the teacher to the pupil remains entirely foreign to him. All apparatus is dead, all arrangement of no avail, all teaching fruitless, if the pupil does not by his free self-activity receive into his inner self what one teaches him, and thus make it his own property. (6)

"Sec. 125. . . . These "text-books" must (a) in their consideration of the subject give us the principal results of any department of knowledge, and denote the points from which the next advance must be made, because every science comes to results which are themselves again new problems. . . ." (7)

Strain stipulates that Rosenkranz is what he calls an "Idealist" whose "thought pattern" has been influential in American education. Yet, I claim, these words from Rosenkranz do not agree with Strain's description of the thought pattern.

I assert that when Strain is talking about the thought pattern of Idealism he is NOT TALKING ABOUT IDEALISTS. For Idealists are those whose real experiences identify them as Idealists, and they are generally recognized as so in the history of education. If Herman Harrell Horne identified himself as an Idealist of the variety he termed, according to Strain, (p. 264), "Theistic Idealism," then we should accept him as an Idealist and synthesizing and dynamic views about education as part and parcel of Idealistic educational philosophy. In labeling people "Idealists" we

must recognize the reality and experiences of a John S. Brubacher and his committee of the National Society for the Study of Education in including in its 41st Yearbook, Part I; Philosophies of Education as the representative of Idealism Herman H. Horne (Chapter IV. "An Idealistic Philosophy of Education."). Reality also lies in taking Rupert C. Lodge's statement as true that he wrote Philosophy of Education (1937, 1947) from the Idealist's perspective. So -- if we would be true to the realities of life and our experiences -- must we consider J. Donald Butler as an Idealist, as well as Theodore M. Greene, whose "A Liberal Christian Idealist Philosophy of Education" was placed in the 54th Yearbook of the NSSE by Brubacher and his committee as recognized Idealists. I, an Idealist in educational philosophy, was taught by a declared and internationally recognized Idealist philosopher who reviewed and made suggestions about the manuscript of J. Donald Butler for Harpers which became in several editions from 1951 to the present a representative statement of Idealism in education and in religion. I have experienced hearing from the lips of the same Idealist philosopher the belief that "One should beware of anyone who proclaims himself as having Truth, since we can only achieve 'truths.'" He -- R. A. Tsanoff, a 1910 graduate of the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University when it was the great center for Idealism in American philosophy -- expressed well this dynamic view of the nature of knowledge and truth:

No real truth is rigidly final; rather does it express the summed-up meaning of experience, of experience ever expanding, which just by this expression comes to a fuller realization of itself and in thus maturing points to an expression still more adequate and so to a higher and deeper truth.

Paul Natorp, in his Platons Ideenlehre, captured the essence of this truly Idealistic view when he said: "Thought does not stand still. Continually forward, beyond itself, it changes the thinker." It is exemplified for me when at age 86 and just three years prior to his death, my Idealist teacher, Tsanoff, insists that he [an acknowledged "walking encyclopedia"] still has very much to learn. On July 17, 1973, he wrote me in connection with three Idealists' book on educational philosophy, The Great Educators:

There is so much of it [the extensive material "which may serve as a general introduction to the study of the humanities" assembled in the book] which is very valuable to me and which I could not find so readily in any other volume. You see, I am one of those 'leaders in education' whom you have included in the subtitle of your book, ironically but also sympathetically, a 'leader' who has very much to learn and is only glad to find a great deal of it brought to his attention so generously.

Plainly and simply I am in your debt, and I thank you for it. You have produced a book with an expanded outlook of the educational process which is therefore bound to appeal to readers in a wider cultural setting beyond that of education departments.

This is the Idealist who once shared orally with me this conviction: "I believe that we should assign no limits to the deity -- either lower or upper -- not bottom but also no limits at the top!" I suggest that, contrary to Strain's description of Idealists as Absolutists, I have experienced at least one who places his absolutes not only as "ever just beyond our grasp," as Browning described what "a heaven is for," but perhaps even there -- in "heaven" -- not being "final!"

My experience of dynamic Idealistic thought -- which you may share by reading the literature of the history of education -- reveals dynamic Idealists. Strain pictures them for us as speculators sitting in their ivory towers removed from immediate and practical enterprises and political leadership. That is a false picture indeed! Merle Curti, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, tells it "like it is" when he writes of the Idealist William T. Harris in his classic study The Social Ideas of American Educators (p. 310):

"While it was Barnard and Mann who laid the foundations of the American public school system, it was William T. Harris who presided over the rearing of the structure. His most important achievement, however, was to furnish American education with a philosophy which helped the rank and file to adjust their thought and feeling to new actualities without losing the sense of identity with older values and conditions."

Similarly, in 1964 and 1965 we became aware of Joseph Tussman's Experiment at Berkeley (N. Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969) in anticipation of the Free Speech Movement action against university education. He had been taught by the liberal Idealist Alexander Meiklejohn and fashioned his answer or "experiment" on his knowledge of Meiklejohn's The Experimental College (N. Y.: Harper and Bros., 1932) at the University of Wisconsin in 1930 and 1931, which I know to have influenced greatly a sculptor colleague of mine at Rice University: David Parsons. Parsons designed the medal known as the Alexander Meiklejohn Freedom Award bestowed each year by the American Association of University Professors. You may rest assured that in honest memory of the Idealist Meiklejohn the AAUP does not bestow its famous award upon an ivory tower recluse indifferent to political leadership!

In this Bicentennial year when the Strains continue to condemn such a

dynamic educational philosophy as Idealism and damn Idealists with their special definitions spreading "non-realistic" untruths, we should be stimulated. We can best plow ahead into our future by turning to our past and bringing to bear genuine knowledge. Thus, we equip ourselves to point out such untruths about Idealism as Strain's identifying Idealism with a return to traditional education and traditional ways of society. We might get to know that the list of great educational reformers of the past includes activist, influential, dynamic Idealists. Only in recent years have we become more fully informed about John Amos Comenius and his ideals for education. As long ago as 1859, Karl Von Raumer, writing in Barnard's American Journal of Education (VI, No. 2, March 1859), included this Idealistic Moravian bishop in his "The Progressives of the Seventeenth Century." So we may correctly label as Idealists the great reformers of the past: Pestalozzi and Froebel, who were influenced more by the Idealist Schiller than by Hegel. And in our days another Idealist has been active in keeping alive and vitalizing the idea of "liberal education." I speak of Theodore M. Greene, influenced in his philosophy by the Idealist Kant and in his educational ideas by Alexander Meiklejohn. All stand as "counter-instances" to Strain's identification of Idealism with traditional education and his statement that "When one refers to Idealism as a philosophy of education, one has to have in mind Hegelian Idealism." I take as my guide another of my teachers, another Idealist and a renowned historian of education, who said in his scholarly chapter on "The Rebirth and Reinstatement of Idealism" in his 1952 Development of Modern Education:

"Stripped of elaboration two sharply antagonistic systems of education bid for favor on the fundamental level. The first is the pragmatic, or practical. It is based upon the needs of the organism for food, shelter, and clothing, and, despite the denial of its advocates, it is utilitarian and industrial. It is in reality the traditional apprenticeship system streamlined and brought up to date."

"The other system is historical Humanism. Its greatest expressions were the age of Pericles in Greece and the Italian Renaissance. No one in modern times has so fully caught its real spirit as Friedrich Schiller, and through him it revitalized education in the works of Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel. The transition of the ideas of Pestalozzi from the practicality of Rousseau to his search for 'the harmonious development of all the powers' can best be explained by studying Schiller's conceptions. As for Herbart, his ideas of 'the aesthetic revelation of the world,' the theory of education of taste, the culture epoch theory, and the development of sympathy were all derived from Schiller. Froebel's principles of play, creative activity, self-realization, and socialization evidently came from the same source (Frederick Eby, p. 427)."

Another refutation of Strain lies in the same Frederick Eby's brief treatment of Hegel in the above-mentioned chapter and his connecting Hegel's influence not to Idealists but to John Dewey, the pragmatist:

The momentous consequences of Hegel's philosophy did not, however, result from his educational views but from his conception of the process of cosmic evolution. He explained the universe as a process of universal change according to the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. This conception was early adopted by Karl Marx as the course to be followed for socio-political progress by means of conflict (antithesis to existing conditions) and revolution, or the principle of dialectic materialism. It found final expression in Russian Communism.

In America where socio-political conditions were less inflamed, John Dewey interpreted the process in a less militant fashion. His theory of mind and "how we think" is based upon action, conflict, crisis, and hypothesis. It was, nonetheless, economic and utilitarian, for Dewey had, also, socio-political progress in view. To bring about change in an orderly way, he used the schools, where children were taught to produce and meet problems in accordance with the dialectic of utilitarian pragmatism (p. 430).

Here, then, are my "counter-instances" to damn Strain and his damning of Idealism and Idealists through untruths -- those of definition. My plea is that we come to know Idealism truly. For, if we would know Idealism truly, we would bring its dynamic humanism into play in the education of the future.

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CHAPTER 4.

THE UNEXAMINED LIFE DOESN'T STAND A CHANCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF LEWIS PERELMAN'S THE GLOBAL MIND.

ROBERT C. SCHULTZ.

The American Revolution of 1776, Lewis Perelman writes,

"... was fought not to create liberty but to preserve it. The American Revolution required no radical transformation of American society, and it apparently succeeded."

As we glance both backward and ahead from whatever vantage point 1976 provides us, Perelman offers us the thesis that now we do need a radical transformation of our social order, and that educators, especially those in higher education, must take charge.

Perelman would agree, I think, that it is easier to say where his recent book is coming from than where it's going. The Global Mind: Beyond the Limits to Growth (Mason/Charter, New York, 1976) has its origin in discoveries from the late sixties and early seventies that are familiar to many of us: the discovery that Los Angeles smog is very different from its New York counterpart; the revelations of the Earth Day handbook, devoured in a single night by Perelman ("I felt as if the scales had fallen from my eyes"), and certification that this ecological thing was a real crisis, by everyman's metaphysical seer, Walter Cronkite. But the destination toward which Perelman is pointing us is less familiar. If there are limits to growth which are about to force significant changes in the lives of us earth-people, what sort of new world must we create to survive? If we need a new world, what sorts of minds must educators call into existence in their students? And if 'new minds' are to be created, then by what sort of curriculum is this to be brought about? In speaking to these questions, Perelman attempts both to reflect the cultural evolution that is already upon us and to guide that evolution along paths that he thinks can lead to survival and possibly even a new -- "ecotopian" -- state of human well-being.

The Ecotopian Vision.

Perelman's subtitle, "Beyond the Limits to Growth" is an important clue to his first (though lesser) purpose. In his opening chapters, his intent is to underscore the message of the first Club of Rome report as written by his sometime collaborators, Dennis and Donella Meadows, under the title The Limits to Growth (Universe Books, New York, 1972). The message is: Even allowing for the most optimistic hypotheses of salvation by technological or social breakthroughs (e.g. radically increased crop yields or a leveling off of population growth) some fundamental breakdown in the planetary system appears unavoidable within the next century. The computer simulation variables for industrial and population growth, and for food demand, depletion of resources, and pollution simply cannot be manipulated, given their causal interconnectedness in a finite system, to yield any other prospect. And those who think otherwise, says Perelman, must be classed as "flat-earth" economists, whose assertions that our round earth has infinite capacities for growth are reminiscent of the celebrated case of The Church of Rome vs. Galileo. (Perelman knows, of course, that there's a great deal more to be said -- and being said -- about all this. It is perhaps unfortunate that his response to the critics of Limits to Growth is limited to a rebuttal of a New York Times Book Review critique. One wishes that he had responded as well to the critiques of the University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit, or to the second Club of Rome report by Mesarovic and Pestel.)

But the questions of the growth debate itself -- How many more? How much longer? -- are not to the point of Perelman's overall objective. As he indicated in his earlier Growth and Education (a report to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, published by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, Boulder, Colorado, 1974), his main concern is to help define and to promote a "beyond limits" debate. Much as the dispute over whether the world is round between Galileo and the Pope gave way to the discussion about how sailors should navigate, so the problem of fixing precisely where the limits to growth lie, in either time or place, must give way to the problem of how rational persons should proceed to facilitate the new world order, given that there is clearly some basic flaw in the assumptions underlying the present one. More specifically, Perelman is setting out to help chart a course for the educator -- in the broadest sense of that term -- who needs desperately to know something of what a reasonable vision might be for himself and his students to aim at in a world that's becoming aware of limits to growth, and who also needs to know by what curriculum

and what instructional methods we might hope to transform present into future realities.

The central argument of The Global Mind is a philosophical argument that proposes a new way of looking at our world, a new conceptual framework. Perelman takes his cue from Gregory Bateson's observation that "there is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds." The "bad ideas" Perelman tags the "hardworld" perspective and the preferred paradigm he calls the "softworld" outlook, by analogy to the hardware-software distinction in the domain of computer technology. The "hard-world" vision is that originally provided by classical physics -- "a clockwork sort of model based on 'causes and effects' or 'forces and impacts.'" This is a world composed of atomic elements whose leading inhabitants share a faith that no crisis can develop that will exceed the saving power of our technology. The softworld view of reality is "more like that of contemporary general systems theory, whose basis is one of 'relationship' and 'information,' where holistic thinking, a flexible and projective outlook, and a concern for cultivating the skills of peace-making predominate." (GM, C.3) (Similar efforts to formulate an ecologically sound metaphysics can be found in Hardin's Exploring New Ethics for Survival, where the contrasts between the outlooks of physicists and biologists are elaborated in some detail; and in Peter Gunter's article, "The Big Thicket: A Case Study in Attitudes Toward Environment," which identifies the postulates of infinity (spatial, temporal, and material), atomistic structure, and manipulability as the fundamental "bad ideas.")

Perelman's diagnostic thesis is, of course, that the hardworld perspective has dominated human consciousness and that it is largely responsible for the perilous situation in which we now find ourselves. His prescription is that only by adopting the softworld paradigm can we hope to make the necessary shift from "the age of exponential growth" to the "age of equilibrium." Because the prescriptive side of his argument holds the larger import for educators, it is on this side of his discussion that I wish to focus attention. There are two further reasons for this. The first is that I think much of his proposal is sound and deserving of the attention of educators at every level. The second is that I think there are important philosophical corrections that ought to be made at several places in Perelman's prescription, if it is to be adequate to its purpose.

The "Educated Person": A New Model

One of these corrections has to do with the new model of "the educated person" put forward by Perelman. Let us assume that an educator might be willing to accept the softworld vision of a world where survival, welfare, and even development are possible because mankind's activities are grounded in and limited by a sound ecological awareness. Obviously, the educator, being a practical person, will have to translate this vision into a conceptual framework suitable to his/her tasks. This implies asking the question, what sort of person can count as an educated person within this new framework?

Perelman adopts the name "transformer" to introduce his view of the new "educated person." "Historical concepts of the educated person -- the philosopher king and the Renaissance man -- are no longer applicable to the contemporary human and planetary condition." (GM, 268) What is needed instead are persons whose education makes them skillful agents for social change. A radical "transformation" and nothing less will be needed if we are to attain an equilibrium condition, and attain it soon enough. Hence, the change agents that the educational system will have to produce are to be called "transformers." This new breed of "educated leaders" are to be distinguished from certain other types of change agents: (a) from the guru, who limits his effectiveness by sticking to efforts at self-perfection; (b) from the jet-set, "outside expert" reformer who remains ineffective because his own wealth or status exempts him from a personal involvement in the problems to be solved; and (c) from the political revolutionary whose violence tends to leave the social order relatively intact in its essential relations.

The transformer, by contrast, will be a person whose style is shaped by a softworld perspective, who "understands the counterintuitive nature of many problems of change and appreciates that the proper use of information is usually a more powerful instrument of change than direct force." (GM, 219) Some of the social roles for transformers that Perelman identifies are that of broker, referral agent, matchmaker, facilitator, systems expediter, network manager, "underground" manager, network builder, gadfly, whistle-blower, (e.g. Daniel Ellsberg), brakeman, conflict manager, evaluator, observer, futurist, historian, transitions assistant (this last, a sort of temporal "flight attendant" helping people function "under conditions of instability and stress"). It is characteristic of these roles that they are not located in established institutions; they

are meta-institutional, inter-institutional, or just non-institutional. This is to be expected, of course, as the very purpose of their work will be to make it possible for mankind to move from existing institutional orders into new arrangements compatible with the ecotopian vision.

What are we to say of this new claimant to the title of "educated person" with its implications for the reorientating of our educational ideal and purposes? It will be illuminating, I think, to examine Perelman's model by comparing it to another model which has enjoyed rather wide influence in recent years in the English speaking world. I have in mind the model that R. S. Peters elaborated first in his essay "Education as Initiation" (in Reginald Archambault, editor, Philosophical Analysis and Education, London, 1965). This model does share with the philosopher king and Renaissance man models a central commitment to knowledge and understanding, but has the advantage for our purposes of being free from some of the historical encumbrances of those earlier ideals.

Peters, following Mill and others, begins his model building by setting aside a certain very wide conception of education according to which, as Mill puts the point, "whatever helps to shape the human being [including laws, forms of government, the industrial arts, modes of social life, even natural influences like soil, climate, etc.], to make the individual what he is or hinder from being what he is not, is part of his education." ("Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrews," Francis W. Garforth, editor, John Stuart Mill on Education, New York, 1971, p. 154). The trouble with thinking of "educated person" under this wide definition is that everyone is included under the concept, and no criteria are provided by which deliberate efforts to develop a certain sort of person, especially a certain sort of leader, can be guided or criticized. A concept of "educated person" which embodies such specific criteria is, I think, the shared central concern of not only Mill and Peters, but Perelman as well. As Perelman remarks, "In this book I have coined the term transformer as a general label for the kind of new educated person I think is needed, one capable of leading (emphasis mine) the transformation of dynamically conservative social systems from a state of crisis to one of equilibrium." (GM, 269) The comparison of Peters' and Perelman's views which follows relates to how we are to shape the image of the leadership of our social order, an image which presumably has particular relevance to the education of students in the liberal arts and professions in our colleges and universities.

Peters' educated person will be one who has been initiated into certain valuable public traditions, thereby achieving a (a) breadth, and (b) depth of knowledge and understanding to which he has become (c) personally

committed as having (d) intrinsic worth. Viewed in terms of Aristotle's definition per genus et differentia, this model or profile lays down knowledge and understanding as the genus of the educated person, and then specifies a series of differentia which rule out various types of persons-having-knowledge as qualifying for the title of "educated person." The "breadth" criterion rules out the person whose knowledge is restricted to a narrow area of scholarship or expertise. The "depth" criterion requires that one's knowledge be more than mere information, but be grounded in a solid understanding of conceptual frameworks, modes of justification, and the like -- in short, that one have theoretical competence. The "personal commitment" criterion implies that education is no mere cognitive rucksack to be donned or slucked at will, but an imprinting upon one's life that would make the phrase "life-long education" redundant. The "intrinsic work" criterion -- perhaps the most crucial of the differentia -- eliminates such knowledgeable persons as value their cognitive achievements simply for their utilitarian or instrumental worth, such as technicians (considered as a type) and possibly persons whose knowledge is commonly classed as "professional" (although the notion of "professional ethics" implies a commitment to intrinsic values that makes the case of the professional person less easy to classify).

How should the educator respond, faced with a choice between Peters' ideal of the person initiated into the cherished traditions of human knowledge and understanding that purport to illuminate what is of most value in a distinctively human existence, and Perelman's ideal of the agent of radical transformation, dedicated to rescuing the very possibility of that existence? The choice is not to be taken lightly, for what is at stake is both the long-range future of human civilization (insofar as that may lie in the hands of the educator) and the existential redefinition of the educator's own life project.

My view is that Perelman's transformer ideal should indeed be incorporated, and the sooner the better, into the educator's conceptual framework. But its rightful place is not as a replacement for the traditional conception of the educated person, but rather as a new model of the professional person. The basis for this criticism is that, in Mill's famous words, "Men are men before they are lawyers or physicians or merchants or manufacturers; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians." (Mill on Education, 156) Restated in the language of Perelman's "roles for transformers," the premise becomes: "Men are men before they are facilitators, or network builders or conflict managers or futurists; and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible facilitators or network builders."

Many of the central activities of civilized social orders are carried out by practical persons -- nurses and doctors, attorneys, craftsmen, industrialists -- individuals whose business is to apply what we know about our world and ourselves to the tasks of promoting the survival, the well-being, and the development of human beings as individuals and in groups. At the level where these activities require leadership, as distinct from "mere" technical competence, the traditional name for the social role involved is that of "the professional." And, although the name "professional" has been beaten about rather severely lately -- often with very good reason -- it seems to me a useful notion, particularly because it enables us to conceptualize a role that is different from that of "the technician" on the one hand and "the educated person" on the other. Mill's point is that the primary task of higher education is not the preparation of professional persons to apply basic knowledge in the pursuit of what are deemed to be worthwhile objectives. Rather, the educator's task is to focus on "what every generation owes to the next, as that on which its civilization and worth will principally depend." (Mill on Education, 155) In other words, an educated person is best defined by what he or she is, more than by what he or she can do, even though these are intimately related. And what it means to be an educated person is, for present purposes, that which is spelled out in Peters' profile: to have a depth and breadth of understanding that is informed by a personal commitment to intrinsic values as such.

The implication of this viewpoint for Perelman's thesis is that the "transformer" vocabulary simply isn't large enough to spell out the meaning of "educated person." And the reason is that no matter how desperately we need transformers (facilitators, network builders, conflict managers, futurists, etc.), these agents of social change cannot adequately carry out the tasks of restoring the possibility of a future for man unless they know what it is that must be transformed into what, and why. In other words, educators must insure, if they are to do their job adequately, that either the "new professionals" themselves (cf. the book by this title, edited by Ronald Gross and Paul Osterman) or those who will provide the knowledge-base and the direction for their transformational activities, must be educated persons in the sense that Mill and Peters have in view. Otherwise, we shall still not have escaped the predicament described by Ortega in The Revolt of the Masses: ". . . the direction of society has been taken over by a type of man who is not interested in the principles of civilization." The man of action, who will be indispensable in bringing about transformation in the social order, must be guided by the man of reflective wisdom whose historically informed consciousness carries the values which make civilization worth saving. "We have need of history in its entirety," says Ortega, "not to

fall back into it, but to see if we can escape from it." (Revolt of the Masses, New York, 1932, p. 96)

Assuming the essential soundness of this critique of Perelman's new candidate for the title "educated person," several cautions must be added immediately, which reflect my earlier affirmation that "much of [Perelman's] proposal is sound and deserving of the attention of educators at every level." I state these cautions as a series of obligations which the educator must take upon himself if he/she concurs in my rejection of Perelman's proposal for reconceiving the meaning of "educated person:" first, (1) the educator is obliged to keep in mind that the "schooled" or "credentialed" person who emerges from today's institutions of higher learning is by no stretch of the imagination to be identified with the "educated person" of the Peters' model; (2) the educator is obliged to guard assiduously against the sort of corruption of the Peters' model that might be called the "19th century English gentleman" ideal, where this implies "education" as a luxury for the children of the wealthy, where the cultivation of the traditional disciplines, breadth of learning and non-instrumental values, only serves to perpetuate the existing social order; most importantly, (3) the educator who chooses to guide his work by the more conservative ideal of "educated person as initiate" undertakes the obligation to proceed in constant awareness that "there's a war on." That is, liberal arts and professional educators need to be aware that values and both pure and applied knowledge must now be transmitted to learners who have lost forever the right to any assurance that human life or a "quality" human existence is guaranteed for themselves or future generations.

A Curriculum for Transformers.

I have argued in support of the sense of urgency surrounding Perelman's prescription that educators ought to turn out "transformers" even though being an educated person ultimately means more than being a social change agent of a certain sort. And I have suggested that educators, both in professional schools and in liberal arts institutions, ought to incorporate the notion of "transformer" as a way of reconceptualizing what it means to be a professional person. What are the curricular implications for educators of this qualified acceptance of the transformer goal? And what critical assessment can be offered regarding Perelman's "curriculum for transformers"?

37.

In his discussion of "an adequate ecological education," Perelman lays down six general criteria for an adequate curriculum. As he sees it, such an education must be:

- "1. Multilevel. It must function at all three major levels of learning -- Learning I, Learning II, and Learning III. [See below]
- "2. Interdisciplinary. It must span the boundaries between conventional disciplinary and professional fields. Sometimes this is called transdisciplinary, a-disciplinary, or nondisciplinary
- "3. Problem-centered. It must focus on and be responsive to the critical problems of the real world
- "4. Future-oriented. Rather than concentrating on the past and serving the status quo, it must be forward-looking and concerned with the imagination, design, and realization of alternative, sustainable futures.
- "5. Global must not be parochial, chauvinistic, or provincial in its perspective
- "6. Humanistic. It must be concerned with the maximum realization of what is commonly known as "human potential." This includes not merely the development of cognitive and affective skills but also the development of the kind of physical competency associated with the control of physiological states through meditation, yoga, biofeedback, and conditioning, as well as the kind of spiritual competency associated with psychic phenomena, altered states of consciousness, and mystical and religious experience." (GM, 223-4)

The global perspective criterion (#5) seems to me both clear in its intent and unexceptionable in its merit. For each of the other criteria, I would like to offer a brief explanation and/or evaluation.

Perelman's "multilevel" theory of learning is derived from Gregory Bateson's discussion of a hierarchy of learning levels in Steps to An Ecology of Mind (New York, 1972). The key idea here is that of logically distinct types of learning activities. At the most basic level (Learning I) the goal is the "adaptive transformation of existing control (including information processing) systems." (GM, 234) For ecological education, some specific objectives might be reducing litter, increasing recycling, adopting family planning, eliminating biochemical warfare -- the stress in each case being on changing the makeup of behavior patterns.

In Learning II, the focus is on learning to learn, i.e. "learning or cultivating the skills of various forms of Learning I; learning to transform Learning I systems; and learning . . . character or personality traits." (GM, 235) Perelman offers, as examples, the tasks of learning to be persistent in critical questioning, learning alternative problem-solving modes, and learning systems-thinking. He criticizes traditional scientific methodology (the rational/experimental approach) as being seriously limited by its simple, linear, analytic and statistical nature; and he suggests that where complex systems are under study -- which will be the case if basic ecological principles come to shape our inquiry -- then a much more effective methodology will be one which combines an existential awareness of the role of the inquirer, with a systematic appreciation for the breadth of scope that a meaningful inquiry must have.

But even learning-to-learn does not complete the educational process, because it too often traps learners into "cages fashioned from bad ideas," i.e. into self-validating frameworks that inhibit continued growth. "The crucial objective of Learning III is not just the redefinition of the self, but, beyond that, the attainment of a conception of selfhood that is fluid and transmutable." (GM, 240) Perelman includes a long list of items for possible inclusion in the Learning III curriculum, from meditation to values engineering, from Outward Bound training to Yoga and Zen; but he stresses that the Learning III curriculum is largely uncharted territory and not all these "ways" are obviously appropriate for ecological education. The main point is, I think, that there are a variety of learning-to-learn modes, and a corresponding variety of conceptions of self, and that some provision for dealing with this fact must be made in an adequate curriculum for an ecological education. (This suggestion leads directly to critical issues in philosophical anthropology, with important roots in Kant's critique of Hume's theory of the self. But I leave the discussion of this for another occasion.) This point is connected with Perelman's "humanistic" requirement for the adequate ecological curriculum. It is, I think, unfortunate that both Learning III and the "humanistic" criterion are discussed only in terms of programs usually connected with the recent "human potential movement," such as Yoga, biofeedback, Outward Bound, and the like. It would be folly to ignore such programs for educational growth. But it would be equally foolish, I think, to omit from this part of the ecological education curriculum the riches of human sensibility and understanding embodied in the traditional liberal disciplines -- history, literature, religious thought, philosophy, the fine arts, jurisprudence, etc., as well as the natural and social sciences.

In introducing into this review some of the disciplines of learning around

which liberal arts and professional education have traditionally been organized, I also provide a perspective from which to criticize Perelman's other three criteria for the adequate ecological education -- that it must be interdisciplinary, problem-centered, and future-oriented. Much of Perelman's advice to the educators seems to me to be essentially sound as educational theory, and also quite consistent with what thoughtful critics of actual institutional practices have been saying for some time. Thus they constitute not so much new theory, as a reaffirmation of what we already know to be wrongheaded about common instructional procedures in contemporary colleges and universities. For example, Perelman wants us to place emphasis on "process and form, on cybernetic structure, on unifying principles that govern dynamic behavior, rather than on categorical pigeonholing, naming of parts, simplistic pairing of cause and effect;" and we are advised to stress the "rules of the game and the strategy of play, rather than . . . the score of the game and the names of the players." (GM, 186) This is an important point to make, given what actually goes on in university courses. But it should be kept in perspective, as a reaffirmation of guidance that can be found in Dewey, Whitehead, and Peters, along with any number of other well-known educational theorists. Perelman is also on solid ground as well as in the company of numerous important critics when he observes that "many aspects of traditional disciplinary studies may take on new meaning and relevance in the context of ecological education" (GM, 247) and "This trend [to leave students free to 'do their own thing'] seems to be based partly on an erroneous presumption that people can anticipate the value of knowledge or experience they have not yet acquired." (GM, 248)

But there is one respect in which Perelman's theoretical framework seems to me to be weak. And if I am correct, there is more of a case than he allows for teaching which is disciplinary in orientation, and which invites students to look very carefully at the intellectual-cultural heritage which forms the context within which current problems and future solutions must be understood. What I have in mind bears on what is involved in recognizing and defining a "problem." Perelman's paradigmatic educational setting seems to be one where the various disciplines provide various "tools and skills" by which certain presumably obvious "real-world" problems may be intelligently treated, and alternative future solutions may be identified and assessed. Now it is true that certain problems are obvious, not only at the level of survival, but also where human welfare and development are concerned. And it is true that our experiences of cognitive dissonance serve to focus these problems in our consciousness. But Perelman himself points out, that there are important cases where it's not clear what "the problem" is:

"... it was the better part of a decade before Rachel Carson's recognition of DDT as a problem came to be shared by most of the scientific establishment. Similarly, it took a Ralph Nader to get the automobile industry to treat safety as a problem. On the other hand, Andrew Weil looked at the problem of 'drug abuse' . . . and concluded that the real problem was the treatment of drug use as a problem, just as Ronald Laing concluded that the major problem with schizophrenia was the practice of treating people manifesting this form of behavior as 'sick.'" (GM, 238)

Every college teacher knows that for his students to recognize his jokes (or he/she theirs!), there must be some kind of established framework delineating what is logical, normal, ethical, factual, fitting, and perhaps even sacred. The same conditions that make humor possible are needed for the recognition of problems. And what I think is insufficiently understood by Perelman is that often it is precisely the initiation of learners into the basic knowledge-disciplines that establishes, for them, these problem-determining frameworks. What enables a person to see DDT as a problem, or more of a problem than a solution, is his/her being on the inside of the discipline of ecology, with its characteristic sets of concepts, principles, and modes of validating beliefs as normal or factual. A framework that determines what behavior is ethical among diverse factions in a society is necessary in order to identify automobile safety as a problem. And the examples could be multiplied at length. It seems equally clear that only where basic knowledge frameworks exist and are shared by members of a community (of scholars, or citizens), can problems be sorted out into those which are trivial and those which are fundamental, a point familiar to all who have wrestled with the demand for relevance in setting up curricula.

Moreover, the value of grounding education -- liberal or professional -- in the disciplines lies not merely in this being indispensable to the recognition of problems. It lies, too, in the fact that the solving (or, as we more often ought to say, the managing) of problems depends upon persons coming to the problems equipped with considerable intellectual power of a sort that can only come from being solidly grounded in the arts and sciences that make up our intellectual heritage. In some parts of his discussion, Perelman seems to recognize this. But what seems to me to be insufficiently recognized is that a shift to problem-centered education could have an inverse relationship to the achievement of problem-solving potency in our students. Solving problems requires not only knowing how to seek the best answers to questions that have been formulated, but perhaps more importantly, knowing what questions to formulate. How shall we best describe this event, or activity, or object? What causal

relationships is it involved in? Does it have a past that is worth trying to understand? Is it ethically or aesthetically or spiritually significant? By what logical or mathematical relationships can we best know it? Can we predict its future? By what criteria should we assess its desirability as against the value of alternative future events, activities or objects? Certainly there are and will be other questions -- I'm quite willing to stand with Perelman on the importance of Learning III and against the Kantian confidence in a fully developed architectonic of rationality. But these are questions which a really competent problem-solver will need to know how to ask, incisively, imaginatively, judiciously. And this knowledge is grounded in the basic knowledge-disciplines of history, science, mathematics, logic, ethics, the arts, and so on. And only if our students are adequately equipped with this depth and variety of intellectual-emotive power, can we hope for the efforts at interdisciplinary, problem-centered and future-oriented education to be as effective as we so desperately need them to be.

For centuries, Western educators have carried out their tasks under the Socratic dictum, "the unexamined life is not worth living." And, for the last two of these centuries, educators in the United States have often looked to the Socratic model in shaping their conception of the "educated person" and the curriculum for higher learning. What Perelman and others are telling us now is that "the unexamined life doesn't stand a chance." It seems to me that, if educators are to stand a chance of winning their race against catastrophe, their philosophical vision will need to encompass both the traditional learning that is appropriate to free human beings and the transformational imperative set forth in The Global Mind.

CHAPTER 5.

A PHILOSOPHY FOR CULTURAL DEPRIVATION.

SARRA ENRIQUEZ, PI FARR, FRANK SAUNDERS.

To many of us it is trite to be reminded that experience is something less than meaningful when it is without signification. Yet many programs for the educational improvement of the "Culturally Deprived" child seem to be designed to extend the range of his experiences without deliberately focusing on the problem of meaning in experience.

The "realia" of the classroom are employed as part of the "enrichment" program for the child's experiences while the "forms" by which the experiences are given signification are usually neglected. The tendency of instructional programs to begin "in the experience" of the child, "to begin where the child is" presupposes a philosophic commitment to some ontological priority of meaning and data. Problems of knowledge bases are left, somehow, to the mere summation of experiences. The purpose of this paper is to describe the context of "cultural deprivation" in certain epistemological terms with the intent of refocusing the meaning of "deprivation" as a deprivation of meaning forms rather than of extended experience, of conceptual variations instead of content.

The literature is replete with variations on the definitions for "cultural deprivation." There is even a strange security on the part of some teachers to think they should call the rose by some other name. Let's join the naming game. But rather than add to the list, let's try to give meaning to the present proliferation.

Cultural deprivation will here be used to designate the condition of children who seem to have gained little meaning from their exposure to the general cultural framework, a condition in which even their subcultural circumstance has provided limited meaning. Elaboration and proliferation; abstraction and nuance are lost to the deprived child. The slum child is from an isolated or insulated area where "survival" is the issue, where the parents are dissociated and disinterested in cultural transmission or ethnic peers, and where the absence of generalization or abstraction

precludes history, diversity, or language complexity. The child of a migrant worker could be a case in point. The child may not know or could not know diversity in options. He has no value conflict, he has no options.

The "disadvantaged child" can be taken to refer to the child who is simply at a disadvantage in some competitive system. He is not at a disadvantage in his own context. But, having been "benefited" by the "war on poverty" and the public school curriculum, he now has goals he cannot attain. This child is at a loss to comprehend the fuller meaning of the new goals, yet he knows he should want them. He wants to want to but doesn't know how. How many of us are culturally disadvantaged?

The culturally different child probably represents a case of non-pluralism in our society. Cultures in conflict may each have leaders who in the opposite groups will have problems not because either leader is inadequate in his exhibition of complexity or diversity, but, because his value scheme is somehow incompatible with the goals of the alternative culture. The culturally different child has a value conflict or confusion. The Hopi child in the public school exemplified this case. He is aesthetically alert, integrated into a well organized system of meanings, and has a clear set of values and language patterns. Yet, he will probably not succeed in public school due to his lack of understanding or assimilation of public school objectives.

The question beginning in satire leads to the serious confrontation of curriculum construction and other financial considerations formulated to "help" these children. Is it likely we can help any or all of these children by expanding their experiences? Is the object world in any way whatsoever going to contribute to the educational welfare of these children? Obviously, the questions are loaded as is the philosophic concern.

The claim made by this paper is that when a diagnosis of deprivation is made that only the thought patterns of the child are at fault or need reconstruction, never the experiences as such. Concepts and levels of abstraction, relational and syntactical meanings are impoverished in cases of deprivation, disadvantage, and sometimes in cases of cultural differences.

Is there a philosophic model for describing the thinking habits of deprivation and disadvantage such that educational programs could be constructed to alter the styles or category habits of children in these diagnostic groups?

Styles of thought or cognitive category habits are distinguishable by the kinds and levels of language and by the definitional types employed by the user.

A major feature of this model of thought holds that language and conception, in whatever priority and combination, determine meaning which determines perception and finally the character of the "real." (The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis entails a variation on this thesis.)

The experiences of the child in the "direct," "concrete," "immediate" sense do not and cannot provide relational referents nor can they participate in a rising hierarchy of meanings in abstraction.

If the deprived child's thought patterns cannot make use of relational meanings in ever increasing degrees of inclusion and refinement, no abstraction is possible: no abstract-relational meaning, no future and no past — only a spurious present.

In the process of thought growth, children can be seen to proceed from "survival" literal conception to general description; from classification to categorization, and from generalization to relational contextual meaning. This change in "style" of thought could see the deprived child as one fixed in the first phase rather than as deprived of all meaning. Modified learning programs could take on the task of diagnosis of style and designed improvement of relational-contextual patterns.

One hypothesis which could be tested from the "style" concern could be: If the cognitive style of the individual is determined by his possible language usage, and if the culturally disadvantaged have a language pattern restricted to operational or concrete references, then the child from a minority group where everyday life is a "survival" situation will define in any given context in terms of descriptive or usage language, topical rather than abstract, generic, relational, categorical or inferential frameworks.

The conceptual style will then be impoverished as is the language usage. Where this cognitive "style" is a pervasive, category habit, the world will "look" impoverished regardless of the diversity of experiences presented by the curricular form. Operational or usage language without relational generic criteria is blind: no futurity or contextual system, no meaning possible. In other words, until the criteria of our experience have been decided, experience could not be significant of anything or even be problematic.

Education for deprivation must include, if not be designed by the goals of reflective and critical formulation of integrative principles in language (syntax), conceptual style (relational contextual category habits), and stylization (aesthetics).

The "reals" in experience do not teach. Rather the conceptual forms anticipate experience, categorize whatever is to have meaning, and indeed, legislate reality. The culturally deprived apparently cannot judge. Here resides the educational challenge.

It must be clear at this point that the culturally deprived child is not to be confused with the handicapped child or one who cannot employ abstract relationships for whatever reason (probable neurological impairment). Instead the culturally deprived child does not habitually appeal to categorical-generic systems for judgments of meaning. An example of "horizontal" elaboration in the absence of forms for abstraction ascension, can be found in groups claiming "natural rhythm" or other special abilities, e.g., dancing for Negroes.

The conception proposed here is in direct conflict with and precludes the notion that cognitive structure is limited by inherited generic conditions. In effect, intelligence is "learnable" to the extent that a teaching-learning context is one where levels of abstraction, the language of these levels, and the theoretical systems in which this language functions are given priority. Intelligence in this sense is a process, not a magnitude, in which humans are engaged in categorical, inferential, contextual-relational processes. The integrative describes the process of intelligencing.

Now what of the hypothesis indicated earlier that the child's "style" of thought is conditioned by his language category habits, and definitional usage. The culturally deprived child has an impoverished style because he is neglected in his appeal to these elements.

The teaching of this idea could begin in the analysis of kind and variety of definitional habits used by any given child. Literal and "experience bound" definitions characterize the culturally deprived child.

Definitions are incomplete, non-generic, and without nuance. "Dog" would be defined at the "four legs," "furry," and "barks" level.

Where the culturally deprived child has a less inclusive definitional scheme, he is not likely to abstract or generalize to integrating principles. Since meaning feeds on meaning, the higher order processes

are contingent on successive feed-back of more abstract relational functions. The selective loss of data from the thought of the culturally deprived child results in greater impoverishment while the same loss in a contextual-relational style of thought probably indicates a loss which has been converted or subsumed into a general conception.

A distinction could be made here between the culturally deprived and culturally disadvantaged in that the deprived child finds no option in "higher order" processes and elaboration. The disadvantaged child may well see an option which remains beyond him temporarily. He may seek alternate elaborations of an aesthetic nature rather than continue to compete in a theoretical world where verification possibilities rule out his participation (he lacks categorical tools or conceptual style).

Again the hypothesis of a culturally deprived style includes the component of transactional difficulties. One upshot of this difficulty is the poor syntactical model found with culturally deprived children. This feature of the culturally deprived thought means for one thing that the child cannot dispense with empirical props as soon as do his non-deprived contemporaries. Poor language forms, syntax, and definitional styles by their continued usage provoke and reinforce specific and limited relationships.

The culturally deprived child has a consistent method or definitional style by which he mediates his environment. The cognitive process can change levels only as the pervasive category habits change. The preference of the culturally deprived child for the immediate or direct in experience is understandable where delayed goals and futurity are rendered opaque by his inability to conceptualize the non present. The intensity of aspiration is directly proportionate to the time delay possible in goal setting. A culturally deprived style cannot sustain the non present in symbolic form, nor can it develop an enthusiasm for that transactional process involving relational propositions. Is it any wonder the culturally deprived child is a dropout and "basic" student?

It has been suggested that the form of language and choice for definition type are components of a category habit for explanation. The style of the culturally deprived child is characterized as impoverished in syntax, poor elaboration of concepts, poor relational abstractions, and inability to sustain goals not a corporate part of his immediate experiences.

In the classroom the culturally deprived child can be described best as one who prefers visual object lessons, short explanations, personally relevant examples, and acted out responses or participation, univocal

usage of terms devoid of nuance in the "survival" style, and clichés. The culturally deprived child's parsimony of language and short range actions are based on an inadequate elaboration habit rather than on a concern for methodological precision. Topical abstractions can be meaningful to the culturally deprived child but any effort of the teacher to sustain a sequence of abstract usage will predictably be met with disappointment. These characteristics have led many educators to design wider "experience" ranges rather than better forms for abstraction. Focus is usually on detail. Yet details and descriptions do not carry adequate prescriptions for change. The philosophic commitment carries the value claim.

Direct educational implications for culturally deprived children, then, on the basis of this paper, consist first in the caution that enrichment of experience is only enrichment where relations, futurity, and integrative principles have provided for greater signification. This concept rejects the progression of meaning from experience to conception. Indeed the converse is held to be the most appropriate form for educating the culturally deprived children.

Finally, in a more specific sense, an implication can be found by converting the descriptions of a contextual relational style into a goal for the culturally deprived child. Any analysis of the characteristics of the deprived child should help educators to program for change, i.e., impoverished syntax as a diagnosis implicates the goal of improving syntactical constructions.

The entire issue of this paper turns, however, on the assertion that a model of explanation of the conceptual variety is more adequate to the education of children than the "experience" or "discovery" models in education.

CHAPTER 6.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: EXCELLENCE, EQUALITY, AND EDUCATION.

ROBERT W. BURNS.

The thesis which I offer for your intellectual audit tonight is that excellence in education is inhibited by an extreme egalitarianism (1) and that an overemphasis on equality, in education or society, must necessarily come at the sacrifice of freedom, in education or society.

I.

This thesis runs counter to the common, implicit, and unexamined assumption in the minds of many today, particularly in the thought of those who identify and pride themselves as liberals: that a liberal democratic social philosophy postulates that liberty and equality mutually and necessarily reinforce each other; that the free society cannot have one without the other; and that the diminution of one entails the diminution of the other, just as the growth of one entails the growth of the other.

This relationship is not without intuitive basis, and its roots grow at least as deep into history as the two major revolutions of the eighteenth century, (2) the American and the French, whose events and justifications were in large part legitimate children from the parentage of the Enlightenment. Our own Declaration of Independence, in its most famous and oft-quoted phrase, conjoins liberty and equality when it declares that

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."

And the élan of French democracy is yet captured by the linkage of liberty and equality in the famous revolutionary slogan, "Liberté! Egalité! Fraternité!" which became official in 1793 and remains so today.

But is it heresy -- and if it is, recall that one of our tasks as philosophers of education is to examine the assumptions which undergird policies and practices in education -- is it heresy to ask if the relationship between liberty and equality is in truth inseparable and mutually reinforcing in the liberal democratic society?

My thesis tonight is intended to provide a preliminary analysis of that question; and the analysis, admittedly incomplete, is based on an argument which holds that liberty and equality are not inescapably and inseparably transitive; and its conclusion, on some application of the Aristotelian "Golden Mean," is that unless we moderate our pursuit of happiness through equality we run the risk, first, of brutalizing excellence in education; second, by so doing, of endangering liberty; and finally, by so doing, extinguishing any expression of meaningful equality in our schools, our society, and in our lives.

Let me underscore the incompleteness and inadequacy of what you hear tonight. I ask you to take these comments as the first, perhaps awkward and perhaps wrong, step in dialogue which I trust will prompt questions and responses from you, out of which we might construct a dialogue of benefit and, in time, perhaps, a paper of considerably more substance, thought, and scholarship than this opening comment. To stimulate discussion I have cast this in a polemical tone.

While the thesis is certainly not of the "gloom and doom" genre it does run counter to the common, implicit belief of many that liberty and equality could not possibly, in any way, be opposed the one to the other.

The exploration of that thesis, since I referred to the American and French revolutions which so dramatically encapsulated the organic relationship between liberty and equality, might be initiated by a set of excerpts from he who was student of both, Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote:

"It has been said a hundred times that our contemporaries [ca. 1835] are far more ardently and tenaciously attached to equality than to freedom; but . . . "

"It is possible to imagine an extreme point at which freedom and equality would meet and be confounded together . . . "

"That political freedom may compromise in its excesses the tranquility, the property, the lives of individuals, is obvious . . . [b]ut on the contrary, none but the attentive and clear-sighted men perceive the perils with which equality threatens us "

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"I think that democratic communities have a natural taste for freedom: left to themselves, they will seek it, cherish it, and view any privation of it with regret. But for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery." (3)

That is the danger: in our passion for equality we may sacrifice liberty. More specifically, and in an educational context, that in our justifiable and defensible drive for equal opportunity we may sacrifice excellence, and by sacrificing excellence in education we endanger the very foundations of liberty; for more than any other, a free society demands and depends upon excellence for its very survival.

A discussion of equality, if it is to be intelligible, requires some definition of the key term. There is no meaning of "equality" to which all would nod heads and subscribe, as the term or concept is certainly not self-defining. Certainly the meaning of "equality" is not at all as clear and as simple as the egalitarians would have us believe. Even so, some commonly understood and accepted elements of the application of equality ought not be impossible to identify, for whatever else may or may not be meant by the term "equality" surely it means at least that each individual has or should have worth or dignity in common; that each individual has or should have common civil, legal, and political rights; and that each individual has or should have common access or opportunity in the pursuit of happiness.

But does it mean more than that? Can it mean more than that? Certainly the egalitarians put more meaning to it than a reference to the rights which we share in common because we are, first, human beings and, second, citizens of a particular republic.

The egalitarians assume, implicitly as judged from their actions if not explicitly as taken from their writings, that "equality" in fact means "identity." On this definition equal rights means identical rights; equal treatment means identical treatment; and equal opportunity means identical opportunity.

While dictionary definitions solve few disputes it is instructive to note that the Oxford Universal Dictionary lends some comfort to the egalitarians, for it defines "equality" as meaning

"... freedom from fluctuation or variation. To make uniform. To level. to match." (4)

Clearly that definition is accurate insofar as it reflects the definition in the minds of the egalitarians: equality means identity.

It is on such a definition, and other considerations more of an ideological rather than lexical source, that egalitarians conclude that no one should be better or be judged better in any way than anyone else; that no one should be treated differently than anyone else; that if conditions of status or result or achievement are not identical, they are not equal and, therefore, are intolerable in a society of equals. Morality, therefore, requires society to make uniform, to level, those differences by placing artificial restraints on some and the provision of special treatment for others.

It takes no logician, of course, to observe the contradiction in such an egalitarian thesis: in the name of equality, inequalities are justified.

Contemporary egalitarianism of this nature did not come upon us yesterday. Its history is traceable to the pre-Socratics, but perhaps its most well-known forerunner was Jean Jacques Rousseau who argued that because nature erred in making individuals unequal, society must remedy nature's mistake by aiming to make them equal.

But the social remediation of nature's action is not easily, if at all accomplished: for individuals can be made equal only at the cost of liberty, if then, and equality apart from freedom seems not a frail definition of slavery.

The perceptive Aristotle identified the danger of egalitarianism, that it easily leads to extremes. He summarized the illogic of egalitarianism by noting that their error lies in the belief that if individuals are equal in any respect, then they should be equal in all respects -- a fallacy which justifies a universal generalization on the basis of an existential specification.

The consequence of this, as Edmund Burke pointed out, is that

"The true danger is, when liberty is nibbled away, for expedients and by parts. Those who attempt to level never equalize. . . [they] only change and pervert the order of things." (5)

But one need not subscribe to the classic liberalism of Edmund Burke to conclude that egalitarianism, out of a quasi-religious moral fervor, a fervor which subordinates hard facts to soft beliefs, often simply denies that there are any innate differences in capacity, assigning any and all

human variation to nurture and the evils of society rather than to nature and the gifts of individual differences; and, with Rousseau, asserts that social or environing conditions which create, permit, or tolerate differences must be controlled or eliminated. To say that is 1984ish or Brave New Worldish may do some disservice to Rousseau, but certainly not to the contemporary egalitarians who insist that all should be, even if we are not, as alike as peas in a pod: the pod of equality cum identicality.

Equality cum identicality can only refer, even if then, to the political rights we assign to ourselves, individually and collectively, in a social compact. It cannot possible refer to individual skills, abilities, interests, potentials, efforts or achievements for none of us is equal in those respects, if by "equal" we mean "identical." And those are the respects that constitute the differentia of our lives, and give our lives significance and meaning.

John Gardner, himself a passionate defender of equality who fears the dangers of egalitarianism, is well aware that an egalitarianism

"... which ignores differences in native capacity and achievement [,] has not served democracy well. Carried far enough, it means the lopping off of any heads which come above dead level. It means [and here we academics must wryly smile, for perhaps more than others we experience this] committee rule, the individual smothered by the group. And it means the end of that striving for excellence which has produced mankind's greatest achievements." (6)

Egalitarianism, when it assumes the root metaphor of "equality" is "identicality," in practice leads to a levelling, a commonness, a sameness, that can only be called mediocrity; a mediocrity which breeds more of the same. The eventual result of a well-motivated but mean-spirited egalitarianism must be, as that Gloomy Dane, Soren Kierkegaard, predicted, a mediocrity which is "... unrelieved by even the smallest eminence." (7)

But if "equality" is not to mean "identicality" what might be an alternative meaning which would not endanger freedom, which would not, in the name of liberty free the strong to oppress the weak, and which would respect and protect the clear and common intent of "equality" -- that all individuals are or should be possessed of common civil, legal and political rights as well as the right of individual human dignity?

Let me offer, for your consideration and critique, the suggestion that

these ends -- nay, these means and ends -- are better achieved if, instead of finding the meaning of "equality" in the concept of "identity" we find that meaning in the concept of "equity." Again, the OD may be instructive when it defines "equity" as "Fairness. Impartial. Even-handed. Fair and right." (8)

The fundamental and significant difference, of course, is that "equality" as "identity" implies uniformity and conformity, the twin scourges of freedom; but "equality" as "equity" implies variation, pluralism, and an appeal to what is right based upon individual circumstances -- the very themes of the liberal democratic society, and thus a meaning of "equality" which would be in harmony with and extend those very themes.

Ralf Dahrendorf puts the case for "equality" as "equity" when he wrote that

"... liberty means that equality is there for people to be different, and not for the differences of people to be levelled and abolished. . . . The [other] result of a false egalitarianism is that greyness and drabness, that absence of any prospect of individual advancement and collective change which makes certain brands of socialism the enemy of liberty. All men are equal in rank and right as human beings and citizens, but they differ in their abilities and aspirations. To deny such difference is to deny life-chances, thus liberty." (9)

The metaphor of "equality" as "equity" raises the fundamental question of equitable treatment: how ought we treat one another? As T. V. Smith, the only academic ever to hold a triple appointment, as Professor of Philosophy, Politics, and Poetry (at Syracuse University) made clear, in order to treat men as equals we must first recognize their inequalities and, having eliminated spurious inequalities -- such as those based on race, creed, color, sex or age -- the social task and obligation is one of letting each individual

"... shine where he can . . . [and on] this approach, we must give men equal opportunities in order to discover and to turn to full account their different abilities." (10)

On that consideration, and with Dahrendorf,

"I have always assumed that equality provides the floor of the mansion in which liberty flourishes; it is condition, not purpose; equal opportunities are opportunities for unequal choices . . ." (11)

and it is those unequal choices which are not only the taste and flavor

but the very meat of liberty; for without them the foodstuff of our lives is drawn from one menu containing as its only entre the gruel of uniformity which will in time starve our spirit and so the body politic of the free society.

In the free society, in the liberal society, the full expression of equality thus comes in equality of opportunity, and "equality" as "equity" means the liberty to pursue happiness on the basis of a freedom whose meaning is explained, if not exhausted, in terms of the existence of alternatives, the right and the ability to choose among existing alternatives or to create new ones, and the opportunity to try to implement the life choices that one makes. (12)

But the egalitarians even pervert the meaning of equality of opportunity, a perversion stemming from the blinded view that "equality" means "identity," through a circuitously simple-minded rationalization that if equal opportunity does not yield equal results then those unequal results prove the opportunities were not equal.

The only justification for that rationale would be if all individuals were in fact equal, that is, identical, in their natural gifts or abilities; equal, that is, identical, in their interests or efforts; and equal, that is, identical, in their purposes. Yet thousands of years of human experience have failed to sustain such a rationale, and a theory of equality which flies so contrary to the course of human experience ought not be invested with a great deal of confidence.

There are even other internal logical difficulties with the egalitarian argument. Even if equal opportunities should imply equal outcomes, the fact of unequal abilities and efforts would yield unequal outcomes even in the context of equal opportunities. Thus, once again, the achievement of equal outcomes must necessarily be artificial and forced.

Yet in the name of justice that is what the egalitarians commend to us, and where we reject that commendation, attempt to force upon us a theory of "equality" whose practical implementation mandates the forced imposition of inequalities. So much for liberty at the hands of the egalitarians!

The dangers of egalitarianism to the free society remain dangers in theory unless, or until, the egalitarians capture government or the government becomes egalitarian. Or, prior to that, capture the schools.

While none of us can claim that has happened, none of us can deny that it

is happening. Certainly it is happening in Great Britain, our elder cousin whose social philosophy we so often emend and adopt as our own; and certainly to some lesser, but identifiable extent, it is happening at all levels of our contemporary government -- federal, state, and local.

Perhaps such governmental intervention occurs because, in our age of ideology, many have forgotten there is a point of extremes where liberty and equality do not complement but confound each other, where each can destroy the other. When liberty becomes license, equality in any sense is endangered; when equality becomes the ceiling rather than the floor of the open house of democracy, liberty is endangered.

Freedom as license destroys the necessary minima of social order and authority; equality as egalitarianism creates order beyond social necessity. (13) When liberty defines any inhibition on individual will, desire, or action as anti-democratic, equality must suffer; when egalitarianism defines excellence or differential status as anti-democratic, liberty must suffer.

The relationship between liberty and equality is not one of mutual strength or weakness where they necessarily wax or wane together. There is a delicate balance to be kept, and the disproportionate emphasis on the one endangers the other -- and that balance today may be tilting so far in favor of egalitarianism that liberty is becoming endangered. That is what de Tocqueville predicted: the love of equality would overwhelm the desire for liberty.

It remains now to offer a demonstration, however brief, of the pertinence of these considerations to the conduct of education. That demonstration is not hard to make, for egalitarianism, introduced into an academic context, brings with it the most pernicious of threats to academic excellence and academic freedom: the doctrine of epistemological democracy, which holds that all opinions are of equal value, equal worth.

As academics we will admit, we must insist, that any opinion can be considered as hypothesis. In one sense the marketplace of ideas offers for sale nothing but opinions, none of which is to be eliminated or scoffed at based upon its source alone. But opinions that are not sold in the marketplace of ideas because they fail the tests of reason or experience, or because they are of a nature such that they cannot be put to such tests or their holders will not submit them to such examination, cannot well be considered the equal of those which find validation by the test of reason or verification by the test of experience.

As citizens as well as academics we will admit, with John Silber, that

"No principle is more fundamental to democracy than that everyone has a right to his own opinion, and that everyone has a right to express it. Anyone has these rights no matter how wrong, how ignorant, how stupid he may be. Because we ought to be willing to die to defend this principle, we ought to take great care not to confuse it with a counterfeit version that maintains that anyone's opinion is as great as any other's [because] this counterfeit obliterates the difference between knowledge and ignorance, between good and evil." (14)

Thus any testable idea is of equal value as hypothesis, but not all ideas are of equal value as consequence, conclusion, or course of action.

Yet the egalitarians insist that to differentiate among opinions is undemocratic. It is undemocratic, we are told, because differentiation which implies the mind and thought of some is superior (or inferior) to the mind and thought of others demeans the moral equality of all. And when the nature of that non sequitur is pointed out, lo!, he who points it out is pilloried for offering the one opinion that cannot be considered as of equal value!

It is as if Plato had never written Theaetetus, as if the egalitarians did not grasp Socrates' conclusive rejections of Theaetetus' second and third answers -- that knowledge is true opinion, and knowledge is true opinion well-analyzed -- to the question "what is knowledge?"

It is likely they did not grasp the epistemic in Theaetetus for it is likely they have not read it, thus underscoring and emphasizing a point Charles Brauner and I made over a decade ago when, discussing the lack of a sense of excellence in so many teachers, we said that too many

". . . may teach and grade after the manner of bull-session rhetoric without realizing that there is a level of scholarship quite beyond [their] own acquaintance, hence totally beyond [their] students' reach . . ." (15)

This is not to say all epistemological democrats are so because they know no better. It is to say that many are such because their sense of equality has led them into what can only be called a sloppy sentimentalism, a "new humanism," in which they confuse the common moral worth of each of their students with the differential abilities and potential of their students; and from that conclude that comparisons and judgments which reflect differential achievement somehow denigrate the moral worth of students and is to be avoided.

"There is a body of opinion," says Roben Fleming,

"which takes the view that the educational world would be improved if we never made any comparisons between individuals, and if our records reflected nothing more than a kind of equality among students. This seems to me a total delusion . . . [and] When we act as though all students are equal we deceive only ourselves." (16)

Epistemological democracy, based upon a real or wilfull failure of perception of qualitative differences among individuals, completes the separation of opinion from knowledge, of judgment from fact, and of error from truth. It is a separation, based on a mindless sentimentalism, which in effect dooms the hopes even of those whom the "new humanism" would help: the underprivileged, the less-well endowed. The "new humanism" is, as John Bunzel has noted, ". . . the worst form of condescension." (17) It is vicious condescension. It is a condescension because it assumes students are beyond hope of academic excellence; it is vicious because it converts that assumption into a self-fulfilling hypothesis. Thus in the name of distributive justice the epistemological democrats rob students even of the opportunity to discover the world of academic excellence.

Francis Villemain describes this vicious condescension in these words:

". . . where failures to provide opportunities . . . are recognized some would seek to correct the abuses by diluting standards . . . [but this] violates the "dignity and worth" value [of individuals] by abandoning measures of adequacy to which individuals should aspire and be helped to obtain if they are to realize what democratic societies can bring into fruition in personal life. Notwithstanding all of the good will in the world, we utterly fail to respect persons when we do not hold out for the finest accomplishments they are capable of attaining. Persons so treated are degraded by such patronizing. They are disrespected." (18)

Is what I have said grossly unfair? Is it far-fetched to suggest that an uncontaminated egalitarianism introduced into the schools yields an epistemological democracy which subverts the goal of academic excellence and, by so doing, the belief that the free society can be perpetuated and improved only by an informed, well-educated citizenry? Was Thomas Jefferson wrong-headed in his conviction that

There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents . . . The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. (19)

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Was John Adams wrong-headed in his conviction

That all men are born to equal rights is true. Every being has a right to his own, as clear, as moral, as sacred as any other being has. . . . But to teach that all men are born with equal powers and faculties . . . is . . . gross . . . fraud. (20)

What I have said is not grossly unfair. The definition of equality as "identity," the separation of knowledge from opinion in epistemological democracy, have led to the widespread substitution of therapy for teaching. The anti-intellectualism brought to the schools by the substitution of therapy for teaching has led Peter Berger to complain that schools

". . . are to become, essentially, places in which certain existential experiences are to be mediated. Students [are to become] personally moved, rather than instructed. . . [schools are] to provide whatever services are necessary for personal growth. Conversely, they are opposed to whatever smacks of intellectual discipline, objective standards and external regulation. . . If this impulse is traced to its final consequence, it would entail the transformation of . . . schools into what can most aptly be described as vast identity workshops." (21)

John Gardner, himself the famous proponent of both equality and excellence, encapsulates the dangers of what I have called "epistemological democracy" when he deprecates the idea

". . . that the individual should never be faced with a severe challenge, that he should never be called upon for even minor sacrifices, that asking him to undertake arduous duties is a form of injustice." (22)

As illustration, Gardner says

The academic lock-step . . . in which all youngsters are advanced a grade per year regardless of . . . performance [,] was among other things a device for preventing insidious comparisons between individuals. The underlying philosophy [of this] was stated by one educator in these terms: "Any school system in which one child may fail while another succeeds is unjust, undemocratic, and uneducational." (23)

There it is: epistemological democracy at its fullest development. To undertake arduous duties is a form of injustice, because some may fail. A school in which some may fail is undemocratic.

A form of injustice, indeed! How perceptive was de Tocqueville when he wrote that

The evils which extreme equality may produce are slowly disclosed; they creep gradually into the social frame; they are seen only at intervals; and at the moment at which they become most [dangerous] habit causes them to be no longer felt. . . (24)

So we come all but full circle, for it is in the name of justice that the egalitarians defend the equal treatment of unequals; and it is in the name of justice that the epistemological democrats defend the subordination of intellect to ego, of knowledge to opinion, and the substitution of therapy for teaching.

There is not one of us here tonight unaffected by egalitarianism in education, by epistemological democracy.

"Those who derive their authority from the institutions of a free society -- professors, for instance -- have seen their position seriously undermined . . ."

". . . when we reject apprenticeship, when we scorn the learner's role, we demolish the path that leads on to craftsmanship and mastery. And then we discover that the most intransigent tyrant of all is hard reality. [One] cannot vote [one's self] into the company of great heart surgeons or concert pianists . . ."

"Professors should strive to understand the needs of students, but they need not forsake their own role nor for one moment doubt its validity. With respect to the subject at hand there is an inequality that can only be altered through the hard process of learning." (25)

That hard process of learning, that master-apprenticeship relationship, defies an epistemological democracy which asserts one opinion is as good as any other, in which any achievement -- or lack of achievement -- is as good as any other.

There are, as John Bunzel says, some who

". . . charge that anyone who defends the university as a meritocracy is an "elitist" and, by extension, as anti-democratic. This argument deserves to meet head-on. A university is not organized on the principle of "one person, one vote," which is why it is not a political democracy. Its essential role is not to represent the people or to govern. Nor is it

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an egalitarian political institution. The relationship between students and faculty is not inherently equal. As . . . Daniel Bell has said, "The university is dedicated to the authority of scholarship and learning and to the transmission of knowledge from those who are competent to those who are capable." That is the essential mission of the university." (26)

But the university cannot do its job if the elementary and secondary schools do not do their jobs, and that is why all schools must resist what John Gardner calls the "slovenliness" which has attacked us, like dry-rot eating away at solid timber. (27)

Only academic excellence, based on firm and high standards, can retrieve education and, retrieving it, contribute to a strengthened democracy which is guided by the wisest and best that Jefferson's natural aristocracy can yield up.

That is why

Those who are most deeply devoted to a democratic society must be precisely the ones who insist upon excellence, who insist that free men are capable of the highest standards of performance . . . The idea for which this nation stands will not survive if the highest goal free men can set themselves is an amiable mediocrity. (28)

In sum, an equality of political rights is the cornerstone of the edifice of liberty, for without equal rights there can be no house of freedom. But an egalitarianism which moves beyond equal political rights, which becomes extreme, should be resisted. It should be resisted because it denies the natural distinctions and differences that are the source and foundation of human excellence, that very human excellence which is required if liberty itself is to survive.

III.

We all remember Hans Christian Anderson's fable about the fraudulent tailors who conned a vain emperor and his bureaucrats into believing they were weaving a wonderful suit of clothes visible only to those fit for high office so that the entire bureaucracy and the emperor himself, fearful of being exposed as unqualified for leadership, pretended they could see the clothes and praised them as being miraculously beautiful so that all others in the kingdom, lest they admit their incompetence, affirmed the

existence and beauty of the emperor's new clothes until a child, uncorrupted by self-deceit or the fear of being honest, spoke the plain and simple truth by declaring the emperor was naked.

Unfortunately, neither history nor fable records what happened to the child for speaking up. But we can imagine.

It is the extreme egalitarians and the epistemological democrats who would persuade the schools that they, too, have woven for us a wonderful set of academic standards of such authenticity and beauty as to help all and harm none. But of course those who cry that the new academic standards, like the emperor's new clothes, are non-existent expose themselves as unfit for leadership and high office.

Fortunately, neither history nor fable yet records what will happen to those who speak up.

What are those who speak up saying? This: that there is an inescapable relationship between the kind and quality of education and the kind and quality of society we shall have. This: that there is an organic and causal relationship between standards of excellence in education and the preservation of a free society in a highly complex, technological, and interdependent world. This: that academic standards which fail to discriminate on the basis of academic achievement deceive students and society and so betray both. This: that the fact of individual differences in ability, effort, and achievement can no more be defined away by egalitarian educational theories than can the fact of human desires for individuality and social freedom be defined away by authoritarian social theories. And finally this: that the destruction of academic standards, as exemplified by the extreme egalitarians and the epistemological democrats, must be reversed if the raison d'etre of education in a free society is not to be immolated at the hand of internal assassins and, as it struggles and dies, the phoenix of a new and sophisticated authoritarianism in school and society is to rise from the ashes.

Documentations.

1. By "extreme egalitarianism" I mean something similar to the usage of John H. Bunzel when he refers to "dogmatic egalitarianism," to Ralf Dahrendorf when he refers to "false egalitarianism," to Roben Fleming when

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he refers to "egalitarianism wrongly conceived," and to John W. Gardner when he refers to "a misplaced sense of egalitarianism."

2. Deeper; Aristotle offered perceptive comments on the relationship of liberty to equality in his Politics.

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6. John W. Gardner, Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too? New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961, p. 15.

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9. Ralf Dahrendorf, The New Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 44.

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11. Ralf Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 43.

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20. Works of John Adams. Boston: Little and Brown, 1856 (Vol. 6), pp. 453-454.

21. Peter Berger, in U.S. News & World Report, December 4, 1972, pp. 56-58 passim.

22. John W. Gardner, op. cit., p. 96.

23. Ibid., p. 112.

24. Alexis de Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 309.

25. John W. Gardner, "This World," San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, July 13, 1969, p. 23.

26. John H. Bunzel, op. cit., p. 11.

27. John W. Gardner, Excellence, op. cit., p. 74.

28. Ibid., p. 160.

CHAPTER 7.

FREEDOM AND EDUCATION.

JAMES JOHN JELINEK.

There are basically two phases of freedom -- inner freedom and outer freedom. Of the two, the most difficult to identify and sustain is inner freedom.

Inner freedom is the absence of mental restraint. An individual who has been trained or conditioned to believe a certain idea and on the basis of that training or conditioning is not free to examine alternative ideas lacks inner freedom. For example, an individual who has been conditioned or trained to believe all women to be quite impractical and surely inferior to men in reasoning and ability and who on the basis of this conditioning or training is not free to examine alternative ideas about women is lacking in inner freedom. The person with inner freedom is characterized by the use of inner direction, inquiry, induction, hypothesis generation, principle formulation.

Outer freedom is the absence of physical restraint. Limitations to outer freedom are readily observable and sometimes combatable. An individual readily substantiates the absence or presence of physical restraint. A person who is bound, gagged, and kidnapped, for example, does not have outer freedom in that situation.

Be that as it may, it is also important to note that both types of freedom -- inner and outer -- have an impact on each other. Such is the case, for example, in Pavlovian conditioning and Skinnerian conditioning. B. F. Skinner discusses this at length as being beyond "freedom and dignity." (92)

Given freedom a person is intrinsically alert to the consequences of his actions: if the consequence is favorable, he is free to and likely to perpetuate the action producing it; if the consequence is unfavorable, he is free to and likely to abandon or reconstruct the action producing it. In a state of freedom, man rethinks his experience and faces subsequent

situations a different person. Freedom, then, is the basic critical variable in the educative process. The difficulty has been that this independent variable has been imperfectly known and largely ignored by experimenters doing so-called "scientific educational research." These experimenters, groping in the dark, arrange investigations that might invoke one of the forces of freedom but fail to deal with others. Or a single innovation might engage one force so as to facilitate growth in achievement but inadvertently act on another unknown force to inhibit growth.

As a consequence of this experimenters have seemingly tried to investigate the impact on pupil achievement of every conceivable independent variable under the sun in lieu of freedom. The profession now has mountains of research on pupil achievement as correlated with such widely diverse independent variables as administrative factors, attendance, television, independent study courses, correspondence courses, class size, individual consultations, counseling, teacher effort, homework, student involvement, study time, distraction, school size, teacher selection, teacher education, teaching load, ability grouping, policy differences, general approach, discussion method, lecture method, group-centered techniques, frequency of quizzes, programmed instruction, and the like. Anyone familiar with the literature admits the vast number of negative results in the data from the experiments.

On the basis of these so-called "scientific investigations" we have a vast preponderance of negative results which in the words of the investigators themselves identify that "no significant differences exist at levels of confidence based on odds of 1 to 100, 3 to 1000" or whatever. These investigations completed by the following experimenters are classic in the field of educational research: Peters and Voorhis (76), Nachman and Opochnsky (70), Harris (38), Eaton (20), Ellis (22), Hatch and Bennett (40), Herrick (43), Heck (41), Finch and Nemzek (25), Schramm (87), Barrington (4), Bittner and Mallory (6), Childs (14), Dysinger and Bridgman (18), Parson (74), Jensen (51), Milton (67), Bent (5), Leton (59), Marr (63), McKenna (65), Fleming (26), Kidd (53), Powell (80), DeCecco (16), Marlund (62), Eash and Bennett (19), Giffen and Bowers (31), Hoehn and Saltz (44), Greene (35), Hartmann (39), Callis (13), Shouksmith and Taylor (91), Winborn and Schmidt (108), Tilton (104), Schoenhard (86), Jacobs (48), Gropper and Lumsdain (36), Strang (101), Newman and Mooney (72), Trueblood (105), Brambaugh and Maddox (9), Remmers (83), Heister (42), Ricciuti (84), Thompson (103), Douglas (17), Garrett (29), Hoyt (46), Lathrop (57), Kemp (52), Wiseman (109), Ryans (85), Medley and Mitzel (66), Adams (1), Knight (54), Stephens and Lichtenstein (96), Hopkins (45), Shaplin and Olds (90), Ginther and Shrayer (32), White (107),

Zweibelson (111), Lambert (56), Ekstrom (21), Pattinson (75), Svensson (102), Borg (7), Cremin (15), Boss (8), Caldwell and Courtis (12), Gerberich (30), Gray (34), Harding (37), Leonard and Eurich (58), Muir (69), Wrightstone (110), Wallen and Travers (106), Brown and Abel (10), Burns and Dessart (11), Rainey (81), Lisonbee and Fullerton (60), Stovall (100), McKeachie (64), Anderson (3), Sears and Hilgard (88), Stern (99), Selakovich (99), Standlee and Popham (94), Lumsdaine (61), Poppleton and Austwick (79), Owen (73), Feldhusen (23), and Feldman (24).

The fact of the matter is that the time is right for us to philosophize about a single coherent approach to freedom to explain some of the positive accomplishments of the school and the flood of negative results as well. It is possible that this approach accounts for the surprising constancy of the school's achievements in the face of stupendous efforts to modify those achievements.

An individual who does not have inner freedom in a given situation is in a state of arrestment in that situation. In this state of arrestment there is a paradox of behavior that is at the same time self-perpetuating and self-defeating. Actions which have predominantly unfavorable consequences persist over a period of days, months, years, or even a lifetime. (68)

The arrestment paradox, the absence of inner freedom, is caused by conditioning. The conditioned person is not a free person. In the language of freedom, then, conditioners or trainers are the oppressors, and the trainees or conditionees are the oppressed. If action is required and individuals are frustrated in their efforts to act responsibly, if they find themselves unable to use their faculties, then they experience a sense of anguish that sometimes causes them to reject their impotence by submitting to and identifying with a charismatic person, a benevolent dictator, a trainer/conditioner, an oppressor, or a group having power, thus by this symbolic participation in another's life having the illusion of acting, when in reality they are turning away from becoming authentic persons to become phonies submitting to and becoming part of those who act. Because the oppressed consider themselves to be individuals of action, they consider themselves to be free. Thus it is easy for them to have the illusion of freedom, when in point of act they are programmed, conditioned "Manchurian Candidates."

During my visits to a multiplicity of schools in Russia, Europe, Africa and America, I have found it important to reconstruct the main point of Ivan Pavlov's classic experiment, that point being that artificial stimuli can become incorporated into the makeup of an individual. In Pavlov's

time, for a dog to salivate when meat was brought to him was to be expected, but no one would have supposed that a dog would salivate when a bell was rung. Yet by ringing a bell every time meat was brought, Pavlov was able to "condition" dog nature so salivation took place merely at the ringing of the bell, without the presence of meat. Out of this and subsequent experiments the idea of the "conditioned response" entered the thinking of our century.

In these experiments what was found to be true of the dog was easily shown to be true of man. Man can be conditioned to be a creature he otherwise is not. The act of conditioning is the act of training -- the mode by which an artificial stimulus becomes built into the structure of any living organism, including, of course, man. By way of training, a person can be conditioned to eat an olive and like it, to kill his fellow men and feel proud of it, to insult a minority race and feel justified in doing so. The eating of the olive is accompanied by approving smiles, the killing of his fellow men is accompanied by praise for the concern of the majority. In each case the artificial stimulus is so closely tied up with the satisfaction of a particular want that the response to the stimulus is felt to be "natural."

Yet what seems to be "natural" turns out to be grossly "unnatural." It would seem to be likely that a person, or even an animal, would be alert to the consequences of his acts: if the consequence is favorable, the action producing it would be perpetuated; if the consequence is unfavorable, the action producing it would be abandoned. However, in a state of arrestment there is a paradox of behavior that is at the same time self-perpetuating and self-defeating. In this arrestment paradox, actions which have predominantly unfavorable consequences persist over a period of months, years, or even a lifetime. They are not the actions of a free person.

Having observed the arrestment paradox in his experimental subjects, Pavlov (77) concluded that it was the result of "disturbance of the higher nervous activity" involving definite injury of or damage to the brain cells. He regarded it as a pathological state involving structural or physiochemical derangement of cortical mechanisms. He had no conception of the extent to which what happens in one situation is influenced by what has been learned in past situations.

The fact of the matter is that the arrestment paradox is caused by the conditioning, the training process, itself. How to produce the arrestment paradox, or "vicious circle" or "psychopathic upset" (50) as it is sometimes called, is a simple matter for the research physiologist: The

animal is trained to react in certain ways to certain stimuli, and then is placed into a situation in which these responses are impossible. Although each of his attempts is blocked, the animal continues to go on responding as he has been trained to do, caught in the grips of the arrestment paradox, until he finally breaks down. His actions become abnormal, quite different from what is natural to him in health. The sheep, normally gregarious, becomes solitary and morose, neither mingling with other sheep nor eating nor drinking nor responding even to the simplest and most familiar circumstances. Likewise, the rat in the arrestment paradox continues responses that are self-perpetuating and self-defeating, continuing trained responses by dashing his head against a locked door until bruised and bleeding, he batters himself to exhaustion.

Again, what is found to be true of animals is easily shown to be true of man. For example, the research studies on the condition of American youth completed by a staff of specialists for the National Youth Commission reveal that being a Negro youth means living in an intimate culture whose incentives and rewards and punishment prevent the development of those types of personal standards, attitudes, and habits the general community deems desirable. The society trains youth to live up to the ideals of the country -- to cringe to no man, to choose one's own life work, to resist affronts to human dignity, to work toward honestly earned success -- but the society puts Negro youth into the situation of the animal in the psychological laboratory in which the arrestment paradox is to be caused by making it impossible for him to live up to those national ideals as other youth in America do. There are indeed among our students those whose behavior patterns give evidence of the arrestment paradox, those who give evidence of self-perpetuating, self-defeating behavior characterized by the same bewildered, senseless tangle or abnormal reactions studied in animals by psychologists in laboratory experiments. These students are not free.

The basic assumption of training is that man's behavior can be conditioned effectively through external stimuli -- by grades, money, or other rewards. This assumption postulates a certain view of the nature of man and of society that is saturated with materialism, bred in mechanism, and steeped in empiricism. The consequences of this mode are identifiable: (a) The person does not develop the ability to think, (b) he becomes the prey of those who condition him, his oppressors, (c) he destroys his desire to find out the "why" of life, (d) he loses his ability to formulate ideals and to bring them to fruition, (e) he becomes a passive individual upon whom habits are impressed by his oppressor, (f) he becomes anti-intellectual, (g) he relinquishes responsibility for his own actions, (h) he turns to violence when rewards are withheld, (i) he loses his

freedom to infinite individuality, (j) he limits his perspective, (k) he is law-abiding only when he is observed, (l) he learns gamesmanship, especially the game of revenge.

Until recently there has been little evidence to show how the twelve billion cells within the brain store memory. The most noted explorer in this field has been Wilder Penfield (78) who has conducted a series of experiments during which he has touched the temporal cortex of the brain of a patient with a weak electric current transmitted through a galvanic probe. On the basis of this research it was concluded (a) that the electrode evokes a single recollection, not a mixture of memories or generalization, (b) that not only past events are recorded in detail but also the feelings that were associated with those events, (c) that the brain functions as a high-fidelity recorder of every experience from birth, and (d) that the person exists in two states at the same time -- that is, he is at the same time in the experience and outside of it, observing it.

A significant extension of the research by Penfield came from Lawrence S. Kubie during the course of which he concluded "that early in life, sometimes within the earliest months, a central emotional position is established. . . . The clinical fact which is already evident is that once a central emotional position is established it becomes the affective position to which that individual will return automatically for the rest of his days." (55)

There are three basic conceptualizations of self (central emotional positions or ego states) that can be developed -- that of the Oppressed, that of the Oppressor, and that of the Teacher/Learner.

The Ego State of the Oppressed

In the ego state of the oppressed the individual feels he is at the mercy of others. As a child he lacks the equipment and experience necessary to form a different conceptualization of self, so his only guide is the reactions of others to him. There is little cause for him to question these appraisals, and in any case, he is far too helpless to challenge them or to rebel against them. He passively accepts the judgments which are communicated by words, gestures, and deeds in this period. . . . thus the self-attitudes (conceptualizations of self) are carried forever by the individual, with some allowance for the influence of extraordinary

environmental circumstances and modification through later experiences. (95) Thus, basic to the development of the ego state (conceptualization of self) of the oppressed is the mode of manipulation, the mode of reward and punishment, by the oppressor.

Submission to authority, desire for a strong person to tell in behavioristic terms what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and even how to feel about it, all characterize the ego state of the oppressed. Authoritarian submission is evoked in relation to a variety of authoritarian figures -- parents, older people, political leaders, academic trainers, supernatural power, and the like. The ego state of the oppressed is characterized by an exaggerated, all-out emotional need to submit. This would be indicated by agreement that obedience and respect are the most important virtues children should learn, and that a person should obey without question the decisions of the authoritarians, the trainers, the oppressors.

It was in this sense that T. W. Adorno in his classic investigation of the Authoritarian Personality discovered a certain masochistic component to the ego state of the oppressed.

The Ego State of the Oppressor

The ego state of the oppressor, on the other hand, is essentially made up of behavior copied from parents or authority figures. A person in this ego state is a playback of his trainer/oppressor. Thus, in this state the person is essentially nonperceptive and noncognitive. He employs a constant arbitrary basis for decisions and serves as a repository of traditions and values of his own trainers/oppressors.

The ego state of the oppressor is developed at a time when the individual lives under a system of rigid restraints and who for this reason feels put upon and is likely not only to seek a person as an object upon which he can "take it out" but also be particularly annoyed at the idea that that person as an object is "getting away with something." There is, according to Adorno (2), a sadistic component to the ego state of the oppressor, just as there is the masochistic component to the ego state of the oppressed.

The person in the ego state of the oppressed who cannot bring himself to criticize his trainers or oppressors has a desire to condemn, reject, and

punish those who violate these values. Once the individual has convinced himself there are people who ought to be trained, he has the mode through which his impulses may be expressed, even while he thinks of himself as thoroughly moral. He looks to the past. He dislikes change. He dislikes criticism. He demands conformity. He dislikes exceptions. He destroys freedom.

The Ego State of the Teacher/Learner

When a person is in the ego state of teacher/learner he regards himself and others as subjects, a subject being one who knows and acts, rather than as objects, an object being one who is known and acted upon. He is inner, rather than outer, directed. He invokes modes of inquiring, hypothesizing, problem-solving, and reconstructing experience. Growth for him is a matter of a person's rethinking an experience thus facing each subsequent experience a different person. (49) The principle of heurism is foundational to the ego state of the teacher/learner. It is as follows:

If the teacher and student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, is heuristic in nature, if it involves modes of inquiring, hypothesizing, problem-solving, if teachers and students are both subjects (a subject being one who knows and acts) rather than subjects and objects (an object being one who is known and acted upon), then (a) education becomes responding to the intentionalities of the participants, (b) languaging replaces narrating, (c) acts of cognition replace narrating, (c) acts of cognition replace transferrals of information, (d) cognizable objects (referents) intermediate cognitive individuals (the subjects -- the teachers and the students), (e) dialogical relations are used to the fullest capacity of cognitive actors (teachers/students) to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable objects (referents), (f) the term subject or teacher/student replaces trainer-of-the-trainees and subjects or students/teachers replaces trainees-of-the-trainer, (g) the teacher is no longer merely the one who teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with students, who in turn, while being taught also teach; all become jointly responsible for the process in which they all grow, (h) individuals teach each other, mediated by the referents of their world, (i) the teacher/student is not cognitive in his preparation and narrative in his presentation, (j) the teacher/student does not regard cognizable objects (referents) as his private property but as the objects of reflection by himself and his students, (k) the teacher/learner reconstructs his reflections in the

reflections of other teacher/learners, (l) the teacher/learners are critical coinvestigators in dialogue with each other, (m) the teacher/learner studies reality with others and reconstructs his earlier reflections and considerations as others express their own, (n) education involves a constant unveiling of reality, (o) education strives for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality, (p) teachers/learners pursue problems relating to themselves in the world and with the world and feel increasingly more challenged and obliged to respond to that challenge, (q) authentic reflection considers men in their reactions with the world, (r) teachers/learners, simultaneously reflecting on themselves and on the world, increase the scope of their perception and begin to direct their observations toward previously inconspicuous phenomena, (s) teachers/learners develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in reconstruction.

In a word, the individual when he is in the ego state of teacher/learner engages in behavior guided by an anticipation of consequences. He likes change. He rejects cognitive authority. He welcomes criticism. He likes exceptions. He wants freedom -- for himself and others.

For the most part, public schools and education with freedom are contradictory notions. "Public schools," according to Joel Spring, "are supported by the dominant social structure and in turn work to support that structure. . . ." The rejection of the public school, he states, represents one of the important themes in the historical development of education for freedom. (93) Unusual though this thesis on freedom and education may be to some, it is not without historical roots. There have been, for example, the Stirnerian approach during the nineteenth century, the Freirean approach during the modern industrial revolution, and the Freudian approach during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Max Stirner writing The Ego and His Own and The False Principle of Our Education emphasized the primary problem to be that of getting people to the point of truly owning their minds. He, along with William Godwin (33) in the eighteenth century and Ivan Illich (47) in the twentieth century, stated that schools came into being as a means of shaping the moral and social beliefs of the population for the benefit of the dominant elite. Their idea was to create a system of education that would free people from ideological control.

The Freirean approach, expressed principally by Paulo Freire in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (27), sought to attain freedom from ideological control

by raising levels of consciousness and linking thought and learning to social change, thus overcoming human alienation in the modern industrial world. Freire argues that traditional education is based upon what he calls a "banking method" -- the idea that a student is an object into which knowledge is placed, not a subject in the learning process. This banking method of education, says Freire, has all the characteristics of the oppressive society. "The teacher teaches and the students are taught;" the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; "the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the teacher;" and "the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects." Education as banking is not liberating but contributes to the docility and alienation of the oppressed. (28)

The Freudian approach, implemented by individuals like A. S. Neill (11) and Wilhelm Reich (82) emphasizes the necessity of changing character structure. Neill and Reich placed considerable emphasis on changing the family structure and liberating women. For Reich the elimination of the traditional family and the development of free sexual relations were the first step toward education for freedom.

All three of the approaches -- the Stirnerian approach, the Freirean approach, and the Freudian approach -- are based on the common belief that power and domination by social structures depend on child-rearing practices and ideological control and that the power of the state and the economy rests on a submissive, oppressed population. All emphasize women's liberation, sexual freedom, new forms of family organization, and the importance of autonomy for the individual.

Be that as it may, if the oppressed (the trained) have adapted by arrestment to the structure of domination in which they are immersed and to which they have become resigned, if the oppressed seek the praise, approbation, reward of the oppressor in whatever they do, if the oppressed instead of striving for liberation strive themselves to become the oppressors, if the oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor, are fearful of freedom that requires them to be responsible and authentic, then the childbirth of their liberation is characterized by pain, the pain subsiding only in the degree to which they discover themselves to be conditioned, controlled, and manipulated by the oppressor for his aggrandizement and their dehumanization.

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CHAPTER 8.

EDUCATION FOR WOMANHOOD: VIEWS OF MOTHERHOOD.

NEL NODDINGS.

How shall we educate young women for womanhood? This is an era in which we, as school people, are compelled by law to provide identical educations for men and women, in which the kindergarten doll corner has become suspect as a sexist institution, in which unisex has become a trend in hairstyles, dress, and manners. Even to ask the question, How shall we educate young women for womanhood? suggests an inclination to discriminate -- a willingness to define "womanhood" -- to set it apart as distinct from "manhood" and as unique within "personhood." Confessing such an inclination to discriminate, I want to press the question.

In this paper, I shall limit the discussion to the "mothering" dimension of womanhood and, because the analysis will proceed from a critique of the sociological view of motherhood, my remarks will be primarily directed to the education of young adults. We can set aside, at the outset, any temptation to insist that the school educates for "personhood" (in a neuter sense) and that other institutions carry the burden of educating for "manhood" and "womanhood." Motherhood has become a major topic of sociological study, and the sociological view of motherhood will appear more and more frequently in courses of study for young adults. My concern is that this view, standing alone as the school's one intellectual offering on motherhood, is both impoverished and coercive. When I ask, "How shall we educate young women for womanhood?" I have a vision of the result: Adequate education for womanhood should provide every young woman with a rich and complex set of images and potential principles from which she can create -- or, at least, actively choose -- her own sexual identity.

Most of the objections that will be raised here against the sociological view of motherhood are not so much against the sociological view itself as against the educational practice of allowing this view to stand unsupplemented by richer views. We cannot, after all, ask that sociology perform the tasks of history, anthropology, psychology, and literature. But we must recognize that sociological views are impoverished insofar as

they neglect these other frameworks, and yet they are powerful in their very leanness. They purport to describe things as they are and, in doing so, they compel belief. Indeed, it seems that sociological views, with all of their coercive powers, constitute the major myths of modern educated humankind.

A typical sociological study of motherhood begins with an attack on the "Victorian myth" of motherhood. Jessie Bernard begins her comprehensive study with a prolegomena entitled "The Victorian Model for the Role of Mother." (1) The flowery excerpts she includes are well chosen to make a young woman's blood boil, for all the talk is of gentleness, sweetness, self-sacrifice, toil, and devotion:

"Genial, sunshiny, happy. Hers is life's sweetest and tenderest love, a love beautiful and loyal and true, love that never fails. A halo of purity resting on her saintly brow -- her face abeam with joy the world cannot give or take away...." (2)

The impact of this opening set of quotations, laid out without comment, is devastating. The unspoken message is clear: Anyone who would subscribe to such a view -- or, worse, live by it -- must be a fool or a slave or both. Indeed, at the end of the book, Bernard confesses that the quotations were intended to elicit "sardonic chortles." (3) We get a glimpse, here, of a major fault in sociology: It does not, as it purports, simply describe things as they are. It proceeds from a point of view, and its selection of data and use of language support this point of view; it brooks challenge only at the level of data or immediate interpretation of data. But that is not, of course, where a significant challenge can be made.

I want to return to the important matter of language usage, but let's first consider the historical inadequacy of a view that begins with an attack on the Victorian myth. We might agree, with genuine sympathy, that it is difficult to establish a historical context for a sociological study. Where does one draw the line between material which must be included and that which may safely be excluded? Here is a place where it might be helpful for the sociologist to state explicitly the basic point of view from which he or she will be working. For, if we are going to claim that modern women are rebelling against the way in which the role of mother is institutionalized in our society (4) -- if, that is, we are going to begin by legitimizing an attack on the Victorian myth -- we need at least to be sure that there is not something deeper and more powerful than the Victorian myth itself which has contributed to the exploitation and enslavement of women. Why, after all, did women accept such a view? If,

indeed, the myth was concocted by men, what sustained them in the belief that they were justified in constructing and propounding it?

Young women need to know, at least, that there is a fundamental and pernicious view of womanhood underlying and supporting the Victorian myth of motherhood. It is, perhaps, not motherhood -- even Victorian motherhood -- which destroys personhood but this degrading doctrine which destroys personhood at its very roots. I am talking about Pauline doctrine. Its influence is well described by Pearl Buck in The Exile, a beautiful and moving biography of her mother. She says of her mother:

"Since those days when I saw all her nature dimmed I have hated Saint Paul with all my heart and so must all true women hate him, I think, because of what he has done in the past to women like Carrie, proud free-born women, yet damned by their very womanhood. I rejoice for her sake that his power is gone in these new days." (5)

But of course, his power is not gone. It is no longer exercised directly, but it seems to be entrenched in the collective unconscious. I would hope, then, that young women would understand that motherhood is not the enemy and that "liberation" from motherhood will not bring -- or even contribute significantly to -- equality and recognition in social, political, and economic life. And when the temptation arises, as it does among novice feminists, to blame contemporary males for the woes of contemporary females, it should be realized that we all have been captives of doctrine.

The social studies, then, must supplement sociology by providing a more nearly complete historical context for the feminine condition. Not only should there be a consideration of Pauline doctrine and its influence but, also, there should be an exploration of feminine myths and pagan history. (6) It is a sad comment on our educative efforts to hear an intelligent and sensitive woman claim:

"From the first recognition that -- as women -- we have no past, no history, no religion of our own, that we are in fact given over to the necessities of others, we proceed to the difficult task of reconstruction." (7)

I am suggesting, on the contrary, that we have a rich and turbulent history, a past filled with power and mystery, and a set of religions laid waste by a logical longing for simplicity. For the longing after simplicity is one possible motivation for monotheism. And the problem is not the reconstruction of womanhood but the creation and affirmation of

each individual woman. I am not suggesting, certainly, that the school take up a cudgel against St. Paul or monotheism. I am suggesting, only, that the school include in its curriculum as possibilities the myths and mysteries of feminine existence as well as the facts of our history. It is out of all these images that a young woman may construct her Self.

So my first complaint against the sociological view is that it is historically impoverished. The second is that its use of language coerces against motherhood. While Professor Bernard is careful to mention that some women find the contemporary institutionalization of motherhood satisfactory, and while she insists that, "The goal for the future is to make nonmotherhood as well as motherhood a genuine option for those who prefer it,..." (8) her use of language throughout the study urges a choice against motherhood. The young woman who wants to consider herself "intelligent," "well-informed," "liberal," "modern" will feel pressured by Bernard's exposition to opt for nonmotherhood or to make excuses for her (limited) indulgence in motherhood. This result is secured partly by use of an explicit assumption in the sociological view and partly by the pervasive use of coercive language. We shall discuss the explicit assumption shortly.

Illustrative of the subtle and coercive use of language against the choice of motherhood is the following. Bernard discusses "palliatives" for certain women ("nestlings") who will, in the new order of things, be deprived of the large natural families they want:

"One is to offer substitute uses for their time in jobs; another is in foster-care or adoption of other children; another is in offering their services to children who need them in one situation or another. Instead of these unsatisfactory alternatives, nonmotherhood among some women will make it possible for the nestlings to have more of their own." (9)
(Italics mine)

Now, consider. How is an unsophisticated young woman, striving for recognition as a student, likely to react to this passage? Will she be comfortable with the label "nestling?" Suppose (this is just a possibility), that she is, contrary to the sociological assumption, endowed with a genetic predisposition to nurturance and self-sacrifice. In the absence of any actual children, how will she choose? My fear is that, without knowing her own needs or nature, she may choose against herself. I shall not belabor the discussion of coercive use of language. Rather, I invite the reader to peruse a sociological account of motherhood with this question in mind: Who is the heroine of this myth -- the mother or the nonmother?

So far, I have argued that the sociological view of motherhood is inadequate historically and misleading educationally because it subtly coerces against the very option it explicitly endorses. Now, I would like to examine its basic premise and, I fear, that also must be pronounced inadequate. Its basic premise is revealed (not stated) in Bernard's title for Chapter One: "Mother is a Role, Women Are Human Beings." (10)

Her basic contention, that women are rebelling against the way we institutionalize motherhood in our society, -- against the isolation, lack of recognition, assignment of sole responsibility -- can hardly be denied. Indeed, we might agree that

It is as though we had selected the worst features of all the ways motherhood is structured around the world and combined them to produce our current design. (11)

But, while we agree with this contention, we may yet deny the basic premise, that motherhood is best construed as a role. We might suggest, instead, that motherhood is a physical-emotional-spiritual relationship, and this conceptualization changes the whole picture. In our pursuit of full personhood, we might, if we accept the sociological view, reject the role of mother. On the other hand, if we embrace the biological concept of motherhood as relationship, we may welcome the relationship and derive from it both fuller personhood and the strength to modify its unpleasant role aspects.

Biological views of motherhood are certainly not new. Early feminists held that women were, innately, morally superior to men and that their moral superiority coupled with a maternal vision of a better future for humankind made them uniquely capable of exercising a redemptive power in politics. Julia Ward Howe explained it thus:

"The very intensity of our feeling for home, husband, and children gives us a power of loving and working outside of our homes, to redeem the world as love and work only can." (12)

Some modern feminists echo this view, although they hedge on the innateness of woman's moral superiority, suggesting instead that woman's apparent superiority derives from her lack of power and removal from sources of corruption. (13)

But I am not going to try to support a naturalistic fallacy of this sort, although I certainly support the idea that these programs should be made

known to our young women as part of the broad literacy program I've been advocating. When I speak of a "biological view," I mean something much more basic. I am talking about the near universal desire of women to have children and the inclination to nurture which is aroused by the presence of a helpless infant. These two tendencies in women I would label "instinctive," but my argument does not depend on their being instinctive but only on the possibility that they may be instinctive. The possibility is too real and too important to brush aside lightly.

Professor Bernard recognizes that the basic biological view is the most serious contender in opposition to the sociological view, and she attempts to come to grips with it. She recognizes the "all-but-universal" desire for children but denies its biological origins:

"... at least in the immediate future, the emphasis will be on the muting, not the stimulating, of the desire for children. And questions are being raised with respect to this damping down of the mother role. Will it have deleterious effects on women? If the future of motherhood did, indeed, rest on a maternal instinct, frustrating it could have serious repercussions.... We are not, fortunately, in that kind of bind.... Since the all-but-universal desire for children does not require an instinct to explain it but can be explained in terms of the pressures exerted on girls, all we really have to do.... is release the pressures."
(14)

Now, this is an interesting, but obviously fallacious, argument. Because social pressures constitute an adequate explanation from a sociological point of view, it does not follow that the alternative, equally compelling, explanation can be discarded. Suppose the biological mechanism is actually operating? Then the consequences of frustrating it actually operate, and the adequacy of the sociological argument is irrelevant. The sociologist may discard the biological argument and retain a scheme which is internally logical and sociologically adequate. But the educator -- or anyone interested in the possibilities as to how things really are -- cannot build her life or induce others to build their lives on sociological sand blocks.

It seems to me entirely plausible and harmonious that the maternal instinct -- the twin inclinations to bear children and to nurture -- extends to human females. And why should the notion be uncongenial? In his lovely book, All Things Bright and Beautiful, James Herriot describes maternal arousal in lambing:

"The ewe bent over him and began to lick his face and neck with little

quick darts of her tongue; and she gave the deep chuckle of satisfaction that you hear from sheep only at this time." (15)

In the same chapter he describes the life-saving effects of tricking a sick and bereaved ewe, whose own lambs had been stillborn, by tying one of the skins to an orphan lamb:

"She sniffed along the tied-on skin in a non-committal way; then after a few seconds she gave a few quick licks and the merest beginning of the familiar deep chuckle." (16)

Are we so different? Can we be sure? We might properly be deeply concerned about presenting only a view which attributes the desire for children to "societal pressures." Especially in an age when so many young people are turning to primitive and ancient wisdoms and to naturalistic ways of doing things, it seems anomalous for the school to ignore the possibility of ecological harmony that resides in the "feminine principle." Not only do we risk a further separation between individual young women and the very well springs of their nature, but also we risk the loss of active acceptance and application of the instinct to nurture which is a fundamental part of the feminine principle.

Professor Bernard speaks of "palliatives" for "nestlings," and she labels several possible courses of action "unsatisfactory alternatives." There are several serious objections to her statements. We have already mentioned the coercive nature of her language. Now, let's ask ourselves why alternatives such as adoption, foster parenting, and institutional service should be considered "unsatisfactory." They might, indeed, be unsatisfactory if the young women who qualify for the label "nestling" were operating solely out of a mindless desire to bear and nurture children. But young women are both rational beings and female animals. The instinct to conceive and the instinct to nurture are separable. If they understand and accept their own nature, if they understand and appreciate the ecological problems of our world, women can fulfill the nurturing instinct satisfactorily in all the ways mentioned by Bernard. But none of us can complete her own Self in ignorance or illusion. We must, for fulfillment, explore our possibilities and select with resounding affirmation that which rings true for us.

One great, desirable goal looms as a possibility when we reject the notion that there is a maternal instinct. If "mothering" is culture-bound -- if, that is, it is induced by universal custom, then, perhaps, mothering can be shared by men. Now, I am certainly not going to deny that men need to develop a relation to the feminine principle in order to complete

themselves nor would I deny that such development might contribute to the well-being of society as a whole. But I am going to argue that a move toward "mothering" on the part of fathers would not much relieve the mother's burden of "psychological parenting." Many women today are complaining that they bear the full load of this "psychological parenting." By this they mean that their husbands are quite willing to do specific child-related chores -- take the child for new shoes, deliver him to and from the dentist, change his diaper -- but it is the mother who must notice that these things need doing. The complaint of wife to husband is, Why don't you ever see? and the redress sought is a sharing of "psychological parenting."

Now, if the biological view is substantially correct, we might try to instill in young men a sense of responsibility for psychological parenting, but we must be prepared for an outcome which will disappoint many women. Fathers might still go at it "by list and priority," and mothers might feel the same responsibility they have always felt, for it is possible that the differences in attitude are built-in and that psychological parenting is not a role laid upon us by a male society but, rather, it is a talent bred into us by nature. Between woman and child, as between Herriot's ewe and lamb, there is a life-link which, accepted, enhances the life of each -- which, rejected, threatens not only the two lives but the quality of life in the entire society.

This possibility brings us to the last topic which can be considered here. Does motherhood work against the realization of personhood? Certainly, Bernard is right when she claims that the tasks performed by mothers are little valued in a cash-nexus society. Just as surely, she is right when she decries our custom of excluding women from tasks in the larger world on the grounds that they are needed at home as mothers. The way in which motherhood is institutionalized in our society does tend to work against the development of personhood in women who are mothers.

But this need not be accepted as a finalistic sentence any more than Freud's "anatomy is destiny" is so accepted. If motherhood is understood and accepted as unique relationship, women can derive from it the strength to overcome its local difficulties. The Victorian picture of "mother" is a bit ludicrous and, if we see it merely as compensation for robbery in every other sphere of human life, it is a monstrosity. But if we see it, alternatively, as an archetype of the human vision of motherhood -- as an ideal which yields a glimpse of possibilities -- we see in it, as we do in most myths, a kernel of truth. Motherhood is a unique relationship in which to develop patience, humor, courage, watchfulness, appreciation, and the ability to transcend the immediate. That is not to say that nonmothers

cannot or do not develop these qualities. But, it seems that mothers, through the claims and trials of the relationship, are prodded by nature to develop them. These strengths can be used to enormous advantage in the world outside the home. Thus, it is entirely plausible that motherhood is facilitative in the attempt to reach full personhood.

Finally, from the biological-psychological point of view, it is obviously wrong-headed to list all the tasks a mother performs and attach to them dollar figures representing payment which, in the cash-nexus view, would attach real worth to their performance and real personhood to their performer. The relational view transcends the cash-nexus world. That world is, simply, irrelevant to the mother who nurses her child through illness or reads with her child The Trumpet of the Swan or explores with her child the wonders of a spring garden. I am not, it should be noted, saying that money, or time, or services are irrelevant to "woman." On the contrary, the complete woman should engage strongly in the world that includes all of these. The strengths she gains in the mother relation should contribute to her ability to engage competitively in the outer world. But in that relation, in that special association which springs from her fundamental nature, she is in another, complementary but different, world.

I have suggested that the school should provide alternatives to the sociological view of motherhood so that young women may encounter a sufficiently rich and complex set of images from which to construct their own sexual identities. In particular, I have suggested that motherhood might better be conceptualized as a relation than as a role and that we should not ignore the possibility that there is, indeed, a maternal instinct which, far from depriving woman of her personhood, may contribute richly to her full actualization.

Documentations.

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4. Ibid., p. 16 and passim.

5. Pearl S. Buck, The Exile, (New York: Triangle Books Edition, 1938), p. 283. Bernard mentions the influence of St. Paul in a footnote, The Future of Motherhood, p. 379.

6. See M. Esther Harding, Women's Mysteries, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1976).

7. Barbara G. Harrison, Unlearning the Lie, (N.Y.: Liveright, 1973), p. ix.

8. Bernard, The Future of Motherhood, p. 40.

9. Ibid., p. 49.

10. Ibid., p. 7.

11. Ibid., p. 9.

12. Julia Ward Howe in Robert Smuts, Women and Work in America, (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 130. Quoted by Bernard, p. 352.

13. Gloria Steinem, "What It Would Be Like If Women Win, 1970," Time Magazine, Aug. 31, 1970, p. 22.

14. Bernard, The Future of Motherhood, p. 20.

15. James Herriot, All Things Bright and Beautiful, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1975), p. 22.

16. Ibid., p. 26.

CHAPTER 9.

BERKELEY'S LEGACY TO AMERICAN COLLEGIATE EDUCATION.

WILLIAM H. MCGOWAN.

The Dean of Derry, an Irishman by birth and education, was forty-three years old when he, his bride, and four traveling companions set sail from England for the American colonies. George Berkeley's purpose was to found St. Paul's College in Bermuda. The college was to supply clergymen for the Anglican churches in America and missionaries to serve the Indians. This was in September of 1728, at which time there were three American colleges already in existence, none of which represented the Anglican persuasion: Harvard (1636), William and Mary (1693), and Yale (1701). Dean Berkeley's ship landed first at Virginia, giving him an opportunity to visit -- and give his approval to -- the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg. The ship finally reached Newport, Rhode Island, on January 23, 1729. There Berkeley settled, buying a farm and building a house. The house still stands. After waiting nearly three years with the futile hope that the English Parliament would supply him with the funds promised for his college, he finally resigned himself to the fact that the payment would never be made. And so in September of 1731, after burying their infant daughter in Newport, Berkeley and his wife and their American-born son set sail for England from Boston -- but not before Berkeley had visited the Harvard campus. While still in America Berkeley gave books from his private library to both Harvard College in Massachusetts and Yale College in Connecticut; and after he returned to England he saw to it that both colleges received important gifts of books in line with their needs. Berkeley had noted, for instance, that the library at Harvard was deficient in the Latin classics; and yet a later gift consisted largely of writings of the Church of England divines. But the library at Yale was in its infancy, and so it received the lion's share. Berkeley also donated his Rhode Island farm and house to Yale to support a scholarship in classical studies. Yale was later to commemorate Berkeley in the name of one of its colleges. But Berkeley's own Bermuda project had failed, and he was to spend most of his last years in Ireland serving as Bishop of Cloyne. Although Berkeley's force of personality had aided him in raising private subscriptions in

England for his projected college, Berkeley made two blunders: he failed to insist on a deadline for payment of the public funds promised by Parliament; and, due to inadequate geographical knowledge, he was led to believe that the Bermuda site was closer to the American shore than it is. The latter error he could have corrected by switching the site to Rhode Island or New York, and this he probably would have done. But without the Prime Minister's cooperation in providing the promised funds, it could not be his college. Indeed, only one more college was founded in America during Berkeley's lifetime. That was in New Jersey, and it is now called Princeton (1746). Berkeley had no influence upon that project that I know of. But immediately after his death in 1753, two American colleges were founded -- one in Pennsylvania and the other in New York -- which bore the direct imprint of Berkeley's thinking. Berkeley's advice was followed in the early organization of the college of Philadelphia (1753-55), which is now the University of Pennsylvania. And in the case of King's College (1754), now Columbia University, Berkeley's influence was even stronger. Berkeley and its first president, the Reverend Samuel Johnson, were good friends. Indeed, the younger man so respected Berkeley that his first philosophical treatise was not only Berkeleian in its principles but dedicated to Berkeley. It is not surprising, then, that Johnson should write to Berkeley at Cloyne asking him for advice regarding the founding of a projected college in New York. Berkeley obliged by sending Johnson some "hints." No doubt we have Johnson to thank for having the library at Columbia preserve Berkeley's letter so that we can see it today.

One can hardly deny, then, that Berkeley did indeed leave an immense legacy to American collegiate education. The only major European philosopher to visit the American colonies, Berkeley was the best friend that American education had ever had. The eighteenth century educational institutions which he supported -- whether already established or only envisioned -- are still among the very best such institutions existing today. However, because Berkeley's faith in the success of American collegiate education seems to have been borne out, it may come as a surprise if I say that not only are we in danger of losing Berkeley's legacy, but we may already have done so.

Perhaps I should be chided for succumbing to the where-did-we-go-wrong mood which has pervaded our celebration of the American Bicentennial. After all, our bewigged ancestors were not perfect either. There is something to be said for showing them with all their warts. It puts our contemporary problems in better perspective. On the other hand, not all change is progress. Values do get lost which sometimes do not have to get lost, and once lost they may never be recovered. There are times when one must speak up.

We are losing the legacy because, like Oscar Wilde's cynic, we know its price, but not its value. We have failed to attend to Berkeley's conception of what a collegiate education is. If you will, we know the existence of the legacy without knowing its essence. Wanting the essence we have settled for an accident. "Westward the course of empire takes its way," wrote Berkeley, thereby offering the heliotropic assumption behind his Bermuda scheme. This one line from Berkeley's verses on America might be said to epitomize the Romantic illusion of the American frontier mind. Let me repeat Berkeley's verses "on the prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America."

The Muse, disgusted at an Age and Clime,
Barren of every glorious Theme,
In distant Lands now waits a better Time,
Producing Subjects worthy Fame:

In happy Climes, where from the genial Sun
And virgin Earth such Scenes ensue,
The Force of Art by Nature seems outdone,
And fancied Beauties by the true:

In happy Climes the Seat of Innocence,
Where Nature guides and Virtue rules,
Where Men shall not impose for Truth and Sense,
The Pedantry of Courts and Schools:

There shall be sung another golden Age,
The rise of Empire and of Arts,
The Good and Great inspiring epic Rage,
The wisest Heads and noblest Hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heav'nly Flame did animate her Clay,
By future Poets shall be sung.

Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way;
The four first Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day;
Time's noblest Offspring is the last.

If Berkeley needed any special prompting to suppose that his dreams would be fulfilled in some virgin territory to the West, the scandal surrounding the bursting of the so-called South Sea Bubble in 1720 was surely

sufficient. Berkeley took it as a symptom of the moral corruption and possible imminent ruin of Great Britain. But even with our own comparable Equity Funding and Watergate scandals, we can no longer afford Berkeley's illusion. As recently as the 1870's the line "Westward the course of empire takes its way" is what prompted those who chose the site for the University of California to name it after Berkeley. One wonders if they would have been equally impressed with his philosophy of education.

Sadly, it is not difficult to find evidence in our contemporary educational practice that we are indeed renouncing Berkeley's legacy. Consider four widespread assumptions. One, regarding pedagogical means and ends, I call the assumption of Accountability. This is the assumption that the teacher's main responsibility is to get his students to meet certain testable behavioral "objectives:" the final pedagogical ends are the production of the desired proficiency or competency in the student, and the means are a controlled conditioning situation. The second assumption regards the chief social motive for providing an education, and I call it the assumption of Secularity. This is the assumption that when "religious" motives -- concerns about ultimate commitment -- influence the selection of educational objectives the student is not rendered socially useful. But if we exclude considerations of ultimate commitment, then our decisions about the curriculum will be guided by yet another assumption, that of Equality. This is the assumption that there are no qualitative differences between types of academic achievement, that the development of the senses or the imagination is on an equal footing with that of reason. Because reason is essentially reflexive, academic efforts directed toward its development cannot dispense with literature, which records, clarifies, and advances our thoughts and feelings. However, in our contemporary educational practice "audio-visual aids" have not been supplementing but usurping and supplanting literary studies. The assumption is that by studying things, not words, the student will reap what is supposed to be the supreme educational benefit: the magician's power to manipulate the world. This is the assumption of Technicality. Francis Bacon had complained that infatuation with words (the Idols of the Forum) and with philosophical systems (the Idols of the Theatre) can only pose a threat to our control over external forces. This assumption of Technicality renders knowledge of belles lettres incidental at best. The McLuhanesque prophets express it by proclaiming, "The Logos is dead!"

The Accountability assumption leads straight to pedantry by confusing means with the end. Moreover, it is self-defeating in that it makes teachers irresponsible. A teacher is expected to state his educational "objectives" in behavioral terms so that he can test his students to determine whether these goals have been reached. But the behavioral

objectives are not ultimately ends which would enlighten the enterprise, only potential means. The ability to write the English alphabet or to work with fractions or to show the distribution of terms in a syllogistic argument -- these are matters of proficiency. But one can demonstrate such proficiency without understanding the significance of what he is doing or without possessing the sagacity to determine when it is appropriate to utilize what he has mastered or in what degree to do so. A brain surgeon may be "competent" in the sense that he can perform an extremely delicate operation, but his education is hardly complete if he does not know how to relate the chosen goal or objective of a skillfully performed operation to the naturally given end of his patient's health and welfare. The merely trained but uneducated technician can be a menace. But the Accountability assumption requires the teacher to condition his student to perform certain set techniques without any consideration of the possible ends for which they might be used. This is pedagogical irresponsibility.

The Secularity assumption eliminates humane ends from collegiate education. It, too, is self-defeating, for in the long run it tends to render graduates useless to society as human resources. Under this assumption the student, rather than being encouraged to live up to what is most sublime in his nature, is trained to serve the interests of the highest bidders for his specialized services. It makes little difference who the bidder is as long as he has the funds and the inclination to provide a job for the graduate. The student's individual dignity is irrelevant. His education is directed toward making him a cog in the social machinery -- exclusively. If the demands of the bidders change, however, the student may find that his proficiencies have become outmoded -- even before he graduates! If, lacking adaptability, he is no longer a useful cog, then he is thrown on the scrap heap and replaced by another tool -- human or otherwise. Because the Secularity assumption tends to make the very usefulness of the student short-lived, it is self-defeating. And what becomes of those colleges which have not yet been distorted beyond all recognition by being absorbed into the universities (which are now self-confessed "multiversities") or transformed into trade schools, but would retain the trappings of a more traditional collegiate education? Where religious support is not forthcoming, they are hard-pressed to survive without capitulating to alien demands. In speaking of "religious" support I do not mean support from sectarian or even institutional religion. I mean support from those committed to serving the ultimate concerns of man, which encompass the highest aspirations he is capable of. Because such "religious" commitment does not entail theism or even supernaturalism, it is compatible with naturalistic forms of humanism as well as with supernaturalism.

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The Equality assumption precludes the possibility of setting up in advance any priorities in the curriculum. It also is self-defeating: although it parades itself as a fair and "democratic" assumption of tolerance, in point of fact it is tyrannical. What happens when we ignore the natural hierarchal order is that what is relatively inconsequential seizes predominance over the more important. The actual (though unplanned) effect is that the profoundest academic efforts come to be despised. To avoid this disorder two priorities must be taken into consideration: one temporal, the other axiological. The two priorities work in opposite directions. What tends to strike the mind first in the order of time comes through the senses and then inflames the imagination, and only gradually do we learn to exercise our reason by reflecting. But the priority of value must be given to reason over imagination and sense if we are to develop our full humanity. This once respected notion of the hierarchal nature of the soul, at least as old as Plato and Aristotle, counts for little in our contemporary collegiate educational practice. Prerequisites are kept to a bare minimum, and anything may be taught in almost any order. The only real principle of restriction in the curriculum is the budget. But a dwindling proportion of the budget gets devoted to the types of studies which give colleges their real reason for being. And so, because it tends to eliminate the best and most distinctively educational elements from the course of study, the Equality assumption is self-defeating.

The Technicality assumption precludes the exercise of our reason, which is reflexive in nature. It also is self-defeating: under this assumption we eventually are manipulated by the very external forces we seek to control, as evidenced by our nasty ecological and social problems. "The unexamined life," said Socrates, "is not worth living!" But a life of sheer manipulation is an unexamined life. And even if we allow that there is some exaggeration in Socrates' proclamation, it might be that if life is to be worth living, one must be more philologist than philotechnist -- cherish the study of the spoken and written word even more than the study of things and the practical arts. It is only through discourse that reason is able to turn back upon itself and scale the critical heights. There is no real education conceivable which would dispense with the world's literature. We ignore that literature at the peril of becoming enslaved by the very world we set out to master.

These four assumptions which underlie our educational practice had their counterparts in the early eighteenth century. Berkeley called those who subscribed to such beliefs "Free-thinkers." Now even those of us who might consider ourselves somewhat knowledgeable about Berkeley's philosophical thought might tend to be so dazzled by his epistemological

and metaphysical claims, and so opposed to (or supportive of) his theism, that even when our attention is drawn to his attack on freethinking we might write it off as incidental to the lasting value of his philosophical views (or as reassurance regarding our own theism). Although I cannot argue the point here, I myself am convinced that Berkeley's attack on freethinking is part and parcel of his philosophical message. But I would at least like to contend here that his educational philosophy necessitated his attack on freethinking; and I think that the merit of this contention will become apparent if we read Berkeley when he is not grinding his special epistemological and metaphysical axes. In 1713 Berkeley wrote a number of anonymous essays for the Guardian, which can be found in Volume Seven of the Luce and Jessop edition of Berkeley's Works. Three consecutive essays are relevant: "Public Schools and Universities," "Minute Philosophers," and "Short-Sightedness." In these essays we can see, I believe, Berkeley's explicit opposition to the eighteenth century counterparts of our four educational assumptions. I do not have the space here to examine those essays systematically and in detail, and so I must be content to quote from them randomly to support my view about the four principal points in Berkeley's educational philosophy.

First, what is the pedagogical aim of education? Berkeley's answer: The development of "largeness of mind." Berkeley deplored the "short-sightedness" of pedants, misers, and freethinkers. Their shortsightedness lay in the folly of blindly pursuing means without a view of the end, of "mistaking the means for the end." In 1976 under the Accountability assumption teachers are held responsible for their students' achieving certain behavioral objectives. But, as I have already noted, those objectives are really means, not final, natural ends; and so the American teacher in 1976 is being required to be narrowminded and to develop narrowmindedness in his students. Would Berkeley, then, hold the teacher responsible for whether the student does in fact develop an enlarged mind? I think not. Socrates cannot be blamed for how Alcibiades turns out. But the Accountability assumption, nonetheless, does not make the teacher accountable enough. The teacher should be held responsible for taking the enlarged view: for having the right end in view and for choosing means appropriate to serving this end, an end which cannot be attained through conditioning alone. Berkeley's educational philosophy, then, holds the teacher accountable for the possession of at least some degree of wisdom.

Second, from what sort of motive primarily should colleges be established and supported? Berkeley's answer: "It was chiefly, if not altogether, upon religious considerations that princes, as well as private persons, have erected Colleges, and assigned liberal endowments to students and

professors." Surely this was the chief motive behind Berkeley's own Bermuda scheme. In Berkeley's case, of course, this religious motive was also institutional and sectarian: as Dean of Derry he was serving the interests of the Church of England. But he did not think of himself as merely serving those interests; and when the American project failed he was generous in his support of existing American colleges not themselves Anglican in persuasion. It must also be granted that Berkeley's own religious convictions were theistic, and that he did not seem to be as tolerant of agnostic or naturalistic views as he might have been if he were alive today. Nonetheless, he accepted in his notion of what is "religious" at least as much as I have already delineated, whatever else he might have thought necessary for inclusion. My point is that Berkeley would have opposed the Secularity assumption even if he had not been a theist and an Anglican.

Third, should there be an orderly progression in the curriculum, and are there types of study which are qualitatively superior to other types? Berkeley's answer: Yes, curricular matters must be understood in a hierarchal fashion. Berkeley regarded colleges "as nurseries of men for the service of the church and state," and so as places designed to produce useful cogs in the social machinery. But these were to be human cogs, which meant that colleges were to be places designed "to raise the mind to its due perfection." Berkeley believed that we first derive pleasure from things of the sense, and later learn "the pleasure that attends the gradual opening of the imagination and the dawn of reason." The thought is neo-Platonic. "In the scale of pleasure," wrote Berkeley, "the lowest are sensual delights, which are succeeded by the more enlarged views and gay portraitures of a lively imagination, and these give way to the sublimer pleasures of reason." This hierarchal conception of the soul, so pronounced in Alciphron (1732) -- which Berkeley wrote in Rhode Island -- and in Siris (1744), was already explicit in these Guardian essays. In Berkeley's opinion a collegiate education cannot be conducted on the basis of the Equality assumption if it is to give the mind "a taste for those entertainments which afford the highest transport," which are the entertainments of reason. For without a taste for rational pleasures we too often exchange our innocent pleasures for "criminal delights which fill the soul with anguish and the body with disease."

Finally, is knowledge of belles lettres indispensable to a sound education? Berkeley's answer: Yes; not for its own sake, which would be pedantry, but for the benefits which accrue. Many of the books which Berkeley gave Harvard and Yale were in the classic Latin and Greek authors, and the scholarship he established at Yale was in classical studies. Berkeley meant what he said. It is not that Berkeley despised the practical

advantages to be derived from learning the principles of order in the sensible world. We know from his philosophy of science that he gave a pragmatic interpretation not only to the principles of Newtonian science but even to those of mathematics, and he found them important for just that reason. But (to use Berkeley's own analogy) just as the grammarian does not have the last word on the contents of a book, so the scientific technician does not have the last word on the Book of Nature. The Technicality assumption would have it that it is enough to be able to manipulate the world. But for Berkeley to gain proper perspective on the manipulation one must "raise the mind to its due perfection." The benefits of possessing a recreated and exalted mind can be gained only through exercising the reflexiveness of reason, and this we cannot do by scorning the world's literature.

These four points, then, I take to be Berkeley's real gift to American education, a gift which made a difference in the education of the founding fathers of this nation. Let me summarize these points. First, the pedagogical aim of an education is "largeness of mind," which is the opposite of the pedantry of mistaking the means for the end. Second, the fundamental social motive for providing an education is "religious," so that a student's social utility will pertain more to his noblest aspirations than to his capacity for being reduced to a mere tool to be exploited by those who happen to be in power. Third, the natural course of study is not haphazard, which tends to drive out the superior elements, but orderly and hierarchal in design, culminating in rational inquiry. Finally, the ultimate benefit of an education is the usefulness of a mind which reflexive thought -- made possible by humane studies -- has raised to its due perfection so that it is not paradoxically enslaved by its very passion to control things. But certain assumptions underlying our contemporary educational practice are directly contrary to these four points. We are demanding pedantry of our teachers, ignoring the human dignity and true social usefulness of our students, allowing chaos to debase the curriculum, and glorifying the would-be manipulator at the expense of the reflective critic. In short, we are directing our teachers and students to give not the best but the worst of themselves. Is it too late to reclaim Berkeley's legacy? I know of no time in our history when we have needed it more.

CHAPTER 10.

ALTERNATIVE LEARNING AND ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENT: A BICENTENNIAL ISSUE.

COLLEEN DECKER.

The history of education in the United States can be reviewed by listing the textbook and materials usage which has characterized each decade of educational program development. Or, educational programs themselves can be used to identify the major goals and emphases of each stage of the evaluation of educational services as they are currently found in American schools.

A more generic means of delineating educational goals and materials as expressed by the curricular patterns of American schools over the past 200 years, however, is to retrieve the evaluation instruments used by educators to measure the progress of students and to assess the effectiveness of the teaching process. By using "outcome measures," the very heart of our American educational hopes and procedures can be specified. (1)

Two hundred years have passed and for the most part the ways of evaluating educational success or assessing teacher effectiveness have remained essentially the same. The measures of success have been:

- increases in scores on tests of comprehension of subject matters.
- better mental discipline as measured by longer attention spans for students.
- better citizenship as identified by participation of students in school communities and by classroom deportment grades.

For all these 200 years standardized tests have been used to rank and sort students into grades and tracking systems guaranteed to help each student to attain his "maximum potential" as measured by these standardized tests. A kind of reflexive reinforcement of these standardized tests, bulwarked by a kind of a mystique for statistical quantification and mathematical

formula, has sustained the credibility of standardized tests and normal distribution curves for classifying student progress and grade place. (2)

With the emergence of minority considerations in school programs as sponsored by various federal agencies, and with the revitalization of the American educational mission of multi-cultural educational goals in the schools, (3) a new search has begun to find more equitable ways to evaluate all students regardless of cultural history, personal learning problems, or language competence. (4)

"Alternative learning" and "alternative assessment:" These terms conjure up images of radical, experimental, splinter educational groups. Yet, it may now be possible to reformulate the concepts of "alternative learning" and "alternative assessment" in educational terms to satisfy even the most conservative and traditional critics.

Alternative Learning: A Definition, A Function, A Developmental Format.

Learning: A Definition.

Learning has been defined in many ways. The historical sequence of definitions has gone from "a change in behavior," to "a deliberate change in behavior," and more recently to "a deliberate change in behavior as diagnosed by some instrument which does the identification of the change in behavior."

The definitions all have in common the idea that learning is to be identified with the consequences of a student having been exposed to some variables intended to produce a change. The "change," however, is invariably associated with an increase in information, in skills for doing something, and, occasionally, change is associated with the use of some abstraction process which was not present prior to the student's exposure to the instructional variables.

Alternative Learning: A Definition.

Alternative learning can be defined in parallel to the above definitions of learning.

Learning as a "change in behavior" can be demonstrated in alternative learning terms as a result of the student's being exposed to material not directly related to the subject in question.

For example, if a student is to learn to be a bankteller, in the first sense of learning, a simulated situation is established where the trainee "pretends" to do teller operations. An alternative learning activity focuses, instead, on some more basic skills necessary for a teller to perform efficient and correct operations. Visual imagery games, digit span exercises, coding transfers, as examples, are developed to set the stage for performing operations which are specific cases of the skills transferred from the alternative learning exercises indicated above.

Remedial programs and the many attempts to provide individualized or tutorial instruction are probably the best illustrations of the effectiveness of the use of this definition of learning in schools. "An increase in information" is the goal. Delivery strategies are modified for each student, and the personal attention that a student receives in the programs can best be seen as the key to alternative learning; i.e., as producing a change in behavior where the student gains on performance scores although that student may not have participated in the formulation of the program or alternative delivery strategies used with him by the instructor. An increase in selected skills is hoped for.

Alternative Learning Recommendation #1.

The first steps in the process are:

- To formulate some guidelines for designating the essential operations to be addressed,
- to develop some generic exercises to be used for improving the performance item selected,
- to identify and collate the support material to be used, and
- to establish the diagnostic and evaluative bases used in locating "changes" in behavior of more information and better skills.

When learning is defined as having a "deliberate" component, a student must demonstrate somewhere in the learning sequence that the learning

steps used have been clearly selected for the purpose at hand by that student. The key concept involved here deals with foreseen consequences or planning in learning.

Alternative deliberateness in changes in behavior must, then, refer to the presence of alternative purposes or futures, different plans or contexts into which a given learning component can fit. The availability of a choice pattern for these various futures or purposes can serve as a definition of alternative deliberateness in behavior change. New futures dictate procedures alternative to the originally planned futures procedures.

If the teller example is to be continued from the first example of the definition of learning as a "change in behavior," it can be pointed out that the teller could be taught to make mistakes in a consistent manner in an effort to make clearly deliberate the "correct response." Alternative futures or purposes may include the sustained effort to extend, broaden, and make more inclusive, the teller's perspective on the place of teller functions in the total operation of the bank, or of the place of fiscal institutions in the development of an economy.

This extension of contexts or purposes is designed to compound the "simple choice" of a teller and encourage the teller to add alternative goals or purposes to an otherwise digital or rote operation. This process is intended to broaden the horizons of the person instructed and to support the teller's consideration of personal growth and professional advancement in the occupational and social hierarchy.

Programs and courses designed for professional growth are examples of the use of the definition of learning as "deliberate change in behavior" in that the deliberateness emphasizes the presence of choice and suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that a choice requires a deliberate contrasting of several plans or options before a decision is made. Deliberateness involves a reflexive examination of the process of specific choices.

Delivery strategies for alternative learning in this definition are different from those that merely present the materials by either prosaic or ingenuous methods. The strategies are those that require the instructor to share the "teacher's manual" with the student. The student has learned when, and only when, the instructor has shared, in a professional pattern, the most significant problems that the instructor can confront as a professional and as a specialist in the specific area of training of that instructor. The information transfer becomes secondary to the "sharing of the instructor process."

Alternative Learning Recommendation #2.

The second steps in the process are:

- To explore and record for each student the range of futures which may be compatible with each phase of training or education received by that student in the area involved,
- to locate and catalog materials to be used that emphasize critical or contrasting views of all of the ideas explored in the student's program, and
- to formulate some diagnostic/instructional instruments by which to demonstrate that a student has indeed understood and can function with alternative futures and that the student has confronted some of the implications of these choices as determined by the instructor.

Finally, if a parallel is to be drawn between the definition of learning as "diagnosed by some instrument which does the identification of the change in behavior" and the definition of alternative learning, a subtle reformulation of the issue is necessary.

The problem seems to be that learning and alternative learning do not rest primarily on the acquisition of information nor on training in better skills. The concern may well be found in the use of some abstraction process which was not present prior to the student's exposure to the instructional variables presented by the instructor.

The refocus necessary can be located most easily when it is realized that alternative learning, as well as learning in the most popular sense, must stipulate alternative assessment if alternative learning is to be identifiable. Patterns for alternative assessment must be designed before any activity to be measured is identified. Alternative learning precludes the use of standard measures in that an instrument for assessment can only measure what it is designed to measure. An I.Q. test, for example, cannot presume to measure the height of a building, much less can it presume to locate anything but that which the test constructor assumed as essential variables in a specific definition of intelligence.

Alternative learning, then, in this last sense, is directly equivalent to

the assessment instruments used to measure whatever is to be designated as alternative learning. The critical issue is to be found in the model or design basic to the generation of the assessment instruments.

A major topic for alternative learning in the above definition is learning habit rather than something to be learned. This reflexive interest in the instrument of learning establishes the focus on the style and pattern of the learner, who, in each instance of an identifiable learning experience, will approach the learning situation with a learning habit pattern peculiar to each case of learning for that student.

This not-so-subtle change in emphasis places a heavy burden on the system used to develop diagnostic/instructional programs for alternative learning/alternative assessment.

Learning habits, then, as the subject matter which is most appropriate to alternative learning as a process and as one of the first implications of alternative assessment, introduce a concept which is the key to alternative learning/assessment. This key concept has to do with learning or thought styles.

A learning habit, loosely defined, can be found in the kinds of material selected by a student for processing into the kind of meaning which is important to the student.

The teller example can continue to serve as an illustration. When shown how to "balance" the transactions at the end of the day, one "learning habit pattern" will copy all of the techniques for the day, but, due to the lineality of the learning habit, will not help the teller complete a transaction when new variables are put into the transaction. "Tunnel vision" learning can be described as a kind of learning habit. A teacher modeling behavior expects the student to "copy" in a lineal learning habit pattern.

It can generally be expected that a learning habit used by a student in one situation will be identifiable as a pattern of learning in most, if not all, situations which confront that student.

If we do not come in to the problem of alternative learning from the side of:

- logistics,
- delivery strategies,

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- content, nor from
- learning patterns

as defined above, it is possible to re-enter the problem of learning habit from the perspective of a more generic model.

We can define learning as:

- the time taken...
- to place in a context...
- some piece of information.

For an individual student,

- the time usually taken...
- to place in a selected context...
- some familiar piece of information.

An alternative learning process can be initiated in this sequence by defining learning habits (thought style) as one of three types:

Lineal: (a) A problem is solved in a literal way without concern for bigger problems.

Lateral: (b) A problem is solved by placing it in different contexts in an effort to explore new possibilities.

Retroductive: (c) A problem is placed in the largest perspective possible at the time to help give relevance to the many contexts in which the problem can be solved.

This definition of learning provides a way of identifying alternative learning from the viewpoint of the way a student can vary the process of learning by having that student develop a deliberate way to explore the learning process itself.

It is rather evident that there are many who are critical of alternative or experimental learning concepts. While some of the criticism is obviously due to misunderstanding on the part of the critics, the burden

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of proof rests upon the professional community to demonstrate the effectiveness of the alternative learning processes.

Further, it may be important to help people distinguish between two rather different directions of inquiry into learning alternatives:

A Comparison of Contrasting Concepts of Alternative Learning.

Alternative Learning.	Expanded "Regular Learning."
•Student's learning styles.	•Alternative materials provided to student.
•Deliberate choice by student for appropriate learning pattern.	•Alternative strategies used on student.
•Design for identification and instruction, diagnosis and correction of learning style selection.	•An Alternative Learning Center established for student choice for how and what can be learned.

When alternative learning is located on the right side of this diagram, it is difficult to isolate activities peculiar to Alternative Learning Centers and regular activities in other classrooms.

Alternative Learning on the left side of the above diagram places an emphasis on diagnosis and instruction criteria for evaluation and accountability for educational success in operational terms.

Alternative Assessment: Some Current Tests.

There are several writers today who have addressed themselves to the alternative assessment problem.

The B.I.T.C.H. test (5) for instance, is designed to assess the vocabulary of Blacks in terms of their cultural awareness in a way parallel to the use of vocabulary assessment of Anglos based on Anglo culture.

For example, the word "pick" is used in place of "comb." An Afro haircut would not need a comb. This Black Intelligence Test of Cultural Homogeneity is a plea for an equal chance in the game of evaluation. According to its author, a child who knows Malcolm X's birthday and the date of his assassination shows as much intelligence as the child who knows Washington's birthday. This test, then, wants to make the language of educational evaluation attentive to the cultural syndrome of Black culture.

Another attempt to produce clearer tests results for minorities is the A.B.I.C. test of Mercer and Lewis. These investigators have tried to find a way to differentiate the mentally handicapped child from the minority child who merely tests as a retarded child. Adaptive behavior was conceptualized as an individual's ability to plan ever more complex social roles in a progressively widening circle of social systems.

If a child scores low on the test designed for his own system, he is probably mentally handicapped. However, if the child scores high on the test based on his own system and only normal or low on the open social norms, it can be assumed that he is quite bright and even gifted. The problem is ours as educators.

These new tests are referred to here to indicate the emerging concern for children's school evaluations. They also point up two other more pertinent questions:

(a) Are we clear about what norms mean and how they must be clearly used in all written materials evaluating students?

(b) Are we clear about what measurement means in terms of differentiating content items (6) and abstraction skills, models used in constructing

measurement instruments and models for identifying thought patterns? (7,8)

The major difficulties of these "alternative assessments" then are to be found in their continuation of the basic theme that there is a norm or a base from which students can be compared with one another on different subject matter tests and on cultural items. Yet, what does it gain a student to learn to fit into his own culture as well as into the dominant culture in which he finds himself in terms of two different norms?

These "alternative tests" do explain whether a student is indeed a "low achiever" on both tests formulated for two different "cultures." However, there are no instructional components established for correcting educational problems of the "low achievers."

A different basis for evaluating for diagnosis and instruction is needed to assure each student of success in education and society. Non-failure evaluation must be designed to support each student in his search for self-respect and for success in the open marketplace of ideas.

Conclusion.

Alternative assessment as a bicentennial issue becomes much more than a passing fad or a dramatic illustration of how to improve "learning for students."

A national commitment to open and equal access education carries with it a dedication to human growth in terms of non-failure educational programs and greater participation by students in the learning process which affects them.

Since no student can participate in that content or material with which he has no knowledge, the "participation" must be in the structure of the student's learning and in the deliberateness by which the student can select appropriate thought styles for different purposes.

Learning is a shared enterprise:

- a sharing in hopes and futures.
- a sharing in learning processes.
- a sharing in personal successes.

Documentations.

1. A basic assumption here is that by an inverse extrapolation the evaluation goal and procedure, the instruments used, and the pattern of evaluation used will "inform" the meaning and the relevance of the data being submitted for evaluation.
2. "Some Theoretical Considerations of Measurement: A Philosophic Analysis," Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Pomona, California, 1972 by Colleen S. Decker and T. Frank Saunders.
3. Tucson Public Schools: Compliance Plan, 1975.
4. "Alternative Assessment: Focus on Native American Students," by T. Frank Saunders and Roy Blake, 1976.
5. "Violations of Human Civil Rights: Tests and Use of Tests," Report of the Tenth National Conference on Civil and Human Rights in Education, National Education Association, 1972, page 17.
6. "Adaptive Behavior Inventory for Children," 1972-73 Standardized Edition, by Mercer, Jane R., and Lewis, June R., (an unpublished pamphlet).
7. It should be pointed out that it is never adequate to respond to a vocabulary item with a definition of the usage for the word. The classification of the term in a generic frame is the issue. Abstraction skills get the best score.
8. "Some Theoretical Considerations of Measurement: A Philosophic Analysis," Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. Pomona, California, 1972 by Decker, Colleen S. and Saunders, T. Frank.
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CHAPTER 11.

MAN, NATURE, AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT.

SAMUEL BURKHARD.

Two hundred years ago, a group of men launched an experiment on American soil in which the aim was to see if the people could manage their affairs without the aid of a king, emperor, or dictator. They moved on the assumption that all men are created equal and are entitled to the freedom that is necessary to realize the life good to live. They not only initiated a new way to deal with human affairs. They laid down guidelines by which to conduct the management of a new venture in the management of social affairs.

If this continuing experiment is to meet with the anticipated success, managers must constantly take into proper account the nature of man and of the natural environment into which man has been introduced. Furthermore, the educative process demands proper attention for the simple reason that mind-building is directly concerned with the ends toward which social management should move.

Education as a method for insuring the continuity of society is as old as human history. None of the culture which the adult society may have accumulated in the process of living is transmitted to children during their prenatal existence. Children acquire the customs, folkways, and language of their elders by participating with them in the management of the affairs on which life depends. In the early history of man, the mind-building process was carried on without the aid of a specialized institution we now call the school.

It is to be expected that the adult society will take it for granted that the established folkways must be observed as a means for insuring the continuity of the tribe or nation. Acting on this assumption, it is to be expected that the aim in mind-building will be to produce conformists. But in every language and culture there will be individuals who will want to know why certain customs and folkways must be observed. Failure to get satisfactory answers to their questions, they may seek to bring about

some changes in the prevailing customs and traditions which, in their judgment, fail to secure for them the things they want. If innovating individuals are too persistent in their efforts to bring about changes in the established ways of life, they run the risk of being executed or banished from their society. After a long time of quizzing the elders in ancient Greece, Socrates was forced to drink the hemlock. The judges decided that this was a fitting fate for the worst man in all Greece. But history has reversed this judgment. We now hold that Socrates was the wisest man in ancient Greece.

In spite of efforts of the established order to resist changes in customs and traditions, in time, it will find that it is fighting a losing battle. It is in the very nature of life to bring about changes in the management of human affairs. But in spite of change that goes on, there are some things in nature that are constant. One of these constant elements is the universal human desire to live. The satisfaction of this calls for more than a goodly supply of food, clothing, and shelter. One of the guidelines for insuring a satisfactory management of human affairs insists that this universal desire to live must be taken into proper account.

Nature has provided an abundance of raw materials which can be used to sustain life, but nature insists that man must assert himself if he is to avail himself of what nature has provided. This activity we call "work." The law of nature insists that man must engage in production if he would live. But man could decide that he does not want to live. In this event he could escape from the necessity of working. Within a short time his life would come to an end. But one of the problems concerning the necessity for working is that we in our social management are not always sure as to who should do the work. The assumption in the argument in this discussion is that work may well be defined as applying to all activities in the rendition of the many services on which life depends.

Nature also insists that the law of gravity must be taken into proper account in the building of houses that will remain standing. Gravity is no respecter of persons. It shows no favoritism in dealing with Republicans, Democrats, Communists, or any other groupings we might mention. A painful experience is in store for any man who saws off the limb of the tree on which he is sitting.

Furthermore, the sun continues to rise and set with predictable regularity. No one knows how long it will continue to act in this manner. Even though the heavenly bodies may make drastic changes in the course of time, we of the present expect them to continue in their orbits as they have been doing for ages past. But nature also has ways of acting without

any predictable regularity. Rains, earthquakes, and tornadoes come when they come. We simply take what comes.

Man is a child of nature. He has characteristics which must be taken into proper account if we are to have wise management of human affairs. We may well regard man as the crowning product of life's creative process. He is the only creature in existence with a hand that is so constructed that the thumb and fingers can touch each other. Furthermore, in proportion to his body weight he has the largest brain in all creation. With his capacity for insight, he can put his hand to work in making tools which enable him to gain greater control over his environmental resources. We now live in an age of technology which makes wide use of an ancient invention, namely, the wheel and axle. We now are a society running on wheels. With steam and electric energy applied to wheels and axles we have increased our capacity for producing consumer goods. This increased capacity for production of goods is at the present time accompanied with fears that we may be moving toward the time when there will be serious shortage of natural resources. This growing fear is compounded by the aspect of a rapidly increasing world population.

The earth with its natural resources has been here for a long time. Was it created for man or for bugs? I know of no authoritative answer to this question. I have no way of knowing what bugs may think as to ownership of the earth. Man acts on the assumption that it was made for him. In keeping with this assumption, the management of social and economic affairs is in his hands. But bugs have a way of cramping his styles of management.

Social management is complicated by the fact that agreement is lacking among managers as to ends toward which social affairs should be moving. But even so, we may well assume that in the long run we will be satisfied with nothing less than movement toward the more humane society. In one of his public lectures, the late Booker T. Washington told his audience that "No man can hold another man in the ditch without remaining in the ditch with him."

The word "society" can be used to designate social groupings and it can also be used to include the whole of humanity. But none of the social groups as well as nations has exclusive interests. In our bicentennial celebrations we have stressed our independence. But we must remember that a declaration of dependence is also in order to give fruitful direction to our experiment with democratic social management. Interdependence is a fact of associated living. Recognition of the implications of social dependence is of greater importance to humanity than is any declaration of

independence. Dependence moves on a two-way street. We are in for trouble when in the giving and receiving process some persons are short-weighted in the exchange of goods and services and others get the lion's share.

The aim of industrial managers is to produce goods that consumers will want. They resort to advertising to let consumers know what the market affords. Under a capitalistic economy, management must make a profit if it is to stay in business. In like manner, labor must receive adequate rewards for the services it renders so that it can pay for its consumer bills. It is, however, no easy matter to determine what constitutes a legitimate profit and a just wage. The method of bargaining is one way to arrive at a working agreement between labor and management. Striking is another method used by labor to secure better contracts. When a strike is on, management can decide to meet the demands of labor, and it also can close the shop and go out of business. If better wages and other benefits are gained by labor, management can resort to raising the prices that consumers must pay for the goods.

In the end, management must look to consumers to provide it with the money it needs to remain in business. If consumers find it difficult to meet increased prices, they also can go on a form of striking by simply curtailing their accustomed consumption of goods and services.

When consumers go on a strike, one thing that management can do is to reduce its labor force. Unemployed workers no longer receive their accustomed income. But the unemployed must go on living. They can turn to governmental agencies to provide them with money to keep them going. Not only is industry dependent on consumers to keep it going, but the unemployed also are dependent on consumers. The government can resort to taxing consumers to take care of problems brought on by industrial mismanagement. In proper perspective, consumers are the mainstay of society, and labor and management are the servants of consumers.

Industrial managers must have access to raw materials if they are to carry on. But no nation has within its boundaries all of the materials that are used in the manufacture of goods. One way to gain access to raw materials is to engage in peaceful trade. But history is full of records in which nations engaged in wars to gain access to the desired materials. The assumption has been that to the victor belongs the spoils.

At one time wars were carried on with clubs, spears, bows, and arrows. Modern warfare is carried on with guns, armored trucks, airplanes, submarines, and atomic bombs. Our current capacity for waging war has

developed to such an extent that the nation behind the atomic gun is likely to receive as much damage as is the enemy on the receiving end of the gun. The rivalry between the nations in the production of instruments of warfare calls for huge expenditures of money and the uses of a vast amount of materials. All of the nations want security. Warfare is not the way to get it. There must be a better way to manage both national and international affairs.

States of mind are involved in the management and mismanagement of human affairs. But who are the mind-builders? It is well to note that educators operating within the school are not the only mind-builders in the total society. The educative process is carried on in the total environment. In this environment both leaders and mis-leaders have a share in the formation of minds. Parents, educators, ministers, and statesmen can tell us what the requirements for good citizenship are. But how can they hear what we say in our sane moments when what we do rings in their ears? Presumably the way in which we would have our youth go, we must be going that way ourselves.

In our recent bicentennial celebrations we reminded ourselves of how we gained our independence. We paid our respect to the democratic ideal as the guideline to be followed in the management of our social affairs. But in the environment where we do our daily living, we learn of corruption in governmental affairs. Kidnappings, murders, swindles in business transactions, and many other forms of unethical conduct are reported in the daily news. All this goes on in the environment where we have churches and schools which are supposed to uphold moral standards.

It is assumed that children should obey their parents and teachers. In industry, it is expected that workers will obey the foreman. In governmental affairs, subordinates will get fired if they fail to obey their superiors. Participants in the Watergate scandal acted in obedience to the wishes of the chief executive. In one of his lectures, I heard John Dewey state that the German army did no wrong when it violated Belgium neutrality on its way to Paris. The German army acted consistently with the import of Hegel's philosophy concerning the Absolute in which it was assumed that whoever obeyed the commands of a superior officer did no wrong. But we in this bicentennial time hold that laws provide the guidelines for conduct rather than the desires of men who may hold an office of authority. Participants in the Watergate scandal have gone to prison because they did not obey the laws. In keeping with law, the chief executive was removed from office.

In every society, innovating individuals make their appearance. What to

do with them is the problem. Questions of right and wrong are hard nuts to crack. Both innovating individuals and establishments can be either right or wrong. In the Vietnam war, there were soldiers who could not in good conscience do what they were commanded to do. They chose to desert the army and find refuge in other countries rather than participate in unethical conduct. They, along with their enemies, had the desire to live. They had no desire to kill anyone. Wars are destructive not only of lives but also of the natural resources which are necessary to satisfy the desire to live. The challenge of mind-builders is to come to grips with the idea that mankind lives by production and not destruction.

The experiment in self-government that was launched two hundred years ago by the United States of America has not yet run its course. In spite of wars and other conflicts that have taken place in this experiment, we now have what we do have because we are sensitive to the needs of the people and insist on fair play in the management of human affairs. As this experiment in self-government moves on, we the people will be satisfied with nothing less than movement toward a fuller realization of the life good to live.

The democratic ideal moves on the assumption that the individual is entitled to a hearing for any views he may wish to advance. But the challenge to the innovator is for him to show that what he has to offer will improve the conditions under which people live. Freedom to carry on discussion is an essential part of the educational process if the experiment with democracy is to succeed in securing for the people the satisfaction of their wants.

If our experiment with self-government is to turn out well, it is incumbent that we the people in all walks of life realize that all of us have some share in the responsibility for giving good direction to the management of human affairs. A profound respect for ethics as the guideline for the exchange of goods and services is a requirement for securing a satisfactory social management. This requirement is directly related to the implications of social interdependence in all human relations.

With regard to mind-building activities, the adult society needs to know that the way in which it would have the new generation go it must be going that way itself. This is a lifetime assignment for all of us regardless of whether we operate in schools or in other walks of life. It would be much simpler if moral characters could be produced by giving short lectures on what is required of the good democratic citizen. There can be no objection to supplementing environmental influences with lectures

designed to give intellectual credibility to democratic guidelines in the management of social affairs.

As life moves on into the future, problems do arise. Confusion prevails in the experiment with democracy as to what is best to do in seeking solutions. Jesus of Nazareth expressed profound wisdom when he told his disciples that he would give to them the keys to the kingdom. The assumption underlying this assertion is that he had profound confidence in the ability of men of intelligence, men of good will, men dedicated to the ideal of service would be able to find better and better answers to any problems that may arise in the future. The import of this idea is that the affairs of men are in the hands of men. It is a case in which man is the master.

The import of the foregoing discussion is that mind-building activities should move in the direction of seeking better ways to make life become livable. We may well move on the assumption that man is the custodian of the materials that nature has provided. Man as a tool making and tool using creature has the capacity to make the American experiment move in a good direction. But he also has the freedom to use his capacity to devastate the earth to such an extent that may bring an end to human life.

We will do well to take note of the fact that two hundred years of experimentation with democracy has provided us with a good standard of living. But there still remains much room for making improvements in the management of human affairs.

If the American experiment with democracy is to move forward with greater satisfaction, we the people will have to pay constant respect to high standards of morality. We may well take note of the compulsion under which Jesus of Nazareth lived when he told his friends that he had come "that they may have life, and have it abundantly." John 10:10. Furthermore, Jesus recognized that men have many wants that must be satisfied. But he insisted that the way to gain the satisfaction for their wants was for them to seek first the kingdom of heaven. This is equivalent to saying that the humane society will have the frame of mind which is fundamental to a satisfactory management of human affairs. The ideal of service is the guideline for giving a good direction to the experiment that was launched two hundred years ago.

We are a society with a variety of ethnic cultures, but one thing all of us have in common is the desire to live. The fuller realization of this desire depends on an intelligent respect for democratic guidelines in the management of human affairs.

CHAPTER 12.

NEW VISTAS ON THE FREEDOM ROAD.

DAROLD R. BECKMAN.

The children of America learn their patriotic heritage in different ways. I certainly had a mosaic of experiences about our country because my parents moved frequently while I was in primary grades. When I entered first grade in Chester, Pennsylvania, my folks used to like to drive out to Valley Forge for picnics on warm days. It never made much sense to me that Washington was hungry and freezing there. As a boy in second grade in Quincy, Massachusetts, I lived a block or two from the John Adams homestead, and I would leap the stone wall with a pal to play in the inviting green expanse of the surrounding yards. I heard the story of the Charter Oak of Hartford the next year in Connecticut, but it remained a mystery to me for years why a piece of paper hidden in an old tree was so important to the freedom of the colony.

Certainly as the years went by in school I read or listened to many other tales of heroism and national origin. Paul Revere's midnight ride came out as a poem. We crossed the Delaware in a dramatic play in 4th grade to reinforce the story of Washington's raid on Trenton. Some ascetic 7th grade teacher had us memorize the first two paragraphs of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, which we tediously recited by standing in front of the classroom. I even remember rendering an imitation of Raymond Massey as Abraham Lincoln when I delivered the Gettysburg Address in a high school English class.

The simple point behind all this personal history is that somehow each and every one of us who is an American came to our concept of patriotic culture in a unique way. We were exhorted, cajoled, mystified, enticed, or dragged screaming into the American way of life. But as we approach the grey-haired stage of our existence, we tend to reflect with nostalgia and reverence on both the nation's origins and how we became conscious of that precious past. Political candidates and commencement speakers, motivated by caution, have created a special utopian world out of the concepts of freedom, equality, and justice that apparently emerged with

the American Revolution. Those speakers have tended to transform the revolutionary concepts into hallowed verities, akin to Plato's absolutes, with all form and no substance.

For some ironic reason, known only to the deities, our contemporary super-patriots in this bicentennial year have looked upon our history with a purely a-historic perspective. They can see the obvious: thirteen states have grown to fifty, and four million people have expanded to two hundred and twenty million. But the recognition of qualitative change about ideals is not in the repertoire of intellectual skills of the absolutists. Thus, to them, two hundred years have not wrought fundamental changes in the nature of democratic ideals. The question of progress is easily resolved for it has never been accepted.

When Rousseau submitted his prize-winning essay on the arts and sciences to the faculty at Dijon University in 1749, he spoke to the issue of progress. He denied that true progress had been made since the Renaissance because the corrupting influence of the rich transformed the arts into propaganda for the wealthy and sciences were adversely affected by the domination of royalty. But, to the credit of Rousseau, he gave reasons for the retardation of progress in society. He did not invent metaphysical arguments about ideal freedom or justice. In his insightful analysis Rousseau distinguished between natural law and socially-derived law, a distinction which far too many fail to make today when concepts like freedom or equality are discussed.

Americans have had a penchant for using the ideas related to "freedom" for self-identity ever since seeking freedom from the mother country: free enterprise, free world, free people, free speech, free press, freedom of religion, freedom from hunger, freedom from fear. The aura of respect for the ideal is so great that mere analysis of these freedoms, let alone challenging their validity by pointing out certain discrepancies, is almost sacrilegious. Therefore, it requires a courageous philosopher to stand forth and examine these freedoms in any real, meaningful manner. They need to be viewed in their concreteness, not just their abstraction.

The typical pattern for defining a freedom is to note that in a relationship between objects there are no constraining forces. Thus we speak of freedom "from" something. The premises of the definition imply that the object (whether person, institution, or other social force) has a will of its own, which is uninhibited and self-perpetuating. The limitations of this methodology for defining freedom need to be investigated. The laws of universal gravitation make physical objects interpenetrate with one another in their movements, so there is no "free"

planet or other moving object. Likewise, the behaviors of biological creatures are in some lawful way attached to their genetic heritage, whether loosely defined as instincts or more precisely fixed to the spiral codes in the DNA. When we come to human social activity for examples of freedom, again we see the same penetrating and inescapable connections rooted in the laws of sociology, psychology, or political economy. Long ago Aristotle alerted us to the four causes in man's actualization, and modern science has merely updated our comprehension of causative activity in the world.

If the premises for defining freedom are retained in the face of modern scientific law, then we are left with only illusions. An entrepreneur who establishes a franchised doughnut shop or gasoline station today soon discovers that his equipment, employment practices, accounting techniques, advertising, purchases, and so forth are controlled by outside forces. A teacher cannot operate "freely," in opposition with the psychological laws of learning affecting her pupils. A school administrator cannot work effectively by carrying into operation each spontaneous idea he has originated. Does this mean that there is no such thing as freedom? Of course not. It means only that the framework for defining "freedom" has been deficient. In each case, whether entrepreneur, teacher, or school administrator, the measure of freedom was in a concrete situation, where the degree of willing, that is, of making an effective decision, was dependent upon the conscious understanding of the laws of nature and society. Simply put, a "free" teacher is a knowledgeable teacher, but knowledgeable implies more than information. The adjectives "wise," "sympathetic," "just" also come to mind to indicate how the knowledge of natural and social laws are applied by that individual. Knowledge, then, has to be used, brought into action, made an instrument of power before the holder of the knowledge can be defined as "free." Obviously, Aristotle's concept of knowledge for its own sake cannot in the present context of industrial society be a useful criterion for freedom, although it was an adequate reflection of the freedom concept of his slave-owning citizens in the Athens of the 4th century B.C.

It is probably proper to speak of degree of freedom, now that we have referred to freedom in the framework of consciously directed thought and action, just as statisticians refer to validity on the .01 and .05 level. Our acceptance of causal laws force us to reject the simple dichotomy of either free or not-free as to nature. There is no suggestion here, however, that freedom problems be investigated on a quantitative basis, for that could be a useless, academic pursuit. What is suggested is for one to study the questions of freedom of a social entity within its total historical context and to become aware of the over-riding causal patterns

so that effective action is consistent with the rational and emotional realities.

Let us consider the social entity of the National Education Association and its transformation in the past five years or so. We have known the NEA as a professional organization of educators for over a century. It has been an institution dedicated to the goals of professional growth, curriculum development, ethical standards, and teacher and pupil welfare. The NEA met these goals consciously within the educational framework of the American nation. Teachers became increasingly free in the sense that we are using the term because collective knowledge in the organization gave them techniques and understanding for making wiser educational decisions. In the sixties and seventies that freedom, that decision-making capacity and effective control, no longer was remaining in line with the new imperatives. The crisis of education, reflected in eroded teacher purchasing power, school violence, weak teacher markets, budgetary cutbacks, reduced school programs, slashed curriculum offerings, and a host of other educational reverses, brought the NEA to a stage of reassessing the priorities of the organization. In order for educators to remain free, consciously in control, they needed to increase in political power, revise their position on collective bargaining, and push for major reforms in educational funding policy. Thus, the politicalization of teachers can be interpreted as a new stage of development on the freedom road, because it discovered broader, more conscious solutions to society's dilemmas.

Freedom is not only a collective affair. It is a state of being within society that promotes the highest emotional fulfillment of the individual and guarantees his uniqueness and preciousness. Freedom is a function of concerned intelligence that tempers the conflict between unrestrained self-willfulness and brash social momentum. The modern classroom has allowed this freedom to flourish by providing material physical features. The horn book has been replaced by multi-media resource centers. Instead of the graded McGuffey Reader, sets of colorful books have made classroom libraries the mecca of children's attention. Strategic use of tape-recorders have extended the range and instructional influence of the teacher's voice. In other words, the productive capacity of education's support industry has vitalized the potentiality for diversity while it has also accomplished the main social goal of building skills and academic competence among all the pupils. The crime against children is that national fiscal mismanagement has retarded the widespread growth of truly rich learning environments.

The open-classroom has frequently sought a wealth of learning materials,

but, some of the advocates for open classrooms have used the old concept of freedom, the idea of it being a lack of constraint, to guide the philosophy of operation. In those circumstances the rationalizations for anarchy have produced lack of direction in educational effort. A free atmosphere that takes into account the impelling importance of both natural and social law requires the teacher's conscious use of strategies in learning, planning with pupils and others, and knowledge of a variety of teaching skills.

Freedom, thus, requires a knowledge of a variety of choices for action and the probable consequences of those actions. The free teacher can anticipate what might happen under various options. That knowledge must be combined with a sense of caring, otherwise knowledge about consequences might be restricted to pure cognitive matters. The teacher must care about the emotional and personal responses of the pupil and the effect that the teaching/learning techniques would have on his permanent attitudes regarding the discipline taught. If, for example, a teacher consciously used drill, long homework assignments, and excessive intensity in verbal communication to get high test results in mathematics instruction, the end result may be hatred or fear of mathematics work. Such a teacher would be considered to have a lower level of freedom, because fewer choices were available to make honest, concerned, and effective planning for instruction.

Finally, freedom requires the creative activity of model-building or exploration of ideals. This is not copying or Aristotelian imitation as a means to character or value building. This idea of freedom takes as a premise the tumultuous urge of people to remake themselves, to establish new identities, and to redefine values in the fabric of new unique experiences. The search for self and the flowering of personality and personal skills is always social, for the language used to set tasks and evaluate results is from one's own people. The tools, the objects of play, are products of one's culture. The undertakings to be assumed are reflections of society's greater problems. The ideals or models which the child freely creates, that is, his social mind, is a set of modified images. It is a highly subtle product which has been constantly enriched in each generation of reflection. Each opportunity for creative action, whether story-writing, finger painting, clay-modeling, may enhance the subtlety. Each restricted activity from stencil copying to routine dictation may increase dependency habits or establish perception orientations that delimit the skills of acting freely.

In essence, we can observe the 18th century concept of freedom, emerging with the nation's birth, is inadequate to identify the behavior of

individuals and organization in a changing world. We can only see progress in the development of freedom where concrete conditions are analyzed. The conscious recognition of social and natural laws underlie a meaningful interpretation of freedom. Social necessity thus provides the framework through which individual chance emerges in a lawful and consistent fashion. Today our concept of freedom must be guided by a higher scientific understanding of the relation between accident and necessity that our founding fathers could not comprehend.

CHAPTER 13.

THE INTEGRATION OF COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF LEARNING: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY.

STEVEN L. HACKBARTH.

Cognition and affectivity can be conceived of as two dimensions of the learning process. (1) A review of recent publications in the field of education reveals that several contemporary educators consider the "integration" or "confluence" of these dimensions of students' learning to be their primary concern. (2) Such "confluent" educators have attempted to illustrate the nature of their aim by providing case studies and examples from classroom practice. Their more explicit analyses of what it means to integrate cognitive and affective dimensions of learning are usually stated in the mentalistic terms of some psychological theory that leave precise interpretation largely up to each individual reader. Since confluent educators frequently cite the works of those psychologists whose philosophical foundations are largely to be found in existential phenomenology, the special meaning that they assign to "integrated learning" might profitably be understood from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a highly regarded scholar in the field. (3) The purpose of this paper is to draw upon his philosophical writings in an effort to provide an explicit and coherent interpretation of the concept "integrated learning."

The use of the insights of existential phenomenologists to render educational phenomena more explicit has been advocated and demonstrated by Donald Vandenberg. (4) He claims that the descriptive writings of such philosophers as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty contain the language necessary to accurately express educational concepts. He outlines a three phase interpretive ("hermeneutic") process (adapted from the writings of Otto F. Bollnow) for making sense out of educational phenomena that I follow in my analysis of integrated learning.

The first phase of Vandenberg's analytic method entails an attempt to explicate the pretheoretical understanding, or tacit knowledge, of an educational phenomenon through clarification of the language actually used.

by concerned educators. Such tacit knowledge is commonly expressed in the conversations and professional writings of teachers who are daily immersed in schooling activities and similarly in the publications of curriculum designers and reformers with classroom experience. These firsthand insights are pretheoretical in the sense that they usually are limited to illustrations from practice and lack explicit analyses of terms as well as integration into a general conceptual framework. In Vandenberg's terms:

"...the experienced practitioner uses educational concepts within the implicit network of understanding that he, the practitioner, cannot make fully explicit in formally adequate ways. Because this network of meanings is acquired through the joys and sorrows of the pedagogic relation rather than by selling shoes or playing golf, it seems also more correct to say that this is indeed a differentiated form of awareness and knowledge even though this differentiation is not yet illuminated by a unique conceptual structure." (5)

The second and third phases of the analysis essentially consist of describing the educational phenomenon under study from the perspective of one or more of the existential phenomenologists and then relating the specific phenomenon to the whole domain of education.

I initially intended to clarify what confluent educators as a group meant when they referred to their most prized aim -- integrated learning. However, after reviewing the diverse definitions that they have put forth, I concluded that no single interpretation could possibly be consistent with all of them. Furthermore, I discovered that while Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of knowledge as content from the academic disciplines and affectivity as patterns of activity make possible a precise and coherent interpretation of integrated learning, they might well be considered too restrictive to encompass fully the richness of meaning that confluent educators have been striving to communicate.

"Integrated Learning" as Expressed by Confluent Educators.

The writings of confluent educators are marked by some of the most imaginative and humorous metaphors in the educational literature, especially those of George Brown: "Essentially we are attempting ...to pour back some juice into dehydrated educational practices. As a result, the dried-up prunes of classroom process become plums of learning -- plump, sweet, and nourishing." (6) While such analogies are perhaps necessary to

facilitate the communication of esoteric notions in a newly emerging field, they cannot substitute for an explicit and rigorous conceptual analysis. In a recent article entitled "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" Carl Rogers defines learning by the "whole person" in terms of the presence of cognitive ("the intellect working at top speed") and feeling ("curiosity, excitement, passion") elements. (7) In a further attempt at clarification George Brown writes:

"Simply stated, confluent education means combining thinking with feelings so that both benefit. Thinking is sometimes called the cognitive domain. Feelings and emotion fall in the affective domain. Confluent education seeks to integrate these two domains so they emerge to the extent that they both lose their boundaries and result in more holistic or 'together' behavior on the part of the student." (8)

Recent efforts to develop "models" of confluent education have contributed very little to the clarification of "integrated learning." One paper purports to follow the procedural guidelines for an ordinary language conceptual analysis. However, it merely lists features that the author believes characterize confluent education and fails to actually develop paradigm, contrary, borderline, and imaginary illustrations of the concept. (9) A second paper interprets confluent education in terms of two related versions of psychotherapy. Such an analysis is reminiscent of the behaviorists' attempts to express all human learning in the language of operant conditioning in that the theoretical constructs of one discipline are uncritically applied in the domain of another. Instead of serving to clarify the concept "integrated learning," the jargon of psychotherapy obfuscates it: "...a student needs to find and experience his center, become aware of his personality aspects and subpersonalities and how they operate, assess his blocks, conflicts, and polarities, and then begin the work of growing, using the processes of awareness, energy, assimilation, and confluence." (10)

A Preliminary Analysis of "Integrated Learning."

Confluent educators use the term "cognitive" in two quite distinct ways: (a) to denote a mental faculty or function (cognitive skill or process), and (b) to refer to academic subject matter (cognitive domain or content). The former usage enables them to speak of integrated learning in cases ranging from those in which Richard Jones' students react emotionally to movies of infant nursing, animal killing, and to "digs in graves" (11) to

those in which persons undergo a traumatic experience as when Carl Rogers accidentally drives over his cherished flower bed. (12) Cases in which either cognition or affectivity is absent are difficult to conceive.

The sense of "cognitive" most clearly relevant to pedagogical practice is the one referring to content from the academic disciplines rather than to a specific faculty of the mind. The concern of confluent educators for the integration of cognitive and affective dimensions of learning arises because they are confronted with the task of ensuring that their pupils master academic content. They do not consider it sufficient for their charges to acquire knowledge for its own sake or even to develop intellectual acumen. Their aim is to somehow engage students' affectivity in the mastery of subject matter.

What sense of "affectivity" might coherently be related to the acquisition of knowledge? Perhaps the most common sense includes emotional reactions, moods or passions such as fear, anger, joy, and ecstasy. However, integrated learning cannot simply mean that students respond emotionally to the knowledge they encounter in the classroom. It is not enough -- not even unqualifiedly desirable -- that students be titillated, angered or awed by particular bits of information. Merleau-Ponty consistently refers to this superficial sense of affectivity as a disorganizing reaction that interferes with controlled, intelligent, and effective conduct. (13) It is difficult to imagine how students' idiosyncratic emotional reactions to subject matter can in any way facilitate its systematic comprehension.

A sense of affectivity commonly employed by educators is "interest" or "motivation." The history of pedagogy reveals how varied are the techniques that teachers have used in order to arouse and sustain student interest. Curriculum-centered approaches rely on extrinsic incentives (grades, prizes, etc.), whereas child-centered approaches allow students to pursue their own interests. Both extremes share the common goal of heightening the students' desire to learn. However, the former may fail to capitalize on their interests and aptitudes while the latter may preclude the mastery of a broad range of subject matter.

The memorization of information for the sole purpose of obtaining token rewards or avoiding punishment seems clearly not to qualify as a case of integrated learning. The pupil may be enthusiastic but his real motive is to get the prize. He does not care about acquiring knowledge, either for its intrinsic fascination or for its application in the solution of problems.

On the other hand, allowing a student to pursue his own felt inclinations might -- under certain conditions -- result in integrated learning. What might these conditions be? First, if we take "cognitive" to denote "knowledge," the student must, in fact, learn some content "X" from one of the academic disciplines. Second, in mentalistic terms that characterize confluent education literature, the student must be immediately aware of some affective state -- need, aspiration, desire or wish -- "Y" that requires an object (in the broad sense that includes any given state of affairs) for its satisfaction. (14) Third, he must believe that his learning "X" in some way will serve to satisfy "Y." In sum, integrated learning might correctly be said to have been achieved if and only if the student acquires some subject matter content in the belief that by so doing he will be able to satisfy a felt need, solve a problem he has encountered, or in some other way fulfill a conscious desire. This summary statement is more explicit than that offered by Rogers: learning as a whole person "...involves learning of a unified sort, at the cognitive, feeling and gut level, with a clear awareness of the different aspects of this unified learning." (15)

"Integrated Learning" from Merleau-Ponty's Perspective.

The preceding analysis at least appears to shed some light on the nature of integrated learning as understood and expressed by some of the confluent educators. However, it includes terms such as "need" and "satisfaction" that leave further interpretation up to each individual reader. In the absence of more specific criteria for the identification of integrated learning, different teachers would not be able to consistently concur in their claims regarding its occurrence. There might be considerable agreement among those in the humanistic faction, but their judgments would most likely be at odds with others whose views of human motivation and learning have been influenced by Burrhus Skinner or Sigmund Freud. In order to avoid the vagueness inherent in the mentalistic expression of "integrated learning," I will now attempt to analyze and clarify its meaning from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

The key to understanding integrated learning from Merleau-Ponty's perspective is to recognize the role of behavior -- as it reflects all of those dimensions of affectivity expressed in mentalistic language, from moods to aspirations -- in the constitution of perception and consequently in the creation of the academic disciplines. In his thesis of the primacy

of perception, he asserts that knowledge arises from reflections upon immediate perceptual experience: "All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or from experience of the world without which the symbols of science would be meaningless." (16)

Merleau-Ponty's account of human existence as being a particular "body-subject" precludes a mentalistic interpretation of affectivity. "Anger, shame, hate, and love," he claims, "are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another's consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside." (17) His rejection of mentalism is as firm as is his rejection of mechanistic behaviorism. Our physical activities constitute "...the visible form of our intentions." (18) Behavior, for Merleau-Ponty, can only be properly understood as the purposive action of a living being. Clearly it is only by means of empathic observation of human action that the language of affectivity arises for each individual and in every culture. Our bodies bear witness not simply to what we feel or think but to what we are: "...a living body's slightest reflex expresses the total subject's fundamental way of being in the world." (19) Furthermore, "...each person is nothing more nor less to us than this structure (of behavior) or way of being in the world." (20) From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, the affective dimension of learning clearly must be interpreted in terms of a body-subject's actions directed toward the pursuit of knowledge.

The most distinctive feature of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is its emphasis on the role of the active body in human existence: "It is by means of my ever present body that I am in communication with the world." (21) "To perceive is to render oneself present to something through the body." (22) He asserts that it is by means of our actions and explorations that each of us constitutes our own perceptual experiences; actions, once again, that can only be accurately understood as the visible form of our intentions. Certainly not all of these intentions are guided by intellectual reflection: "Even our most secret affective movements, those most deeply tied to the humoral infrastructure, help to shape our perception of things." (23) Often it is only after we have acted that we become aware of our own intentions.

Scholars in the various academic disciplines are able -- to a certain extent -- to direct their attention to certain aspects of the perceptual universe in order to contribute to mankind's emerging body of valid and reliable knowledge. The affective dimension of their learning is manifested in the distinctive structure of their inquiry behavior; a

structure that has been cultivated and refined by disciplined study and years of experience. As a perceiving organism, each scientist constitutes his world as he persists in his investigation of particular phenomena. What he observes at a given time and in a given context cannot be ascertained by merely, as it were, looking over his shoulder as if the objects stretched out before his gaze are readily accessible to all. It is only by viewing the world through his eyes, that is, by adopting his perspective, his experiential and theoretical framework, that one can begin to share his vision. The "same" terrain may appear quite different to the biologist, the geologist, and the historian. While the relatively naive student observer merely notes the brute existence ("savage being" in Merleau-Ponty's later writings) of a muddy river, specialists representing the various disciplines might perceive an ecosystem, a major cause of soil erosion, or a barrier to communication between two cultures. Needless to say, all see the "same" muddy water presently flowing before them. But each person interrogates this natural phenomenon in a distinctive manner, asking it different sets of questions. For example, the biologist seeks to discover what forms of life it supports while the geologist strives to determine how it has shaped the surrounding land. The historian considers the impact that its existence had on the development of and interaction between various civilizations. Each of the academic disciplines contributes content to the school curriculum that students are required to master as an essential component of their full human development. The knowledge that they contain constitutes the cognitive dimension of learning when viewed from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.

As I noted in the preliminary analysis, there is a sense in which all learning is necessarily "integrated." All learning is similarly "integrated" in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty; that is, all knowledge emerges from perceptual experience as constituted by the active exploration of a body-subject. What qualifies my interpretation of integrated learning as a sensible aim (a possibility rather than a logical necessity) is the stipulation that its cognitive dimension be considered some specified form of knowledge, in this case, content from the academic disciplines. The concern for integrating the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning, so conceived, arises because teachers are confronted with the task of getting students to master academic content, much of which, without proper guidance, they would probably never encounter.

It seems quite unlikely that students would stumble upon much significant systematized knowledge by means of their self-directed explorations or in pursuit of their own interests without due regard for the distinctive processes by which each subject area has been constructed. This is because

(in Merleau-Ponty's terms) from the interrogations of science we stand to gain "...an encounter with certain articulations of being which otherwise (we) would find difficult to uncover." (24) The engagement of students in generalized forms of problem solving, inquiry or discovery techniques clearly seems insufficient to guarantee mastery of the distinctive concepts contained in each field. For example, the noted Merleau-Ponty scholar, Remy Kwant, notes that "...scientific phenomena are not original but (are) constructed or constituted by the scientific attitude of mind." (25) The experimental researcher creates artificial environments, isolates and manipulates what he believes to be important variables depending on the hypotheses he has contrived to test, and he records a very limited range of selected observations with complex and sensitive instruments that actually extend the "natural" human perceptual universe.

Each discipline may be characterized by its own peculiar perspective that it takes toward the world. Interpreting Merleau-Ponty's thought on this point, William Luijpen states that: "When a particular attitude of asking questions is explicitly taken up, the formal object, method, and language of the science in question is in principle fixed; and over and over again it will become evident that these are distinct from the formal object, method, and language of the other sciences." (26) Furthermore, it is not the arbitrary selection of a certain field of inquiry but the manner in which the scientists interrogate the universe that determines the dividing lines between disciplines. Extrapolating Merleau-Ponty's position on this issue, Theodore Kisiel writes that "...the phenomenal field would no longer be divided by parceling out various objective realms to different sciences; each science would establish its domain on the basis of a differing type of behavioral Gestalt, a variant dialectic between subject and object." (27) Certain lines of investigation open up entirely new domains that could not possibly have been conceived independently of the procedures originally employed. This is a clear instance of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the perspectivism of perception: the body-subject constitutes the world from its own point of view rather than passively gazing out upon a fixed universe, complete in itself.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, we may tentatively judge the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning to be integrated when the pupil is engaged in certain identifiable forms of inquiry that have in the past and continue to give rise to the emergence of the academic disciplines. Clearly, it is not sufficient for students to engage in prescribed routines without careful reflection upon the relevant aspects of the phenomena under scrutiny. Confronted with the elaborate structures of knowledge in textbook or instructional objective form, a teacher might be led to believe that his students must commit as much

information to memory as possible within a limited time period. Like the technicians who have precipitated the "crisis of the understanding" in modern science, a teacher might forget about the significance that the lived phenomena have for a full comprehension of a discipline's concepts and theories. Unless the student is aware of the questions that have been asked about a particular phenomenon within the framework of a certain theory, it is unlikely that he will even perceive those aspects considered to be of significance within a given discipline.

Several scholars have attempted to express Merleau-Ponty's conception of the intimate relationship between immediate experience and the full comprehension of abstract knowledge. Extrapolating from Merleau-Ponty's writings, Mary Barral states that: "I cannot really reflect on a doctrine -- and make it mine by assimilating its meaning -- unless I 'live it' in some way." (28) Similarly, James Palermo states that from the perspective of phenomenology: "...the understanding of geometric space comes as a second order expression of the body's 'direct experience' of lived space." Furthermore, "...the subject matter of the various academic disciplines constitutes a reformulation of the body's original presence to the world." (29) Although Palermo does not clarify the precise nature of this "reformulation," it seems clearly to refer to the fact that, for Merleau-Ponty, the distinctive procedures employed in each discipline are -- admittedly contrived and complex -- modes of behavior that have a direct bearing on what the scientist discovers and what the student learns. While these authors recognize the stress that Merleau-Ponty places on bodily engagement in the accumulation of knowledge, they fail to explicate the kinds of directed experiences that a teacher might provide his pupils to ensure subject matter mastery in each discipline. Only Maxine Greene draws upon Merleau-Ponty's writings to support her contention that students should follow the procedures of inquiry characterizing each discipline in order to gain its distinct perspective on the universe:

"Merleau-Ponty, discussing the human search for the meaning of chance events, talks about the necessity to look through multiple perspectives, each with its own significance. Seeking understanding from a variety of vantage points, the individual is in no way prevented from choosing the perspectives of the disciplines, along with personal and subjective ones." (30)

The engagement of students in certain forms of inquiry certainly appears to constitute at least one means of ensuring the achievement of integrated learning. Yet, as I previously noted, another step must be taken by the students. Integrated learning remains elusive as long as the pupils continue rigidly to follow prescribed procedures without some deeper

insights into their intended function and into the very nature of the phenomena being investigated. Mastery of a discipline entails far more than the accumulation of bits of information. Theoretical concepts must be understood in relation to the actual phenomena that they were devised to describe, account for, or explain. Merleau-Ponty credits Husserl with the insight that:

"We must get into contact with the social phenomenon, and understand it in its own proper frame, in order to find a social meaning in statistical facts. In the same way it is necessary to get into contact with the psyche by phenomenological reflection in order to understand the results of the empirical investigations of psychology." (31)

Before having reflected upon the experienced dimension of hunger, frustration, and satisfaction, for example, one cannot fully comprehend the strivings of a common human laborer, much less a rat in a maze. A sociologist or anthropologist does not merely tote his bag of procedural tools into the culture he intends to study. He brings a range of concepts related to the social phenomena he has experienced in his own life and culture. He actively searches for the institutions preserving a heritage, the customs celebrating a harvest, and the mores preserving order. The psychologist, donning his peculiar glasses, seeks to unravel the motives of individuals as conditioned by the environment.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, one plausible means of bringing about integrated learning consists of engaging each student in the same kinds of reflective inquiry that are instrumental in the continuing advance of knowledge. The specialized natures of the various academic disciplines require different approaches in order to achieve integrated learning within the domain of each. Even though the tasks of conceptual clarification and methodological explication and reform remain (forever) unfinished, participation in the processes of inquiry currently considered valid by a given scholarly community might lead a student not only to rediscover established facts but also to gain a valuable insight into the grounds for all claims to reliable knowledge within that domain. To the extent that what he comes to know is a result of reflection upon that immediate experience where his own intentions are actualized in his inquiry, questioning, and pursuit of knowledge we may claim that his learning is integrated.

Integrated Learning within the Total Schooling Context.

The distinguishing feature of confluent education is its emphasis on the integration of cognitive and affective dimensions of learning. Yet, it would clearly be an error to deny that other forms of learning exist that might also be desirable under certain circumstances and with particular students. Rote memorization, programmed instruction, drill, and behavioral conditioning all might have their time and place in the classroom. What has been termed "experiential learning" clearly seems to be a prerequisite to integrated learning. One must have suffered or loved, for example, in order to fully comprehend analyses of these phenomena. Indeed, a single lesson might contain elements of experiencing, memorization, drill, and inquiry.

Even if Merleau-Ponty is correct in his account of the systematic emergence of knowledge, it by no means necessarily follows that the best way for students to master it is for them to engage exclusively in those processes responsible for its continuing progress. Depending upon precisely what the teacher wants his students to gain from a certain lesson, engaging them in inquiry might be quite inefficient. Technicians, for example, most likely could function optimally with a minimum of on-the-job training. In contrast, a teacher's performance might benefit tremendously from the insights gained through integrated learning. The language interpreter must perform with speed and accuracy acquired primarily by means of memorization and drill. A disciplined study of the basic procedures and concepts in many subjects might best precede profitable engagement in inquiry. Mature students might demand knowledge in its purely abstracted forms while youngsters may be incapable of performing or benefiting from certain activities. Each teacher must determine whether or not the efforts put into guided inquiry are justified in the case of his particular students and in view of his instructional intentions.

Technically, integrated learning is a process aim and, to a certain extent, what is learned is determined by how one proceeds. However, in confluent education the task of determining what knowledge is the most worthwhile, that is, which of the disciplines students should master, is left open. Obviously, integrated learning cannot be considered synonymous with the whole process of education in as much as it stresses but one form of learning without specifying what subject matter should have priority. A major goal of education might be to foster worthwhile -- particularly

socially constructive -- aspirations in students. Moral education might entail gaining knowledge of principles, forming good habits, and gaining senses of responsibility for one's own actions and of duty to other persons. To suggest that the cognitive and affective dimensions of learning should be integrated does not explicitly delineate the type of moral character that ought to emerge from several years of schooling. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that certain desirable moral virtues would be fostered through participation in guided inquiry such as diligence, respect for genuine authority, and the "habit of truth." Education is a complex human enterprise. I believe that my analysis sheds some light on one very important aspect of that enterprise.

Conclusion.

It is reasonable to assume that most educators would respond affirmatively when asked whether or not they are concerned with somehow "integrating the cognitive and affective dimensions" of students' learning. Like the authors that I have reviewed in this paper they undoubtedly adhere to one of several variant conceptions of "integrated learning" and their pedagogical prescriptions to achieve it might have very few features in common. My analysis has implications primarily for those educators who find that it coherently expresses what they believe to be a desirable form of learning.

Special steps must be taken if students are successfully to investigate the world as embodied in the curriculum in the same spirit as they spontaneously expand the horizons of their lived worlds of daily existence. Engagement of students in the reflective investigation of particular phenomena by means of appropriate methods might serve to foster this spirit of adventure. Such a continuing process has been characterized by Philip Phenix as "...a guided recapitulation of the processes of inquiry that gave rise to the fruitful bodies of organized knowledge comprising the established disciplines." (32) Any teacher wishing to achieve such a recapitulation and thereby effectively ensure the integration of the cognitive and affective dimensions of his pupils' learning should: (a) study the methods actually used to gain new knowledge and the criteria by which evidence and claims to truth are assessed in his subject area; and (b) employ his expertise in the design and implementation of inquiry activities that he believes most of his students are capable of engaging in profitably.

To the extent that a teacher effectively facilitates the integration of the cognitive and affective dimensions of his students' learning, they will begin drawing implications from their observations and initiating their own inquiries as required by the new questions raised and the problems encountered. Participation in such a program would give students valuable insights into the nature of knowing per se and would serve as an ideal preparation for those individuals who ultimately will contribute to the advance of knowledge.

Documentations.

1. I thank Professors George F. Kneller and Donald Vandenberg for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2. See George I. Brown, Human Teaching for Human Learning: An Introduction to Confluent Education (New York: Viking, 1971); and Gerald Weinstein and Mario D. Fantini, eds., Toward Humanistic Education: A Curriculum of Affect (New York: Praeger, 1970).
3. The existence of discrepancies noted by John E. Carter between "third force" or "humanistic" psychology and phenomenology might best be attributed to the former's lack of philosophical development. See John E. Carter, "Philosophical and Psychological Theories of Phenomenology," in Philosophy of Education 1974: Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, ed. Michael J. Parsons (Edwardsville: Philosophy of Education Society, 1974), pp. 137-47. Giorgi, Lapointe, and Merleau-Ponty himself argue for and contribute to the conceptual development of psychology based on existential phenomenology. See Amedeo Giorgi, Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); and Francois H. Lapointe, "The Phenomenal Body in the Later Writings of Merleau-Ponty," The Journal of General Psychology, 84 (1971): 251-65.
4. Donald Vandenberg, "Making Sense Out of 'Existential Thought and Education,'" in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, ed. James J. Jelinek (Tempe, Arizona: Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, 1975), pp. 23-35.
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Crittenden (Edwardsville, Illinois: Studies in Philosophy and Education, 1973), p. 306.

6. George I. Brown, ed., The Live Classroom: Innovation through Confluent Education and Gestalt (New York: Viking, 1975), p. 3.

7. Carl R. Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" Education 95 (1974): p. 104.

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9. Stewart B. Shapiro, "Developing Models by 'Unpacking' Confluent Education," in ibid., pp. 109-20.

10. Thomas Yeomans, "Search for a Working Model: Gestalt, Psychosynthesis, and Confluent Education," in ibid., p. 151.

11. Richard M. Jones, Fantasy and Feeling in Education (New York: New York University, 1968), p. 9.

12. The latter example is given in Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" op. cit., pp. 103-14.

13. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 150; Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 86; and "The Film and the New Psychology," in Sense and Non-Sense, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1964), p. 53.

14. Client-centered psychotherapists and child-centered, open school "educators" notwithstanding, the fact that a person experiences a need does not entail its educational relevance or significance. One goal of moral education, for example, might be to foster worthwhile (particularly socially constructive) aspirations.

15. Rogers, "Can Learning Encompass Both Ideas and Feelings?" op. cit., p. 104.

16. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. viii.

17. Merleau-Ponty, "The Film and the New Psychology," in Sense and Non-Sense, op. cit., p. 52.

18. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," in The Primacy of Perception, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1964), p. 5.
19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Concerning Marxism," in Sense and Non-Sense, op. cit., p. 108.
20. Merleau-Ponty, "The Film and the New Psychology," in ibid., p. 53.
21. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 75.
22. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences," in The Primacy of Perception, ed. Edie, op. cit., p. 42.
23. Merleau-Ponty, "An Unpublished Text," in ibid., p. 5.
24. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France 1952-1960 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1970), p. 84.
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CHAPTER 14.

ISSUES IN EDUCATION: PERSPECTIVES.

CHARLES TOTO.

The love affair between the American public and the schools of its society has waxed and waned. That love affair is nearly over. Not only has there been increasing unrest and criticism, but a similar distaste has been expressed by youth in and out of school -- in no uncertain terms.

Neither youth, the public nor the schools, in general, can be said to be romantic and uncritical lovers. Indifference, disappointment, irrationality as well as name-calling, sloganeering and prejudicing certainly are not bringing these ill-starred lovers together again. The structure of the schools and the society it represents show ever-widening cracks. Hence the title of my presentation: "Issues in Education: Perspectives."

No doubt we can all agree that the American spirit is aching. Is it because the golden dream of centuries is tarnished? Is it because the long-held vision of the good life supposedly attained by the successful scaling of the educational ladder is blurred? Do we doubt that the seeds of educational aspirations have borne bitter fruit?

In these apocalyptic times of social change, it well may be that fundamental inconsistencies of tradition cloud the image of the relation of schooling and education to our other social institutions and to the larger society in general.

I am certain that you and I have listened to many speakers in our time. I am certain that you and I have had strong feelings that little new was ever said. I am certain that you and I were left with a stronger conviction that our original premises were correct. I have considered that what I might have to say could easily be trite -- if not bland but palatable? Can I conduct a relevant dialogue with my audience? I do know that a dialogue too often turns into a raucous monologue in which I, the speaker, tuned to an improper pitch, could block out the message.

My message -- if it may properly be called that -- is that of issues in education. However, it is not my intent to deal with specific issues as such. You are familiar enough with the wide range of topics covered in professional literature, popular journals, and local newspapers. My message is about perspectives or a framework of reference within which one can deal with issues in education.

The main thrust of my thoughts, then, is that rather than supplying simplistic responses to age-old concerns or modern-day controversies, one might find it a more profitable venture to erect a basis of information and observation more conducive to an appropriate questioning of the goals of education and the tasks of schooling.

The process of developing appropriate goals and objectives, for the most part, in a consistent framework of reference dealing with critical assumptions behind said educational goals and objectives has been haphazard, contradictory, fragmentary and too often ill-conceived.

The basis for curriculum planning and development without a sound and coherent grasp of philosophical foundations has led to a climate of critical issues in American education. We rarely give heed to the recognition that public schools in America do interact constantly with other political and socio-economic institutions of society.

We rarely give heed to the constant transforming interactions of these social forces and how they affect what is taught to whom. We tend to cultivate our little gardens as if the school entity exists in a vacuum.

The lack of a systematic and critical examination of our beliefs and subsequent clarification of values has also led to confusion, disillusionment, and diffusion of energies in the translation of goals and objectives onto an operational level -- hence the climate of critical issues.

Although there does appear to be some general and loose agreement as to certain aspects of an operational level, controversy seems to center about the how -- hence the climate of critical issues.

Issues often are debated at great length with little or no reconciliation among those who favor one view or another -- hence the climate of critical issues.

The consistent failure in education to systematically ask the why of this particular goal or the why of that particular aim has brought us to

widespread and pronounced disagreement on desirable values and goals -- hence the climate of critical issues.

Aims and goals in education are grounded in critical assumptions we make about the nature of human species; the world in which that species must live; and the forms of conduct and the modes of thought by which that species -- individually and collectively -- governs its behavior.

Providing a rationale for the discussion of critical issues in education is not easy. It is difficult for me to think of another area of human concern in which reasonable discourse so easily evades the constraint of disciplined thought and rigorous examination of critical assumptions.

Our message which deals with perspectives -- or dimensions, if you wish -- in critical issues is further beset by a counterpoint of views which insist upon the urgency of schooling or the abandonment of schooling, all this accompanied by genuine controversy which often descends to the lowest level of bitter argument.

For a long time now, theorists in education have indicated the necessity of some degree of attention to what they designate as significant areas of concern: namely the choice, definition, and organization of desirable goals and objectives for the schools. Discussion which focuses on the child as learner, the learning environment and the problems of instruction, curriculum, organization and administration have certainly not been overlooked in the literature of education.

I am certain you are already enumerating other issues in education which you believe to be crucial. However, we need not exhaust our energies in stop-gap measures or the maintenance of a faltering educational enterprise. It is certainly within our capabilities to organize the schools so that pleasure in learning is facilitated. It is certainly within our capabilities to provide for the pleasure of esthetic expression. And it is certainly within our capabilities to aid in the development of the good person -- whether it be in the rural and urban slums or the affluent suburbs.

With this in mind, then, may I suggest again the appropriateness of a consistent and systematic framework of reference within which one may continually ask the questions: what is real, what is true, and what is valuable? Most important -- what does this have to do with the purposes of schooling, who goes to school and why, and how does it enable me, the

teacher, administrator, counselor, parent or student to understand my culture and my existence? How does all of this justify the task of the teacher? The task -- for all of us -- is that of cultivating reasonable skills into the translation of critical issues into questions which I have just posed.

True we teachers are not consciously prone to be philosophical-minded. The most self-conscious group in American society is perhaps the educator. Perhaps even more so is the educator of educators. It is also true that it is in the stated aims and goals of education that we can look to the underlying presuppositions or assumptions about the nature of people, the worlds in which they live and the values by which they live or ought to live. The crux of issues is that we do not ask often enough: why we do this or why we do that. The crux of issues is mindlessness.

True, we as teachers do enter the classroom with certain beliefs and convictions which shape our approach to teaching and learning. When we as teachers or participating members of the learning society exert ourselves to define our beliefs, we find that we are engaged in asking the questions asked and are examined by philosophers in education.

To reject this approach to education implies that without that approach one operates blindly, if not in confusion. True, one may say that philosophical perspectives can be systematized and reduced to doctrine and dogma. Yet one can safeguard oneself against this by a persistent asking of basic questions. In fact, can we all agree that it is the fundamental need of the schools and that process called education to continually ask these same questions?

Perhaps discussion of another sort dealing with suggestions of the magical and the mythical at a time when the prime trend of our culture appears to indicate a movement toward the supreme joys of simplification would prove to be worthwhile for some. A discussion such as this must absolutely consider that this trend, approved by a certain portion of the educational establishment, denies the rationality of intellectual endeavors.

The crisis today in education is totally a cultural one. It is a crisis that implicates the basic value-fabric of our society. It is a crisis in which the progress of modern technology is not the road to Utopia unless it is accompanied by a concern of what makes a good human being. It is a crisis in which the thrust of contemporary issues and controversy strongly

suggest a pressing need for change. Indications are that all of society if not most, view the schools as not achieving noble expectations or even achieving minimal standards.

We are experiencing an upheaval in the basic assumptions underlying the course and destiny of western civilization these last 500 years. Does not this crisis involve the total citizenry as well as those of us in the educational establishment?

What can be done about issues in education? I make no claim to being a prophet in my own time. All I can do is encourage us to pursue the building of a foundation and framework which provides a beacon in the direction of choice among a number of alternatives.

A long time ago Aristotle did say this:

"As things are...mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knowing on what principle we should proceed -- should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it."

Ashley Montague is quoted as saying that

"Education is already in process of being revalued by those who have largely been the victims of it; namely, the young, and this revaluation must be encouraged in the light of what education should be for -- the making not merely of instructed or knowledgeable human beings, but of good human beings. One of the principle lessons that we must learn from our past experience is that knowledge is not enough. Education should be training in the art and science of being a warm, loving human being, and all other training should be secondary."

To be human is to be in danger. Ashley Montague said it well. He also qualified this by adding that "by virtue of a unique nervous system, a nervous system which is much more plastic and educable than any other living animal, man is capable of confusing and endangering himself considerably."

The significance of this statement for educational systems and educational

reform is profound and imperative. It is true that certain philosophical systems have provided models of desirable behavior and learning. The burning question is: are they truly successful in the solution of personal and group problems?

If the ultimate aim of education is the humanization of each and every one, we must take heed. Perhaps it is high time to discard the yet prevailing notion that education is different from life -- therefore, separate from life. Perhaps it is high time that in answering the question of what is a good education, we ask the questions...what is a good life, what is a good person?

Two great trends appear to characterize our times. One is that of the mechanization of humans, the other that of the humanization of machines. The peril is that in our preoccupation with stability and orderly process, we have unwittingly aided in furthering the mechanization of human beings.

Let's take a look at what happens to so many students in our schools. Insistence upon conformity and dependency, accompanied by a sense of powerlessness by the child, all topped by irrational regulations militate against the development of preparing and inducting students into the inevitable role of civic and democratic responsibility.

Teachers are supposed to teach! Yet we invariably engage in the well-known self-fulfilling prophecies. Yes, we turn out to be sorters. We sort and we label children intelligent or stupid, achievers or not; good, bad or indifferent. As for the so-called differences in the intelligence of students -- if not a lack of it, depends on how much like one a certain person is. Little is really accomplished since that day of initial judgment.

Schools are supposed to appreciate differences in our children, that is those wonderful differences cloaked in similarities which make up the fabric of Americana. I suggest that there is only a minimal tolerance for differences. Most school rules are neither logical nor rational. Upon whom rules are enforced, depends on who you are. In fact, I would say that schools tend to degrade most children.

Are schools really for the benefit of individuals or does the system aim elsewhere? Can one blame those students who, in their own best interests, drop out? How about those who stay, but turn off?

The elementary school functions fairly well, in a manner of speaking. At least the basic skills taught there do work for most students. However, what does take place on the higher levels of education has little substance. Too often, it is mere ritual accompanied by intellectual dishonesty.

In times past, it was believed that the schools presented an article of faith in its practices of standards and norms. It promised a climb up the ladder of success by strict adherence to the acquisition of large bodies of knowledge and accompanying social skills. Today, even more so, the promises of education seem to require ever-increasing amounts of knowledge rather than a process of learning.

The structure of the school remains essentially the same. It stamps indelibly upon youth the inevitable conclusion that learning is a saleable commodity. The educational experience is not intended to have any immediate meaning for those involved. The rewards, irrevocably, are projected into the "someday of the future."

Let me add: What is learned in school is only a relatively superficial part of education. What is learned in school too often perpetuates artificial distinctions in society.

If the task of making sense out of issues is dangerous, then let us come to grips with the perspectives afforded us by philosophical foundations in education. If the task of the future is dangerous, then let us come to grips with it on its own unique terms. If we are prone to treat crucial issues as symptoms, then let us seek to understand the underlying malaise and remedy it. If the task of the future is dangerous, then let us now begin the constant and rigorous assessment and reassessment of aims and goals in education so that operationally they may release the human potential for all levels of education, for all partners in education.

It is no secret that age-old traditions are being challenged in the classroom. Is it still a secret that we in the past have favored the few at the expense of the many? When considering the affairs of our youth, have we not too often based our involvement upon irrelevant concerns? Somewhere along the line, we seem to have blurred the distinction between what is education and what we define as academic discipline. Education must be distinguished from schooling. No matter how humanistically inclined the teacher, the structure of the school continues to remain the same -- a structure which impresses upon the student the inevitable fact

that schools offer an ephemeral promise of economic reward destined for later in life.

Today, more so than ever, we place our faith and our aspirations for the future lives of our youngsters and our concomitant concern for the survival of our society upon the ultimate ends of the long climb up the lengthening educational ladder. Pushing youth up that educational ladder results in favoring the individual who begins the climb early in life. Furthermore, instruction too often spoon fed and thrust upon the student serves only to blunt the desire for independent learning.

Schools expend energy providing answers to questions yet unasked by students. The schools, for the most part, demonstrate a lack of concern for the most significant areas of what it means to be human.

Schools have failed to focus on the emotional and spiritual needs of their client -- the student. Professional literature has suffocated us with its relentless battering at our insensitivities to the basic need of each student to know himself as well as his universe.

Again, I repeat: if an ultimate aim of education can be said to be the humanization of individuals singly and collectively -- it would seem to follow that we must focus our attention on the critical assumptions underlying the translation of human teaching for human learning onto an operational level. What makes a "good" society, what makes a "good" person, what makes "good" education are the real issues in education. We have been sidetracked into not confronting the real critical issues.

Earlier, in my presentation, I alluded briefly to polarities in our society, polarities which are felt within the educational establishment as well. This polarization, based not necessarily on political lines, but cultural ones, is not essentially a difference between the education of whites and other minority groups; neither is it a difference between the education of the relatively affluent and the poorer segments of our society; it is a polarization between the old culture and the new. The former gives preference to group rights rather than personal rights. It favors competition above cooperation, efficiency over participation; it sanctions means over ends, social forms above personal expression.

Again the burning question! How do we develop clarity and direction, a sense of purpose and opportunity in any proposed grand educational design? What is obvious, at this time, is that all of us are running at full tilt in all directions but up and onward together.

If education is to be beneficial for students, we must of necessity bear in mind that "schooling" is to be established then for that purpose. The essential task then is to aid, not hinder the development of the child.

Generally speaking, young people are preoccupied with change and improvement in society. They place great stock in personal communication. They express a strong desire to receive information on a personal basis through human interaction. Education is highly valued if it can serve to bring about a better life.

For youth, its chief criticism of education is directed at the educational system itself. It is often seen as cold and impersonal; it stifles creativity and innovation. When instructors are criticized, it is for being out of tune with the times.

It is, to me, a sad commentary when one finds nothing at the other end of the educational ladder or somewhere on it, for that matter, which provides meaning and guiding principles to the significance of life itself. We appear, to a great degree, to have forgotten the significance and meaning of education itself -- not schooling or training, but education itself.

Although I prefer to think of myself as a realist when it comes to American education, I recognize and confess to a high degree of optimism. The gathering of such a group here today bears witness to that optimism. I am, and have been, critical of American education and rightfully so -- I believe it can be a vehicle to the good life.

To achieve this good life means a partnership arrangement for student and teacher, the public and the general society. It shall mean paying attention to the importance of that area we call non-intellectual -- that is emotions, feelings, interests, values and character. It shall also mean critical selection among educational problems in which the "solution" emphasizes the integration of affective, cognitive and behavioral elements in individual and group learnings.

It shall also mean the synthesis and distribution of what we know into a process-oriented model or models consistent with the nature of learners, the realities within which they, singly and together, must cope and with the wherewithal to choose wisely among a variety of alternatives pertinent to the development of self and others.

It is not a question of a model which draws from one discipline or another

in the social foundations, but again the question of a process-oriented model which contains many "truths" and which seeks vigorously to reduce its "inconsistencies."

I have deliberated at some length upon critical issues and perspectives thereof. With your permission I shall add that there is another commodity, a cultural commodity needed in education today; it is that of wisdom. On the school level, of course, we are again too often preoccupied with the acquisition of knowledge. Can we agree that for all purposes that wisdom is good sense? Can we agree that wisdom is the ability to exercise good judgment, that it partakes of values and value judgments? Thoreau once said that "it is a characteristic of wisdom not to do desperate things." When we apply wisdom or good sense to the course of youth along the lines of human progress, this, too, is knowledge. Wisdom, for our time, must be, indeed must be, vastly superior to the existing patterns functioning on the basis of myth, folklore, prejudice, and sometimes shaky "authority."

Yes, the supreme aim of education can be the recognition of human goodness, goodness in a far wider range than our present day use of the word suggests. It is you the teacher who is the facilitator in the creation of the virtues of all virtues -- wisdom and reason and a passionate longing for them! It has been said that the greatest ignorance lies in one who does not love, but hates what reason shows to be right and just.

Education is more a process than a preparation for life. School is not only a place for the giving of authoritative bodies of information, but a place for the development of the child's creative powers. It is obvious that any theory of education that begins with an aim may ignore the child. It is equally obvious that an aim which starts with the child may forget that aim. Equally important is the recognition that both must be held in constant view.

For those of us in education, the basic step would appear to be in the direction of what human beings can be. On human terms, we so seldom discuss or are encouraged to do so -- think of what the good life is. Not only is human progress dependent upon an increase in knowledge, but upon a discovery of higher values in the humanistic lexicon of the good life.

I share the belief that teaching is primarily an art. We cannot afford to let this art disappear into mediocrity just because change appears to threaten our ability to teach. Teaching, characteristically, is, and has

been a moral enterprise; its primary intent, basically, is to benefit others.

The child and the teacher both are intelligent human beings capable of using themselves and their knowledge in an infinite variety of ways. Both are unique and becoming more so each day. Both are capable of utilizing the resources available to them in order to solve the problems for which each has a responsibility.

As I reach the final portion of my message which has dealt with issues in education in general and with philosophical perspectives specifically, I am inclined to share my concerns:

In a society that seems to be spinning apart, individual identity becomes significant and essential to survival. A new kind of clustering also is taking place in America. It is a banning together of concerned individuals, anxious and threatened by an isolation from the familiar and the reassuring.

The disintegration of traditional values has been hastened by a lack of rational alternatives and philosophical direction; furthermore, these values are made seemingly irrelevant by the impact of dynamic social forces.

Seemingly I find that the question of mass education in a mass society poses many problems. Are the concepts of freedom and equality contradictory? Are they interrelated? Are they variables within the context of the target concept of what it means to be human? The question of what we as teachers can do to avoid the increasing dehumanization of the individual is linked to the structure of mass society and its search for new definitions of freedom.

When defined, questions about issues in education lead to the question of a criterion as a basis for truth. Obviously, the acceptable criterion influences one's answers to prior questions. You individually and in concert with your colleagues will have to answer or at least search for answers to the eternal questions: what is true, what is real, what is of value?

Issues in education shall in all likelihood continue to confront us. Perhaps our only solution is the constant and rigorous examination and reassessment of aims and goals in the light of human experience.

Do we have the resources to translate our aims and goals operationally? I know we do! On the intuitive level, the arts and humanities provide a veritable storehouse of humanity's dreams and aspirations, conflicts and tragedies, sense of purpose and awareness of life's direction.

The social foundations and other modern disciplines -- as well as philosophy -- contain academic and scholarly insights which give structure to our concepts of particular aspects of reality.

Experientially, the learning environment need not be an artificial reality. It can be, must be and shall be wherever and whenever the student realistically engages in contact with a real world of learning. It can be, must be and shall be where growth as a "good human being" is inevitable and not just a weak promise of maybe, maybe not.

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CHAPTER 15.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AS MORAL AUTHORITY: AN ABSTRACT.

R. FREEMAN BUTTS.

Until almost yesterday the public school was a fixed article in the American public creed, commanding powerful moral authority as a national unifier and equalizer. But for a decade or more the erosion of the legitimacy of the major institutions of American society has begun to result in the deauthorization of the public school as well. We are presently engaged in searching anew for the legitimate authority for public education in the future. I try to deal with two general approaches: pluralism and civism.

Pluralists seek moral authority and legitimacy in the pluralistic communities that serve to bind individuals and groups together on the basis of religious, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or local cohesion and unity. They see such positive values in the diversity and variety of pluralistic associations that they consider them to be the essence of community around which education and schooling should cluster. They see no special authority in public education, viewing it as no more legitimate or authoritative than private schools or any number of other kinds of educative agencies. Indeed, radicals now view public education as positively illegitimate because of its historical connection with an exploitative, capitalist, corporate liberal state. See, for example, Bowles and Gentis, Conroy and Levin, Katy, Kanier, Violas, and Spring.

My principal concern here is with three kinds of "new pluralists:"

- a. New ethnicists in politics -- described by Michael Novak, Glazer and Moynihan, Andrew Greeley, Rumway Friedman.
- b. New pluralists in political philosophy -- represented by Robert Nisbet and Robert Nozick.
- c. New pluralists in educational philosophy -- on the edge of philosophy of education are such policy advisors as Theodore Sieger and Lawrence

Cremin -- in the center are Thomas Green, Richard Pratte, Joseph Kirschner, Nicholas Appleton, and Seymour Etzkoff.

"Civicists" seek the principal authority and legitimacy for public education in the civic or political community. They argue that public education has a special responsibility for being a positive force in promoting the values, knowledge, and skills of participation required for maintaining and improving the democratic political community and strengthening the freedom, the equality, the justice, and the popular consent provided by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

Elements of civism are found in a variety of political philosophies: the experimentation of John Dewey, the functionalism of Robert MacIver, the idealism of Alexander Meiklejohn, the systems approach of David Easter, and the rational contractualism of John Rawls.

My own view is that the moral authority of public education should be restored by infusing it with a rededication to the search for freedom, the search for equality in the context of the search for civic community: "I am convinced that American public education must find its justification in a sense of community derived not from military power, not from revolutionary violence, not from religious faith, not from utopian communes, not from pluralistic associations of race, ethnicity, or class. We must give wide scope to religions and to pluralistic communities and the variety of ethnic heritages, but I do not believe that they can become primarily the basis for community in education. I believe rather that a renewed and revitalized political community for all its weaknesses should become the basis for cohesion and obligation in American education.

"I argue that if the schools would take seriously throughout their organization, their activity, their participation, and their curriculum, the authority of the evolving ideals and sentiments of our political community as embodied in the Constitutional regime and (especially) in the Bill of Rights, the schools and colleges could help this society to put into practice its democratic ideals."

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APPENDIX A.

OFFICERS.

President. Dr. Hobert W. Burns, San Jose State University, San Jose, California 95192.

Vice President. Dr. John B. Connely, California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, California 93401.

Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Post Office Box 3518, University Station, Laramie, Wyoming 82071.

Editor. Dr. James John Jelinek, College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281.

Representative. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Whittier College, Whittier, California 90608.

Representative. Dr. Robert J. Rossi, American Institutes for Research, 1791 Arastradero Road, Palo Alto, California 94302.

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APPENDIX B.

HISTORY.

The Far Western Philosophy of Education Society was founded December 29, 1952. It has held annual meetings in December as follows:

- 1952. Stanford University.
- 1953. University of Southern California.
- 1954. Stanford University.
- 1955. Loyola University of Los Angeles.
- 1956. Fresno State College.
- 1957. Mt. San Antonio College.
- 1958. Sacramento State College.
- 1959. University of California at Los Angeles.
- 1960. San Francisco State College.
- 1961. Los Angeles State College.
- 1962. Fresno State College.
- 1963. Arizona State University.
- 1964. California State College at Hayward.
- 1965. San Fernando Valley State College.
- 1966. University of Santa Clara.
- 1967. University of California at Santa Barbara.
- 1968. University of San Francisco.
- 1969. California State College at Fullerton.
- 1970. University of Southern California.
- 1971. Arizona State University.
- 1972. California State Polytechnic University.
- 1973. University of California at Davis.
- 1974. California State University at Long Beach.
- 1975. California State University at San Jose.
- 1976. California State Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo.

Officers of the Society have included the following:

1952-53. Robert L. Brackenbury, President. Lawrence G. Thomas, Vice President. Lester B. Sands, Secretary. Arthur B. Fallico, Board Member. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Board Member.

1953-54. Lawrence G. Thomas, President. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, Vice President. Joe Apple, Secretary. Morris Bigge, Board Member. Samuel Burkhard, Board Member.

1954-55. Darrell F. X. Finnegan, S.J., President. Morris L. Bigge, Vice President. Willard W. Smith, Secretary. Thomas Hunt, Board Member. Frederic Lilge, Board Member.

1955-56. Morris L. Bigge, President. Thomas Hunt, Vice President. Glenn Austin, Secretary. George F. Kneller, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1956-57. Thomas C. Hunt, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. Clyde V. Martin, Secretary. Glenn Austin, Board Member. Arch Lang, Board Member.

1957-58. Glenn Austin, President. Willard W. Smith, Vice President. David Ferris, Secretary. Keith Oakes, Board Member. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member.

1958-59. Willard W. Smith, President. George F. Kneller, Vice President. Arch D. Lang, Secretary. Stephen Alley, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1959-60. George F. Kneller, President. Arch D. Lang, Vice President. Wilbur F. Murra, Secretary. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Maurice P. Hunt, Board Member.

1960-61. Arch D. Lang, President (to May 1961). Joe Apple, Vice President. Julian Roth, Secretary. Louis Fischer, Board Member. M. Rose Emmanuella, Board Member.

1961-62. Julian Roth, President. Maurice P. Hunt, Vice President. Louis Fischer, Secretary. Wilbur Murra, Board Member. Herman Yeager, Board Member.

1962-63. Maurice P. Hunt, President (to November 1963). Wilbur F. Murra, Vice President. Herman V. Yeager, Secretary. Richard Dettering, Board Member. Daniel McGloin, Board Member.

1963-64. Clyde E. Curran, President. Herman V. Yeager, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary. Lester B. Sands, Board Member. Louis Fischer, Board Member.

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1964-65. Herman V. Yeager, President. Louis Fischer, Vice President. Gerald McDonald, Secretary-Treasurer. Wayne Hill, Board Member. William O'Neill, Board Member.

1965-66. Louis Fischer, President. Gerald McDonald, Vice President. William O'Neill, Secretary-Treasurer. Father O'Farrell, Board Member. Lester Sands, Board Member.

1966-67. Gerald McDonald, President. Lester B. Sands, Vice President. Kenneth Lottich, Secretary-Treasurer. John J. O'Farrell, Board Member. Lloyd Scritchfield, Board Member.

1967-68. Lester Sands, President. John J. O'Farrell, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. Bernice Goldmark, Board Member. Frank Saunders, Board Member.

1968-69. John J. O'Farrell, President. Morton Fierman, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Clyde E. Crum, Board Member. Leroy Troutner, Board Member.

1969-70. Morton Fierman, President. William O'Neill, Vice President. James J. Jelinek, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Hugh C. Black, Board Member. Edwin Carr, Board Member.

1970-71. William O'Neill, President. James J. Jelinek, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Board Member. Leonard Fels, Board Member.

1971-72. James John Jelinek, President. T. Frank Saunders, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Homer Bronson, Representative. Wayne Hill, Representative.

1972-73. T. Frank Saunders, President. Hugh C. Black, Vice President. Robert Bruce McLaren, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Dr. Leonard Fels, Representative. Helen Isabel Nicklin, Representative.

1973-74. Hugh C. Black, President. Leonard Fels and Robert B. McLaren, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. Thomas A. Reed, Representative.

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1974-75. Robert B. McLaren, President. William H. McGowan, Vice President. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. James John Jelinek, Editor of Proceedings. James L. Jarrett, Representative. Helen I. Nicklin, Representative.

1975-76. Dr. Robert W. Burns, President. Dr. John B. Connely, Vice President. Dr. Donald S. Seckinger, Secretary-Treasurer. Dr. James John Jelinek, Editor. Dr. Michael Praetorius, Representative. Dr. Robert J. Rossi, Representative.

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APPENDIX C.

PROGRAM.

TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY.

December 3 to 5, 1976.

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, California.

Friday, December 3.

Registration. 10:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. at Vista Grande (see campus map).

11:30 to 1:00. 1976 Executive Board Meeting and Lunch. Vista Grande.

1:30. Welcome. Robert Kennedy, President, California Polytechnic State University.

1:30 to 2:45. General Session I: Paper and Discussion. "Rationality and Public Education," Jerrold R. Coombs, University of British Columbia.
Session Moderator: Michael Praetorius, Whittier College.

2:45 to 3:15. Coffee Break. Hosted by California Polytechnic State University.

3:15 to 5:00 p.m. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Some Cultural Dilemmas and the American Dream," Donald S. Seckinger, University of Wyoming.

B. "Damned by Definition!" Hugh C. Black, University of California, Davis.

C. "The Unexamined Life Doesn't Stand a Chance," Robert C. Shultz, University of Denver.

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6:30 to 7:30. Cocktail Party. Madonna Inn. Hosted by San Jose State University.

7:30 to 9:30. Banquet and Presidential Address. "Excellence, Equality, and Education," Hobert W. Burns, San Jose State University. Toastmaster: Gerald E. McDonald, Santa Clara University.

Saturday, December 4.

9:00 to 10:00. General Session II: Panel and Discussion.

"Teacher Certification and Program Accreditation."

Panelists: John Connely, California Polytechnic State University. Lester Roth, California State University, Fresno. Donald J. Lou, National Council for the Accreditation of Education. Session Moderator: Nicholas Appleton, Arizona State University.

10:00 to 10:30. Coffee Break. Hosted by California Polytechnic State University.

10:30 to 12:00. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Freedom and Education," James John Jelinek, Arizona State University.

B. "Education for Womanhood: Views of Motherhood," Nel Noddings, Stanford University.

C. "Berkeley's Legacy to American Higher Education," William H. McGowan, California State University, Long Beach.

D. "Alternative Learning and Alternative Assessment: A Bicentennial Issue," Colleen Decker, Pima Community College.

12:15 to 2:30. Luncheon and Business Meeting.

3:00 to 5:00. Concurrent Sessions.

A. "Man, Nature, and Social Management," Samuel Burkhard, Arizona State University.

B. "New Vistas on the Freedom Road," Darold R. Beckman, Whittier College.

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C. "Confluent Education: An Analysis from the Perspective of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy," Steven L. Hackbarth, University of California, Los Angeles.

D. "Issues in Education: Perspectives," Charles Tot, Jr., California State University, Sacramento.

6:00 to 7:00. 1977 Executive Board Meeting.

Sunday, December 5.

9:00 to 10:00. General Session III: Paper.

"The Public School and Its Moral Authority," Freeman Butts, Professor Emeritus, Columbia University, Distinguished Visiting Professor, San Jose State University. Session Moderator: Catherine Fels, California State University, Los Angeles.

10:00 to 10:30. Coffee Break. Hosted by California Polytechnic State University.

10:30 to 11:45. Panel and Open Discussion.

"A Bicentennial Consideration of Education in America: Retrospect and Prospect."

Panelists: Jerrold R. Coombs, University of British Columbia. Freeman Butts, Columbia University. Francis T. Villemain, San Jose State University. Robert Brackenbury, University of Southern California. Session Moderator: Robert Rossi, American Institutes of Research.

11:45 to 12:00. Announcements and Adjournment.

Nominating Committee. John Connely, Chairperson, California Polytechnic State University. Robert Brackenbury, University of Southern California. T. Frank Saunders, University of Arizona.

Program Committee. Robert W. Burns, San Jose State University. John Connely, California Polytechnic State University. Francis T. Villemain, San Jose State University.